THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

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AMERICANS, HAIL!

FRANK offspring of that all-adventuring land,
Where, in the petty fray of Lexington,
Thrice fifty summers down the wondrous Past,
Began no less a duel than of Night
And Morning, that was world-watched eight loud years,
Till Morning triumphed, and the watchers knew
America's soil and soul for ever free:
O if you fight as well upon our side
As once you fought against us, how can then
This cause, which is your own and ours and Man's,
Do aught but conquer? You are come to us
Full of the strong wine of your Western air,
Full of the marrow and the sap of life,
Full of the tingle of youth and maiden valour.
You come as Spring comes to the winter fields
When she has hovered long betwixt 'I will'
And many a coy 'I will not'; for even so
You hovered, halting betwixt 'Yea' and 'Nay'—

Then thundered 'Yea' and hurled your doubts afar.
And not more beautiful upon the mountains
Were ever yet the feet of him that brought
Glad tidings, than your prows upon the sea.

Fresh and untired, you find this host of ours
Worn with the burden and stress of fight and toil:
A host, though but of yesterday's begetting,
Already, in blind, deaf hurricane of battle,
Neither ill tried nor proven an ill match
For foes that in their nursery lisped of arms:
A host proud of your great copartnership,
Proud of their strong new brothers in the sword—
That just, that holy, that benignant sword
Whose purpose and whose goal are peace: a host
Famously captained by such chiefs of war
As well might seem the very topmost reach
Of God's own happy art in making men.

And yet, not to the heroes, fighting there
On strangers' soil—or underneath it laid—
Not to the brave that face yon storms of fire,
Be all the laurel, all the glory and praise!
Here, too, is greatness; here are heads grown grey
In council, not yet dreaming of repose;
Here are the athletes of debate, and here
The brains that are the lamps without whose light
Armies would grope and stumble, and noblest prowess
With a waste splendour dazzle a fruitless field.
Here also, his hot thirst for toil unslaked,
The sinews of his lithe mind unrelaxed,
Is he, our Empire's leader: he who set
The wheels of the machine of victory
Whirring and spinning throughout all this isle,
Till Britain hummed as one great mill of war:
A man, no wraith or shadow; a live man,
Loathed by the spectres and the counterfeits;
A man as human as your Lincoln was,
Not muffled up in formula and phrase,
With palisaded spirit, but giving us
Access and entrance to his hopes and fears,
And in companionship of glorious hazard

Bearing us with him, while he treads a road
Built like a causeway across flaming Hell;
Himself a flame of ardour and resolve,
Beset by all the tempests, but unquenched,
Being used to blasts, and native to the storm,
And thriving on the thunder from his prime.

Ours were the shame, if having such a leader
We proved unworthy at last to be so led,
And lowered the flag of an unshaken will,
And stooped our soul to a stature and a posture
Like theirs who preach a base truck with the foe;
Theirs who desire not to see wickedness
Caught in the noose of its own vile intent,
But hunger for that evil thing, a pact
With evil, nay, a bargain with this pit
That vomiting all putrescence has o'erflowed
On the sweet earth, a treaty with this slime;
Who ask that we betray the spirit of man,
Defraud the world that looked to you and us
As guardians of its inward patrimony,
And co-trustees of its estate of freedom.
From all such grovelling counsellors, and from
The craven mood that in a puissant people
Were the calamity of calamities
And the one desperate ill, a people itself
Must be its own sole saviour. But O friends,
'Twixt whom and us the dark, cold, salt partitions
Avail not now to intercept the heart,
We have an enemy that amid the once
Glad vineyards, orchards, and dear meads of life
Hews at the root of all on earth that flowered!
It flowers no more, for has not he been by?
He found us drowsed and half unsentinelled,
Half unaccoutred and unpanoplied,
Lapt in a human trust of humankind
And dreaming that himself was human too.
Fatal, befooling dream! He spoke indeed
With human organs, gave forth human sounds,
Made human gestures, and his melodists
Had fashioned heretofore high human music,
None fairer and none nobler, and his poets

Had thrilled the world with most perhuman song;
But all his later study and care had been
To rip from his own breast the human heart,
And, having rid him of so vain a thing,
To found upon the hideous ghastly void
The edifice of his thoughts, deeds, and desires;
As if upon a hollow and a want
There could arise aught 'stablisht to endure.
And this, this was not all! For where his heart
Had suffered dread erasure, demons found
Befitting residence and domicile,
And made that cavern in his breast their home.
Yonder they camp, thence do they sally abroad,
And thither from fell foray they return.
These, his foul tenants, these no arms can slay,
Theirs being a monstrous immortality;
But he o'erthrown, their fort and citadel
Were fall'n, and lacking that secure retreat
These Terrors would be terrible no more.
This, then, O friends and mighty aiders, this
Must be your task and ours: to level with earth
That fort, that citadel, that hold itself,
Where all the trooping fiends find harbourage
And trysting-place, and couch and kennel, and whence
In the aghasted eye of the sick day
They make infernal sortie. More than this
No league of Man can compass: less than this
Would, for ourselves or for our woeful heirs,
Be but damnation a brief while deferred,
At best a little putting-off of fate,
At best a little miserable ease,
And then the paying of all the arrears of doom,
Vouched in remorseless audit; then indeed
Ruin and perdition and a world undone.

In that belief, you and ourselves await,
With hope that cannot wholly vanquish fear,
The veiled, unknown, tremendous morrow; we
With our own chiefs of camp and council; you
With yours; and at your head the famed, the trusted,
The hated and revered one: he whose speech
Is hazeless sister unto cloudless thought:

Who, flooding with a bland light all his theme,
Can, when the hour craves gallant archery,
Unquiver none the less a deadly lightning:
A mind 'twixt wariness and boldness poised,
Wide-watching and far-scouting, subtle and sage;
Cool, as a pine at its firm heart is cool,
Though secretly a colleague of the sun,
And living by his fire: a soul erect
Ev'n as the pine itself is; and although
Towering amid the forest of your life
O'er all beside, still of that forest, still
One only of a hundred million trees
Knowing no difference in their right to Summer.

Ah, once, in the dead yesterday that seems
Entombed so deep, haply we did him wrong!
We knew not all: now, now we understand.
We are men, and see the man; large, patient, calm;
Freed from the trammels and the coils that bound
And half obscured him: standing there to-day,
Etched with no vagueness against no blurred sky:
Yonder concerting and controlling all
The instruments in that vast orchestra,
Your nation, whence there rises goldenly
Though sternly, with far surge and tidal swell,
Not without sad and wailful underflow,
But mighty in heave of sound, all dissonance hushed,
That new Heroic Symphony of war;
Heard throughout Earth with a grave thankfulness
By such as love great music; and perhaps
Ev'n on an ear divine not wholly lost,
Not utterly unacceptable to Heaven.

WILLIAM WATSON.

IN THE BALANCE

THE past year has been even more eventful than the preceding ones; it has been full of tremendous and terrible events which have shaken mankind literally from China to Peru. And yet the issue still hangs in the balance; nor is it possible to see any decided inclination of the scales. The cries of certain victory still rise in equal volume from both sides and cancel each other. No man—no statesman or soldier or looker-on—really knows how anything will turn out or what will happen next, and far less does anyone know what the end will be. The elements are too many, too obscure and too uncertain to be measured or calculated; and instead of growing simpler and clearer they become more tangled, confused and undecipherable. If at one moment a fairly clear prospect seems to open out, at the next turn of Fortune's wheel it disappears again from view. From the beginning calculations have been confounded, not invariably, but generally and in the larger issues. Something has always happened to upset them. It is some satisfaction to think that the Germans, who rely most on calculations, have been most often disappointed. If they had not we should have been done for long ago. But we have had plenty of miscalculations on our side, or rather failures for want of calculation; for if the Germans calculate too much we calculate too little and take too many chances. Perhaps failure is less disheartening in the case of a hasty plan or none at all than in that of a well-considered one, but failure is failure and the practical result is the same. So the unexpected happens now on one side and now on the other, the balance oscillates this way and that, and the future remains veiled to our sight.

This should cause neither surprise nor misgiving. There is nothing new in it. War is always like that at the time; it is full of chances and changes, unexpected turns, ups and downs; and the end is always uncertain until it comes. Viewed afterwards in the perspective of history the course of events may be traced and the connexion of cause and effect sufficiently revealed to explain each phase; but even then it is rarely possible to say

that any event was inevitable. Rather it seems that the greatest issues have often turned on small occurrences which might have gone the other way and changed the whole subsequent course of the war. Such phrases as the 'fortunes of war,' the 'God of battles,' and the like, which have passed into common use, imply recognition of an incalculable element in war which overrides all man's efforts and can determine the issue in spite of him. The regular inclusion of God among other assets on the German side is a tacit admission that the most perfect plans of the greatest soldiers in their own estimation that the world has yet seen—to wit the Kaiser and his military chiefs—are subject to a higher influence which might conceivably wreck them, if the German people and particularly His Royal and Imperial Majesty were not, as they happily are, the special objects of Divine favour.

There is no ground for expecting this war to be free from the hazards, the vicissitudes and the uncertainty of war in general; but quite the contrary. For it depends more than others on the people in the mass, and the most inscrutable element is man himself. It has been often and truly said that this is essentially a people's war, and who can gauge the mind, the feeling and the will of the people? Here lies the *crux* of the problem. If one could read the hearts of the people one could foretell the issue, at least in broad outline. It is possible, perhaps, for a good observer of large experience and unbiassed judgment to know his own countrymen well enough to tell how they will act in given circumstances, but he cannot be sure. Much less can he be sure of other countries; he can only guess or go by what he is told, which may be all wrong and even meant to deceive. What do we really know now about popular feeling in the enemy countries? We hear contradictory voices raised there, but they are all more or less inspired by prejudice or passion and we cannot decide between them. The accounts we have had from neutral travellers threw some light on the subject, but they were limited and conflicting, and now they seem to have dried up altogether. We are in the dark about the enemy peoples, and they are still more in the dark about us. The greatest of all the German miscalculations have been those based on what they believe to be the psychology of other nations. They have totally mis-read every nation with which they are at war, one after another; and this has upset their plans over and over again from the beginning. If they had known before what they know now, they would not have started on the venture as they did. They would have postponed it or shuffled the cards better.

The two great events of the past year illustrate with particular force the part played in this war by the popular will, the difficulty

of reading it and the consequent uncertainty of future developments. They are the entry of the United States into the War and the Russian Revolution. These are the greatest events that have occurred since the outbreak of war and they are both expressions of popular will in a peculiar measure. Both are results of the War, yet they came unexpectedly, and who can say what their eventual effects will be? One of them has alone suddenly changed the whole aspect of the War on the military side within the last few weeks. The recent developments of the Russian Revolution rebuke the short-sighted and premature enthusiasm with which it was hailed. No one who knows anything of revolutions or of Russia can have supposed that such an enormous change could pass off as smoothly as it began and be consummated without great turmoil. Six months ago I said in this Review that the grand upheaval had still to come, and in such a welter anything might happen; but I was hopelessly at sea about the probabilities and ruled out the very thing that has happened. Did anyone foresee that the Russian people would allow men—whether lunatics or traitors—to gain the upper hand who would fling Russia's honour and good faith in the mire, sell their country to an alien military despotism and themselves practise a more violent and shameless tyranny than the autocratic rule they succeeded? Did anyone suppose that Russian soldiers and sailors, whose devotion to peace bade them throw down their arms before an invader, would eagerly take up the same weapons to use against their own countrymen? Peace and democracy! Civil war, assassination, pillage, terrorism, anarchy and ruin—these are the fruits of peace and democracy, as interpreted by an ignorant mob, fed by fantastic promises and drunk with crazy delusions. Even our Bolsheviks are sobered by the spectacle and can only say that it is all the fault of the Allied Governments. If their own advice had been taken, they maintain, all would have been well. Would it? Their own advice has always been to adopt the policy of Lenin and Trotzky—stop the War, trust the enemy, peace at any price—and so far as they have any influence at all it has gone to encourage the wreckers in Russia. They accuse the Allies of not supporting Kerensky; but he received consistent support both from the Governments and the Press, so far as it was possible to understand what he wanted. Then everything is put down to the failure of the Stockholm Conference. But that was stopped by the inability of the Socialists to agree among themselves and by the revolt of British seamen and other Labour elements. Either was sufficient in itself to kill the project, and both operated before the question of passports came into play at all.

But, in truth, no outside action could have diverted the course

of the Russian Revolution. The delusion of international proletarianism or the solidarity of Labour had to be put to the test. It had been so deeply instilled into the minds of the working classes, at least in Petrograd and other industrial towns, that they firmly believed that they had only to open their arms and cry *Kamerad!* and the German people would immediately fall upon their necks and all would be peace and joy and brotherhood. They wanted the Allies to do the same, and that is the idea of all the Socialist peacemongers. It was the idea of the Stockholm Conference. There are two flaws in it. The first is that there is no proletarian solidarity. It is a German invention and it has been used for many years by German Socialists to humbug the others for the benefit of Germany. The German Socialists are, in their own eyes, the born leaders of the world in Socialism, as other Germans are in all other spheres of work and thought. It is for them to lead and command, for the rest of the world to follow and obey. I have known this for years, having heard what they really think of their foreign colleagues in Germany. There are some exceptions, of course, genuine men who really hold their creed and try to live up to it; and there are some foreign Socialists whom they respect for their attainments and capacity, but the peacemongers are not among these. They have a particular contempt for the leaders of the Independent Labour Party, whose intellectual capacity they consider puerile and whose views they find unintelligible. They thought Keir Hardie a feeble-minded simpleton and other leaders muddled sentimentalists.

In this arrogant frame of mind they ran the International very much at their will and pleasure, as both French and English Socialists of the more robust order have long complained. I have told the story at length elsewhere and will not repeat it here; but briefly they played the same game at the International as the German diplomatists at the Hague. All the other Socialists were to oppose war in their respective countries, but the Germans were never to be bound by anything but the vaguest declarations, they would agree to no practical steps which would stand in Germany's way. They carried on their double game right up to the eve of hostilities, when they sent a special envoy to Paris to assure the French Socialists that in no circumstances would they vote for the war credit in the Reichstag, in order to induce their French colleagues to refuse support to the French Government. Peaceful penetration again! There is no truth in these people, where German interests are concerned.

And if the professed internationalism of the German Socialists is an empty phrase, much less could any response be expected from the German trade-unions, which make no such profession

but avowedly regard the War and everything else from the standpoint of their own interests.

The second flaw in the idea of international brotherhood is that, even if German Socialists wanted to respond, the issue does not rest with them but with the military dictatorship, which has them in an iron grip. Kerensky, no doubt, saw the folly and futility of the brotherhood delusion and wished to stem it, but it was too strong and carried him away. He reaped where he had sown and met the usual fate of demagogues who arouse passions which they cannot control; he was swept aside to make room for more violent men. The German Government, having angled for this very thing, was ready to take full advantage of it. There is something pathetic in the spectacle of these poor silly dupes, after throwing away their arms, opening the gates and letting down the drawbridge, proceeding to bargain with the mail-clad figure they had invoked and to impose conditions as though they were on equal terms. 'No troops to be transferred from the Eastern to the Western Front and the Baltic islands to be evacuated.' The mail-clad figure deigned no reply until the troops were already *en route;* and then it was easy to agree to no transference 'unless it had already begun.' So might children parley with an ogre.

It has been a great stroke for Germany, and has swung back the balance that was inclining against her; but the end is not yet, and German jubilation may prove as short-sighted as it has often proved before. In testing their peace theories the Bolsheviks have also put the German Government on trial and made them disclose their hand for the world to read. If there is any truth in the accounts that have reached us, the terms are those of a conqueror—annexation of the occupied territory and economic subjection of the rest. This is the real Germany, with whom our peacemongers would negotiate, relying on vague declarations and empty phrases such as the famous 'No annexations and no indemnities.' The world now knows what the offer to enter into peace negotiations made at the end of 1916 and all the subsequent talk really meant. The persistent refusal to specify any terms or give definite answers on particular points is fully explained. Germany means to take all she can compel other nations to give and to give up nothing that she can help. We are back in 1871 and with the military principle even more predominant because untempered by the political sagacity of a Bismarck and the milder instincts of the then Sovereign and Crown Prince. 'Lasting peace' and 'reconciliation'! The German version is peace under an iron heel and reconciliation by surrender. Nations that wish for better terms can only get them by fighting for them.

If there were ever any doubt about the real attitude of the German Government towards peace there can be none now. It is and has always been determined by the military situation. In December 1915 the Imperial Chancellor scornfully repudiated the suggestion that he was ready to enter into peace negotiations, and denied that there was a word of truth in the rumours to that effect. 'No,' he said, 'we shall resolutely carry on the War, which the enemy wanted, in order to complete what Germany's future demands from us.' Germany was then in the high tide of success in the Balkans and through them to the East. Serbia had been conquered and overrun and the main line to Constantinople was in their hands. Russia was at a standstill and short of munitions; our offensive in Flanders had failed. In short, the military situation was highly promising. Twelve months later, almost to the day, the Imperial Chancellor announced in the Reichstag the decision to propose negotiations for peace to the enemy Powers. This remarkable change was based on the ground of German victories and 'the deep moral and religious sense of duty towards the nation and beyond it towards humanity' entertained by the Kaiser. In making the announcement the Chancellor apparently forgot what he had said a year before, and declared that while progressing on their way with firm decision and always ready to defend themselves, they were also 'always ready to stretch out their hand for peace.' The attitude is the reverse of that maintained in 1915. Then he was not ready to stretch out his hand for peace and indignantly denied the rumour that he was. And Germany was resolutely going on with the War, not to defend herself (being, in fact, engaged at the time in a purely aggressive campaign), but to 'complete what her future demanded.'

What had happened meantime? The only victory or success which the Germans could claim was the defeat and invasion of Roumania, and that was not complete. Everywhere else their position was worse. They had failed in the gigantic effort at Verdun and in the naval adventure off Jutland; they were being beaten on the Somme. The British forces were greatly enlarged and properly equipped, the Russians had recovered and had again advanced; the Italians had stopped the Austrian advance and turned it into a retreat; Greece had yielded to the demands of the Allies; Erzeroum and Trebizond had fallen; friction with the United States had become acute; more colonies had gone; the Zeppelins were a fiasco. Taken all round, the situation was rapidly worsening and looking ominous. Germany stood to gain very little and to lose a great deal. This is why the moral and religious sense of duty, which was dormant in December 1915, had woke up in December 1916. For my part I believe the

Kaiser is really oppressed by the sense of responsibility and would fain end it all; but his conscience is in the keeping of his military advisers. They had no use for it in 1915 but a year later circumstances were more favourable to indulgence in the luxury, and indeed called for it. The military situation was reacting on popular opinion in Germany. The utmost skill in dressing up news could not wholly conceal the unfavourable turn of events, and the unending announcement of victories was recoiling on the Government. If the German arms were so invariably successful, Germany's position so sure, and the enemy so hopelessly inferior, why on earth did they not make peace? The theory, persistently instilled into the minds of the German public from the first, and artfully sustained by a garbled version of the diplomatic documents, that the Entente Powers were waging an aggressive war against peaceful Germany, was incompatible with their persistence in an obviously hopeless struggle and suggested that they must surely be ready to abandon an attempt that had failed. So the popular demand for peace, inspired by prolonged and increasing privations, grew louder in Germany and still more in Austria. Besides, the great commercial and financial interests were getting uneasy. Something had to be done, and the way was prepared for the peace offer by a debate in the Reichstag a month earlier, in which the Chancellor expressed Germany's readiness to join a union of nations for the maintenance of peace and 'even to place herself at the head of it.'

The offer was perfectly safe. If the Allies rejected it or nothing came of it, all the blame would be thrown upon them and the cries for peace would be silenced. In that case the unlimited submarine war, which, as we know from the subsequent official admissions, had long been determined on as soon as they were ready for it, would be furnished with an excuse, which was much needed in view of the American attitude. If on the other hand the offer to negotiate were accepted, Germany would at least get a respite, and in the event of peace being arranged could reckon on coming out of the War with substantial advantages derived from the military situation. The sincerity of the offer was very soon put to the test by President Wilson's invitation to the belligerents to state their peace terms, ten days after the German note. His action caused a good deal of excitement here and aroused strong resentment, for it seemed to be backing up the German move. I ventured at the time to suggest in this Review that his object might be to induce the Central Powers, who had professed their desire to discuss terms, to disclose their hand. American interests were being threatened, and he had a perfect right to find out, if he could, what was likely to happen. We know now, from Mr. Gerard's revelations, that the President

must have been much better informed about German character and aims than appeared from his official utterances, and his invitation was intended to give the German Government a last chance. Of course they did not take it; they had no intention of disclosing their terms to anyone. The Chancellor had declined to state them at the private conference of party leaders that preceded his Reichstag announcement. He as good as told them that the terms were not their affair, but would embody the intentions of the Kaiser and the leading Federal Princes.

It is perfectly plain from all this that the German Government has no intention, and never has had any, of adopting a peace policy based on any principle, except that of getting as much and giving as little as possible. The terms will depend on the military situation, and, since that is a variable quantity, they vary with it. Through all the heated controversies about peace which have been raging in Germany during the past year, nothing definite has emerged from any of the successive Chancellors. They have confined themselves with extreme care to vague phrases and general formulas. They have been directly challenged about Belgium but have always evaded the question. The Pope, who expressly demanded of Germany the complete evacuation of Belgium with a guarantee of her full political, military, and economic independence, had no more success than the President in eliciting a definite statement. He was answered by an eloquent silence, which was incompatible with professions of a desire to promote serious negotiations for a 'just and lasting peace.' If Germany seriously wished to enter into negotiations with a view to 'lasting reconciliation' (Dr. Michaelis's expression in the Reichstag two months before), here was the opportunity to begin. Acceptance of the Pope's proposal about Belgium must have drawn a reply from the Entente Powers, and, once begun, the discussion of terms must have continued. It would have altered the whole position. The deliberate refusal of the opportunity could mean nothing but that the German Government had no such wish and no intention to restore the Independence of Belgium.

The treatment of the Pope's offer proved the hollowness of the proceedings in the Reichstag on the 19th of July, when the famous resolution was passed and the formula of 'no annexations' nominally adopted. It has long been recognised in Germany as a comedy staged to silence the growing demand at home for a move towards peace and to throw dust in the eyes of other countries and especially of Russia, where the formula originated. The part played in it by the German Socialists (Majority) has been candidly avowed by prominent members of the party. For instance, Dr. Paul Lensch has explained that the demand of the

Socialist Party, made at the outbreak of War, that it should end without annexations, was merely a statement of doctrine, impossible of fulfilment; and that the adoption of the formula in July 1917 was a conversion, not to Socialist principles, but to Socialist tactics. The question of annexations, he contended, was already automatically disposed of in regard to the frontiers and retained its importance only against England.

> It is against England—against her enormous annexations and her world tyranny—that the peace resolution of the Reichstag is directed with a plain and sharp point. That is the meaning of the sentence 'the freedom of the seas must be secured,' the insertion of which in the Reichstag resolution is no accident. Before the peace formula of 'no annexations' could become the watchword of a majority policy in the Reichstag that formula had to lay aside the pacifist veil in which it was still enveloped on August 4, 1914.[1]

Other prominent Socialists have written in a similar strain about German aims and policy. They advocate the formation, under German auspices and control, of a great Continental economic *bloc*, extending the 'Central Europe' idea by the inclusion of Russia, to set over against British and American interests. This is an obvious proposal for economic war on the German side, and it assumes a state of standing antagonism like the corresponding proposal on this side. As I have shown before, the policy of economic war hereafter tacitly implies the failure to secure real peace as the outcome of the War and postulates the transference of hostilities to the economic field. It abandons in advance the possibility of 'reconciliation' and looks forward to a state of hostility which must again issue in war sooner or later. In short, it assumes an inconclusive peace, of which it would be the natural sequel. It is highly significant that leading German Socialists should be advocating such a policy on their side and proposing to use the new situation in Russia in order to carry it out. Herr Max Cohen has explained in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* that the development of this policy would have been their task at the Stockholm Conference. It shows that they neither believed in nor desired the 'lasting reconciliation' of the Reichstag resolution, but were planning opposition to 'Anglo-Saxondom' and German aggrandisement.

There is undoubtedly a general desire for peace in Germany, but great differences of opinion prevail about the terms. At one extremity is the full pan-German programme of vast annexations and indemnities to match; at the other extremity the policy of the Minority Socialists, which includes the complete restoration and compensation of Belgium, independence and self-government for Serbia and the Polish peoples, Alsace-Lorraine to decide its

[1] *Die Glocke*, July 28, 1917.

own position by popular vote, general disarmament, compulsory arbitration, democratic control of foreign policy, etc. It is only necessary to state these items to see how far apart this policy is from that of the other Socialists, which includes none of them or so wraps them up as to take all meaning out of them. There is indeed bitter strife between them. The Minority have been carrying on a forlorn struggle against their colleagues and trying to win over the rank and file. The greatest assistance they have received has been from the failure of the war strategy and particularly of the U-boat campaign, which was the real cause of the crisis that brought about von Bethmann-Hollweg's fall and led up to the Reichstag resolution. They have received no help from the Peace Socialists here and in other countries, who profess the same aims, but actually support their antagonists by blaming everybody for the War except the German Government and the military party and by ostentatiously holding out hands of friendship to the German War Socialists. It is curious to see how our own Peace Socialists now ignore Liebknecht, Bernstein, Kautsky and other German Socialists who used to be idols, just because they denounce German militarism as responsible for the War and the obstacle to peace, and declare the Reichstag resolution a sham. It is sufficient to cite Bernstein, who discussed the subject in the *Neue Zeit* soon after the Reichstag debate. He pointed out that the Chancellor's demand for a peace which would 'secure Germany's frontiers for all time' are incompatible with 'no annexations,' and contended that there were only two ways of completely satisfying the demand for security: one was to put the enemy out for good and make him incapable of resistance, the other was the winning of democracy and the radical removal of militarism. Peace effected in other ways would be a sham peace.

> As long as the present militarism continues to exist a peace between the nations, containing guarantees of permanence and not consisting in violation of the rights of the peoples, cannot be expected.

This shows the conflict of opinion in Germany. Between the two extremes lie many other shades of opinion inclining to the one or the other. Throughout the year controversy has raged this way and that and the current of popular feeling has flowed in one direction or the other according to the military situation. In the spring confidence in the U-boat campaign was high and the bellicose elements were in the ascendant; but as the months went by and no visible impression was made on 'England,' which was and is the chief object of attack, hopes waned and disillusion set in. Herr Thimme, Librarian of the Upper House of the Prussian Parliament, writing on the Chancellor crisis in the

summer, attributed it to disappointment with the U-boats. 'Our hope of victory,' he said, 'stands or falls with the U-boat war.' Exaggerated hopes had been placed on it, he continued, and the prospect produced by their non-fulfilment had weakened the certainty of a German 'might-peace.' That was what they were looking for. If, he said, the belief of very wide circles of the people in a German 'might-peace' had begun to totter, that was not the Chancellor's fault but was due 'solely to the actual war situation.' Professor Max Weber has written in the same sense. The public expected that the U-boats would 'force England to capitulate,' and the failure produced an 'explosion of wrath.' Hence Von Bethmann-Hollweg's dismissal and the Reichstag resolution. It was a concession to public opinion, which had been turned towards peace by the unfavourable military situation, and by nothing else.

One might go on piling up the evidence for pages, but I will add only two more items. The first is quite recent; it is a Reuter telegram from Amsterdam dated December 14, as follows:

> The *Leipziger Volkszeitung* publishes an article pointing out the total lack of principle in the attitude of certain Scheidemann Socialists in regard to peace. The journal quotes from an article in the *Glocke* by Herr Jansson, one of the heads of the General Commission of Trade Unions, to show how their ideas of peace terms fluctuate with the fortunes of Germany's military situation. The War, says Herr Jansson, 'will be decided by military and not by political means. Four weeks ago it was possible to contemplate making certain concessions to Italy within the limits of Austria-Hungary's offers made in the spring of 1915. Anyone who expected the Dual Monarchy to do so to-day would risk being laughed to scorn. Every military decision changes the situation, even though one may be agreed regarding certain broad questions of principle regarding the conditions of peace. Last summer the so-called Scheidemann peace was a possibility of real politics. Whether it will be so in a year's time no one can say.'

The second is a statement made by Herr Bolz, a member of the Centre Party (which proposed the peace resolution in the Reichstag), a few days afterwards at a meeting of the Party in South Germany. It appeared in the Munich papers. He declared—

> that the war aims resolution did not exclude their obtaining extensions of territory at this point and at that, and, in certain circumstances, did not exclude their also getting a war indemnity; but that what they finally achieved would depend upon the military situation at the conclusion of peace.

The sequence of events and German comments on it present a sufficiently clear picture for our edification. We see a number of political groups urging their several ideas of peace conditions and disputing vehemently with one another, each trying to win support. We see that amorphous entity, the general public, which

is made up of elements more or less associated with the political groups, but is nevertheless distinct and less concerned with theories or principles than with the hard facts of existence. They long for relief and therefore want peace of some kind. They naturally want the most advantageous peace procurable and would infinitely prefer a German 'might-peace.' They can be kept fairly quiet by a sufficiently convincing promise that they will soon get it, if they are good. But as time goes on and promise after promise is falsified they become more sceptical, more difficult to convince, and more restive. Each failure draws them away from the more bellicose political groups, which promise them the universe, and strengthens the position of the more moderate ones. The movement is shown by the conduct of the former, who feel that they are losing ground and redouble their exertions. Thus the Pan-Germans revealed their fears and the turn of public opinion last year when things were going wrong. Count Reventlow, one of the most notorious fire-eaters, even went so far as to threaten the dynasty with the warning 'No victory, no Monarchy.' That was in April last, when the moderate sections were urging the Government to renounce all claims to territorial expansion. For it is the Government, standing outside both the political groups and the general public, and forming a third factor, that holds the decision in its hands. The Government is the Kaiser and his War Council, in which, we are given to understand, the dominating voice is that of the great twin brethren Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

Now this paramount body looks on at the swaying mass of public opinion, aloof but watchful, and keeps its own counsel. The *Massgebende Persönlichkeiten* who compose it have no doubt long ago threshed out the whole question in every possible aspect and are prepared with a policy to suit every event. But the time for a decisive move has not yet come; so they wait and watch, while every expedient, military and political, is tried and tried again. The 'might-peace' is, of course, their ideal; but it tarries long, the future looks darker, and popular agitation rises at intervals to a crisis. Something must be done to allay it, because it extends to the army, and the great danger lies there. Then consultations take place, and no doubt different opinions are put forward and different policies canvassed. Representations from Austria complicate the problem and cannot be altogether ignored. But the war policy always prevails and some spectacle is arranged to satisfy the public. So we had the peace offer at the end of 1916 and the Reichstag resolution last summer, and in Germany the Prussian franchise reform. And there have been sundry side-shows, such as the Stockholm Conference project and the Pope's Note, which help to draw off

attention by providing another subject of discussion and new grounds of hope.

But all these things are stopgaps. What has really kept the German ship on her course, barring a few squalls, has been the revival of hopes by a new stroke of war—the U-boat campaign at the beginning of last year, the Russian collapse and the consequent resumed offensive now. And with the revival of hopes down goes the peace barometer. The connexion was well brought out a few weeks ago by the *Westminster Gazette*, which has, in my humble opinion, often distinguished itself of late by particularly lucid, well-reasoned and cogent articles on the general situation. I will take the liberty of borrowing the illustration. It consists in a comparison of Count Czernin's utterances in October and December last. At the beginning of October he solemnly exhorted the nations to adopt a new attitude towards each other. Europe must be placed on 'a new basis of right, offering a guarantee of permanence,' and the only way to attain it was by complete international disarmament and the adoption of arbitration. No shifting of power among the belligerent States could do it. At the beginning of December he made a speech foreshadowing a most extensive shifting of power to the advantage of the Central Powers. In the Balkans the noble conduct of Turkey and Bulgaria was contrasted with the base intrigues of Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania, and a plain intimation was given that the iniquitous settlement resulting from the Balkan War must be set right for the benefit of Austria's Allies and at the expense of their opponents. Similarly Italy's treachery was being righteously punished by Austrian occupation of fertile regions. Albania was being led in the way it should go by Austrian pressure, which was happily persuading the Albanian people to 'lean on' that disinterested friend. Poland had been freed from Russian oppression and would gain full independence in good time, with a hint that it would be under Austrian suzerainty. Nothing was said about freeing Prussian and Austrian Poles from *their* oppression. As for disarmament and arbitration, they were mentioned but in a very different tone. Instead of being the only way, they had become of minor importance and had assumed a different form, a tentative, hesitating and conditional form. Complete disarmament had changed to the gradual reduction of armaments, coupled with the 'freedom of the seas,' that familiar formula which every German speaker and writer repeats but none attempts to define.[2] Arbitration was to be 'provided with corresponding guarantees,'

[2] Since this was written Dr. Karstedt, of the German Colonial Society, has explained that it consists in the possession by Germany of sea power wrested from England. So now we know.

whatever that may mean; and then the two together, so limited, 'might offer' the Central Powers the guarantees they require. Guarantees for what? Not for enduring peace and the new basis of right, which had been the object in October, but for 'our free and unhampered development.' We know that phrase too. It means that the interests of no other nation must be allowed to stand in the way of any plans the Central Empires choose to make. If that is conceded they will keep the peace. Of course; for there would be nothing to gain by war. You cannot fight people who make abject submission; you can only proceed to suffocate them.

As the *Westminster Gazette* said, it is the old story—When the devil was sick, the devil a saint would be; when the devil was well, the devil a saint was he. The devil is well now, thanks to the Bolsheviks, who have swung the balance over once more. Count Czernin referred to them. 'The only Government which took up our idea was the provisional Government of Russia.' Exactly; and by natural consequence 'We follow with sincere sympathy the efforts of the Russian people to direct its destiny in peaceable paths'—the peaceable paths of civil war, anarchy and terrorism. The sincerity of the sympathy need not be doubted; those peaceable paths have set the Central Powers on their legs again.

This brings me back to the present situation. As I said above the end is not yet, and the next turn may again upset calculations. The present condition of affairs contains within itself the certainty of a strong reaction. The German cause has been too successful in Russia; it has provided an object-lesson for the world, including the Russians, and completed the proofs that the policy of the Germans depends entirely on the military situation, that is to say, on the degree of compulsion they are in a position to exercise. There used to be an instrument of mediaeval torture much used in Germany, if I remember right, and called the Iron Maiden. On being clasped she squeezed the victim to death, cracking his bones one by one. The Bolsheviks have clasped the Iron Maiden and Russia's bones are cracking. But there are other Russians who have no mind to have their bones cracked, and they are rallying against that fate. What success they may have no one seems to know and I cannot even guess. But I am certain of this, that the Russian people have not got rid of their hereditary autocracy in order to exchange it for a German one or for a self-appointed terrorist autocracy under German patronage; and the Germans neither have reduced nor can reduce them to impotence. Of course, the Germans know that and are proceeding with a certain amount of caution; but it is not in their nature to treat an enemy generously or in such a way as to reconcile him to defeat. They never have done it

and they are not likely to do it now; they do not know how to do it. They believe that the Russians will appreciate the blessings of *Kultur* presented on the point of the sword. It is another miscalculation. Even those Russians who are coquetting with the German war-machine have a totally different ideal in view. They look forward to the fraternisation of free democracies, which implies, not their acceptance of German *Kultur*, but its radical transformation. These views are irreconcilable, and when that becomes plain there will be trouble for the Germans on the Russian side again. Moreover the Japanese cannot stand passive and allow Russia to pass under German control. They have already taken a hand in the game at Vladivostock and must throw all their weight into the scale to prevent the triumph of Germany, for even we have not offended more grievously and the score against them will not be forgotten. In short the German path in Russia is beset with snares and a dramatic change may occur any day.

The situation in Russia is reacting also on other countries, both belligerent and neutral. It is even reacting on Sweden according to the London correspondent of the *Dagbladet* (Christiania), from whom a letter appeared in the *Daily Chronicle* of December 15. It concludes:

> In these days, when official Germany proclaims no indemnities, her agents in Scandinavia are making a great pressure on us to persuade us into the Middle Europe scheme. They are kindly inviting Denmark to share the plunder of Russia, for Russia is now to be made a German colony; they promise Denmark that Copenhagen is to be the staple harbour for North Russian export, as Russia is to be completely shut off from the Baltic and reduced to an Oriental land Power. And they extend their plans over Finland, too. She is to join the Germanic economic union as Germany needs her ironfields.
>
> It seems as if the collapse of Russia has at last opened the eyes of Sweden to the danger of Germany, when she is now taking the full command of the Baltic. It has had some influence in establishing the Scandinavian Entente, which was formally concluded when King Gustav was in Christiania.

The collapse of Russia and the consequent partial collapse of Italy are reacting on us too. They have had a sobering and bracing effect, enhanced by the lamentable breakdown at Cambrai, which spoiled a great victory and converted its termination into a heavy reverse. These events have dealt a blow—let us hope a final one—to the boastful over-confidence and childish complacency which have all along been the background of all our weaknesses and have lately been increasing even to such heights of imbecility as the promise of Peace before Christmas. There is talk of depression. If that means the reversal of all this nonsense, the dispersal of ignorance, and the confounding of fools,

then it was just what we most needed. If it means a positive weakening of spirit, then it is the wrong lesson to draw from the swaying of the balance, with which this article began. The true moral that I wish to point is that we should not be moved by the vicissitudes of war, which tip the balance now to one side and now to the other; that we should be neither elated by successes nor depressed by reverses which succeed each other in alternation, but should go steadfastly on through good and ill, with a firm, unfaltering but humble faith that if we do our duty the end will be good though we cannot see it.

Let us have no more ringing of bells followed by 'depression.' The one is the corollary of the other, and alternating moods do not make for mental stability. We may leave that to the enemy. The German war gods are fond of saying that the strongest nerves will win. They mean their own; but the oscillations of popular feeling and of policy, discussed above, indicate nervous instability, which is indeed a marked characteristic of the German temperament, as Lamprecht has pointed out. There has hitherto been no such oscillation here, but a general prevalence of over-confidence since the autumn of 1914. It was based on an inadequate conception of the magnitude of this struggle and was put too high. Consequently I regard the sobering effect of recent events as salutary, and look to it to produce a mood not less calm and steady but more conscious of the realities before us and what they demand. There was a remarkable article in one of the Sunday papers a few weeks ago by a neutral lady who has lived here for some years. She said that she did not like the English but was constrained to pay a tribute to the quality which had struck her most during the War. This was the imperturbable coolness of the English character. It was, she said, amazing and incomprehensible to a foreigner like herself. It is the *sang-froid* for which this nation has been famed for centuries. There is something stronger than strong nerves, and that is to have none at all.

We need it now as never before; for we, too, are being weighed in the balance, and if we are found wanting the sentence will be pronounced and there will be no appeal. Shall we be found wanting? I really do not know. A year ago I wrote an article which I called 'Ordeal by Fire,'[3] meaning thereby the trial of endurance that lay before us. It attracted some attention but was not understood. Such comments as I saw were silly. People picked out an incidental mention of 'flappers' among other signs of frivolity and self-indulgence and found it amusing. The War has never seemed to me a humorous business, though the fighting men are right in getting as much fun as they can out of it; nor

[3] *Nineteenth Century and After*, January 1917.

does the prospect of losing it by folly and vice strike me as very amusing. My argument will perhaps be better understood now, for every word of it has been borne out. I said that the people of this country were approaching the sternest ordeal in their history and would need all their strength and endurance and fortitude to pass the test with honour; but that many had utterly failed to grasp the magnitude of the struggle and the scale of effort and sacrifice demanded by it. I gave evidence of that and some of the reasons for it; and said that what we needed was 'a stern and imperative call.' 'The best have given ready sacrifice; the rest, who have not, will heed no appeals.' And I further pointed out that there would be a particular temptation for the Government to temporise with difficulties and consider sectional interests because there was going to be great trouble about food-prices and profiteering.

I do not recall this in order to say 'I told you so,' but to make people think of the past year, how it has been spent and how it has ended. They realise better now the ordeal of which I wrote, and can see how far short of facing it we have been and how differently the coming trial must be met if we are to get through it. At least I hope they realise this. The English—and I say English, not British, for definite reasons—are a most extraordinary people. You never know what they are capable of until the time comes. They will go on playing the fool up to the last moment, but when they are right up against a sheer necessity they will do more and stand more than any other people whatever. Therefore I am more hopeful than desponding. But we have too many passengers in the boat and very heavy ones. Let there be no mistake about the trial. It will be very great and we shall not pass it by blaming others and visiting our own short-comings on them. We can all see the mote in a brother's eye: every fool can do that, especially when the brother is a Cabinet Minister or a Government official. We need no screwing up in that direction. We have too much of it already. There is a useful and legitimate sort of criticism which Governments need; but incessant nagging, carping, bickering, girding and jeering, bawling for this and screaming for that day after day, is neither useful nor legitimate. It is purely harmful and it will not help us in the coming trial. I suggest that it be damped down and replaced by a little more self-criticism. If people were more concerned about their own duty and their own short-comings they would have less time and less inclination to blame others and we should all get on so much better. This is, I think, a good test of character in dark days and hard times. Those who cry *Nous sommes trahis* at every failure or reverse are no good. People must be prepared to put up with a great deal more than most of them have done

yet, and instead of grumbling and grousing they ought to go down on their knees and thank God for the blessings they enjoy. No other European country, belligerent or neutral, is so well off, and most of them are infinitely worse off.

Of course there is the alternative of a bargained peace, but I do not think much need be said about that. The question stands just where it did, there is nothing new about it. A lasting peace cannot be concluded with a Power which regards peace merely as an interlude between wars. That is the German doctrine and it has never been repudiated. On the contrary influential Germans are already talking of 'the next war.' There is General von Freytag-Loringhoven, a man of high position and weight in the Supreme War Council and a 'moderate' militarist. In his book on the present War he draws candid lessons from German failures and points out what will be necessary for the next war which he takes for granted. Professor Eltzbacher, of Berlin University, has been still more candid and has provided the German Government with an argument justifying the future war which he contemplates, to be waged by submarines against the civil populations of enemy countries. It has acquired, he says, an independent justification by the new international law formulated in Berlin and based on the well-known juristic principle of German interests. This is very significant, for it is the business of German professors to provide the Supreme Command with arguments justifying whatever action it suits them to take. The same argument covers air-raids and throws some light on the proposal for disarmament and other guarantees for peace. Germany will always be able to have fleets of air-craft and submarines of unlimited size, because they will be built and kept *for commercial purposes*, but will be convertible at short notice.

It is futile to talk of treaties with Germany as she is. No other Power believes or can believe in her good faith. It is not merely the violation of Belgian neutrality, as some peace-mongers insincerely argue, that is against her. What has forced one after another into open hostility is the systematic violation of compacts and abuse of confidence, practised in conformity with the 'scrap of paper' principle. The German Government has not only broken a treaty; it has adopted bad faith as an avowed principle of policy and acted up to it in dealing with one Power after another. It was this that at long last left President Wilson no alternative, and made him the most downright and determined of all Germany's antagonists. It was this that turned the South American Republics into enemies. No human being can devise guarantees which could not be evaded, and what we might expect if we had any difficulty with Germany would be a fleet of submarines surrounding our coasts without notice and working on

the principle of *spurlos versenken* or 'dead men tell no tales,' while a fleet of aeroplanes dropped bombs of unheard-of destructiveness on London. If any other Powers or League of Nations ventured to interfere, they would be told 'Hands off! or you will get the same,' and none of them would be ready. Moreover, to shake hands with the unrepentant makers of this War would be to condone all that they have done, and to condone is to legitimatise.

Some German has said 'If we do not lose, we win; if the Entente does not win, it loses.' That is true. If the War-machine State, embodying the rule of Force, emerges undefeated from the conflict, all the other States must be prepared either to meet it with its own weapons or to submit to it. We refused to submit and have had to meet it with its own weapons; so has the United States. Some people call that 'Prussianism,' but they fail to draw the obvious inference that the continued existence of the War-machine would make Prussianism perpetual, because other States could not maintain their independence by any other means. The alternative and the only way to lasting peace is to get rid of the War-machine. That is now generally understood and it is called 'destroying militarism.' What is not clearly understood is that this can be done only by the German people. We cannot do it. Militarism cannot be destroyed so long as it lives in the hearts of the German people; nor is the case in any way altered by using violent language and talking of 'smashing and pulverising' militarism. To get rid of it the German people must themselves give it up. And for that two things are necessary—(1) the conviction that it has failed, (2) the assurance that they have nothing to fear from abandoning it.

It is essential to a clear comprehension of the problem to take account of both conditions and of their relations to each other. Some people see only the first, others are thinking of the second, and great confusion of mind prevails. The controversy about Lord Lansdowne's letter turns upon it. Lord Lansdowne is evidently not quite clear in his own mind, as he has since admitted that the letter did not correctly represent his views. I venture, with all respect, to explain the discrepancy. What Lord Lansdowne had in mind was the second condition; what his critics everywhere were thinking of was the first, which he seemed to abandon. They feel that unless the War-machine or militarism is proved a failure no other steps will have any effect. And they are quite right in putting it first, but they are wrong in ignoring the other. Perhaps I can best explain my meaning by repeating what I wrote nearly three years ago in an article on German Hate.[4] I said that the first thing we had to do, in order to be

[4] 'German Hate: Its Causes and Meaning,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, May 1915.

on better terms with the Germans in the future, was to convince them that they had over-estimated themselves and under-estimated others. I meant convince them on the field of battle. That is to say, we should chasten their military arrogance and destroy their belief in military power. But after that we should have further to convince them that we did not enter on this War treacherously for the deliberate purpose of destroying them. I concluded with these words:

> The two objects before us should be kept carefully distinct and taken in their order. The first is to convince the Germans that they have under-estimated our capacity; the second, that they have over-estimated our rapacity. Any attempt to attain the second before achieving the first would be a fatal blunder; it would be misinterpreted and stultify itself.

I stand by that still, but the situation is totally different. Great progress has been made with the first, and though it has not yet been achieved and must still be steadily pursued, I believe that the other might have received more attention with advantage. Dean Inge is quite mistaken in supposing that the German people are passionately attached to the military machine for its own sake. On the contrary they groan under it and vote for Socialists on account of it. Why they cling to it now so obstinately is that they believe it forms their only salvation from destruction. Remove that belief and their doubts of its surpassing merits and super-excellence would be enormously strengthened. The wall would be sapped from within as well as battered from without. The two are the converse and obverse of the same process. But now that German hopes of victory are again in the ascendant, the moment is inopportune, and that is the mistake that Lord Lansdowne made. His letter was hailed in Germany as a sign of surrender or the case is hopeless. At the same time, a fuller statement of our objects is needed. 'Restoration, reparation, and guarantees' are too general. What restoration, what reparation, and what guarantees? The Labour Party's pronouncement contains some fantastic proposals, but the idea of it is sound. We need something of the kind.

I will conclude with the exhortation Moses gave to Joshua when bidding him lead the people into the Promised Land after forty years of sojourning in the Wilderness—'only be strong and very courageous.' The last step of the journey is hard, but it may not be so long as some suppose. German nerves will not stand another great disappointment, unless I am much mistaken.

A. SHADWELL.

THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR

On the 30th of January 1900, when the people of England were still feeling the depression caused by the three defeats of Magersfontein, Stormberg and Colenso, the Prime Minister (the late Marquis of Salisbury), speaking in the House of Lords, made a remarkable speech.

> If you will look back over the present century [he said—the nineteenth century] you will see there have been four occasions on which the British Government has engaged in war. On each occasion the opening of these wars was not prosperous. These were the Walcheren Expedition, the Peninsular War, the Crimean Expedition, and now the South African War. In all these cases at first—in the case of Walcheren not only at first—there were lamentable losses. . . . We cannot have been so unlucky as to have fought four times and to have lighted upon the most incompetent and worthless ministers that the world has ever produced. It is evident that there is something in your machinery that is wrong. . . . I do not think that the British Constitution as at present worked is a good fighting machine. . . . It is unequalled for producing happiness, prosperity and liberty in time of peace; but now in time of war, when Great Powers with enormous forces are looking at us with no gentle or kindly eye, it becomes us to think whether we must not in some degree modify our arrangements in order to enable ourselves to meet the dangers that at any moment may arise.

I propose to consider the question raised in 1900 by Lord Salisbury as to the fitness of the British system of government for the conduct of war. The inquiry may perhaps throw a reflected light on some other problems with which we are all just now much concerned—those that are expected to need solution after the War.

The earliest form of government is one man, a King; and one of its later developments is also one man, an Emperor. The primitive King does all the work of government himself, being at one time administrator, at another time judge and again at another time director of war. He performs these several functions by throwing himself for the time wholly into that one which at the moment is most urgent. You find Napoleon for part of his day wholly absorbed in the movements of his armies; at another entirely immersed in diplomacy and next morning fully

concentrated upon the business of legislation. Whatever he is doing, all of him is plunged into it.

At an early stage however the King found that his time and attention were more than absorbed by his work and he had to seek the assistance of his servants (called in the Latin of the Middle Ages ministers), chosen presumably each for his skill and knowledge in the branch assigned to him. On special occasions the King would assemble his ministers, the heads of the great branches of State business, and hold a council or committee meeting, at which he would preside and at which important matters transcending any single department would be considered.

In practice every Government consists of such a committee; of which the chairman is a Monarch, a President, or a Prime Minister, and the other members the chief executive officers or heads of the great government offices or departments. The only difference between various systems seems to be that in some cases the whole committee meets to consider every important decision, while in others the chairman usually confers only with the head of the department concerned.

Broadly speaking this form of a chairman and committee is common to all governments, whether monarchical, aristocratic or democratic. These three types are distinguished not by the mode in which the business of government is transacted but by the way in which the chairman of the committee is appointed. As a rule in a monarchy the position belongs to the King and is hereditary; in the United States the President is elected by a popular vote; in Great Britain the system is for the King to appoint the Leader of the Party which has a majority in the House of Commons. Democratic systems give the power of selecting the head of the ministry, the chairman of the governing committee, to the popular vote, either directly or indirectly through an elected chamber.

The efficiency of a Government composed of a set of ministers and a chairman will depend upon several factors, of which the first is the knowledge and skill of each minister in the branch of business carried on by his department; the second a sound distribution of business between the offices; and the third the power of the chairman to secure co-ordination between them.

The question is, What parts in a Government so constituted are indispensable for the conduct of war? In all matters a wise Government will unload from its own shoulders all that can safely be delegated to subordinate or local authorities. It will decentralise wherever possible in order to make its own central action more effectual. Only a Government can declare a war, make an alliance, or conclude a treaty of peace. Only a Government can raise and maintain an army and a navy. Only a Govern-

ment can select and appoint the commanders of its fleets and armies and give them their instructions. These are the three indispensable functions in regard to war, and there are no others. Between them they cover the whole of the preparation for and conduct of a war. What ministers or offices are required for them? The relations with foreign Powers are always conducted through a minister of foreign affairs. Every Government in every country has a minister charged with raising and maintaining an army; and every Maritime Power has also a minister charged with raising and maintaining a navy. These functions of maintenance are performed in peace as in war. They involve large expenditure, and the minister who discharges them usually has the duty of explaining his estimates to the representative chamber. So far there is no doubt or difficulty. But with regard to the third set of functions—the choice and appointment of the commanders of fleets and armies and the issue of instructions to them—there has been and perhaps still is some obscurity. In order to clear it up it may be a good plan to examine the actual business of war. In it the all-important work is that of the Commander of the Fleet or the Army. So well is this understood that in ordinary language a victory is always associated with the General or the Admiral who commanded on the winning side; and his army or fleet is hardly thought of. We talk of Hannibal defeating the Romans at Cannae and of Scipio defeating Hannibal at Zama. The historians speak of Caesar, of Frederick, of Napoleon and Wellington as though the armies they commanded were of comparatively small importance and acquired their powers from the leader. In discussing naval wars we think of Blake and Hawke, of Suffren and of Nelson, and beside these personalities the whole apparatus of the fleets which they handled sinks into insignificance. The usage of everyday speech is a rough expression of the truth, for in reality victory is the work of the commander, whose forces are merely his instrument. He is the artist, and among all the activities of war his is the master-art. But it has little to do with raising and maintaining the army or the navy. During war this cannot be the work of the naval or military commander, who will probably be at the headquarters of the army or on board the flagship. Thus the work of the Minister of War or of Marine, as the provider of the army or the navy, is distinct in character and separated in place from that of the commander of either. The one has to make an army or a navy; the others to handle it against an enemy. Hardly any great commander, except Cromwell, raised his own army.

A Government will hardly enter into a war if it can help it, unless it sees a prospect of success. The end of a war is usually a treaty of peace. If the committee entrusted with the nation's

welfare is considering whether or no it will take part in a war, it must examine the terms of the treaty of peace by which it hopes or expects that the war will be concluded. Evidently if the adversary were willing to accept those terms there would be no war. The necessity for a war arises from the fact that the adversary's will is contrary to our own; he wants a treaty which we are quite unable to accept. How then is he to be persuaded to agree to our terms? By force. We must beat his army and his navy, and put him into such a position that he can no longer resist our forces; he then will have the prospect—if he still rejects our terms—of the destruction of his forces, the occupation of his territory and possibly the overthrow of his whole system. To prevent that he will accept terms which, while he thought he was stronger than we, he regarded as out of the question. Accordingly before we (the members of the committee) decide to appeal to force, we shall do well to ask ourselves what kind of blow would bring our adversary to his knees; and whether, with the forces we have or can produce, we are justified in expecting to strike such a blow.

The committee, then, when considering a possible declaration of war will wish to hear certain of its members. The Foreign Secretary will explain what the foreign Government, whose action has caused us to meet, is preparing to do and why we cannot agree to this and must resist it. Next, the two Ministers of War and Marine, who keep up our naval and military forces, will set before us tables of our fleets and armies and of those of the prospective enemy, and will explain what further forces we and the enemy can expect to raise. But that is not enough. We want to know what probability there is that, with such forces as we have or can raise in time, we shall be able to beat the enemy's forces and so obtain the treaty we should like. This is evidently a question of supreme moment to which we need a trustworthy answer. We must therefore have among us some man who knows all about war, whose business in life is to understand the use of force. He who can answer this question will be the type of man upon whose judgment we should rely for planning our action in case we decide to go to war, and for supervising the execution of those plans if that becomes necessary.

It might be thought enough for the committee to consult a man of this type at the moment when they are contemplating a war or are confronted with the necessity of resisting an attack. But the possibility of a dispute with another nation is contained in almost every decision taken by a Government in regard to its external action, and the time to consider the possibilities of conflict is the time when the possibility of conflict arises—i.e. when a new step is taken in the relations with other Powers. A

thinker-out of wars is therefore always required in order to explain to the members of the Government, at every stage of their external action, what that action would involve if it had to be translated into terms of force.

The most important member of the whole Government in relation to war is the designer of victory, the exponent of the General's art, of which success in war is the object. In many Governments no such office is found among the ministers because the task is reserved for himself by the head of the Government, the King or Emperor. Of some Governments a Commander-in-Chief is a member, and in the United States the command of the forces is by the Constitution vested in the President.

Some representative of the art of war is always necessary, for every question of policy is in the last resort one of force, and the key, both to the avoidance of war and to success in it when it becomes inevitable, lies in the due co-ordination of policy and strategy. The mode in which that co-ordination must be sought is a conference between the Chairman of the Committee, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Strategist, on each occasion when any new departure is taken in external policy. At such a conference the Foreign Minister would explain the course he had to propose, the Strategist would then say what it might involve in case of conflict.

Suppose the action contemplated involved a conflict with another Power, a prudent chairman or committee, on being convinced that it was right and just, would, if it implied for its success an addition to the forces, insist on that addition being made as a condition of the adoption of the policy.

Throughout the course of a war the strategist is required by the Government; for once the appeal has been made to force, by force the issue is decided. Yet nothing is so common in war as for persons of great influence to urge a Government to scatter its forces for purposes not directly conducive to victory though thought in themselves desirable. Especially is this the case when the possession of particular places seems advantageous or likely to influence opinion at home or abroad. Few but trained strategists understand that in war everything can be had by victory but nothing without it; and that victory requires the concentration of all possible forces to strike a blow at some one point in order to destroy the enemy's fleet or his army. There seems to be no limit to the errors in the direction of fleets and armies that can be committed by Governments in the deliberations of which the voice of strategy is silent, divided or overruled.

The strategist is even more essential to a Government than the minister who maintains the naval or military forces, for that minister must base his arrangements on the requirements of the

fighting, of which the strategist alone can judge. The minister's presence in the governing committee is needed mainly in order that his financial proposals may be presented to the representative chamber with all the authority of Government.

In the case of a maritime State and especially of an insular Power there must of course be two strategists: one for the navy and one for the army, for the mastery of both sea and land warfare is rarely combined by one man. If the two men are really masters of their work they will not disagree, for the main principles of the art are the same, whatever the element in which they are applied.

The voice which is to be heard by a Government in council on the question of peace or war must carry the weight of a master of his craft. He who can see in advance the features of a coming war and can design operations giving promise of success will be the proper person to direct those operations. Upon him therefore the Government will be wise to rely for the distribution of its forces in the several theatres of war, for the choice of their leaders and for the instructions to be given them. To him therefore should be given authority in peace to regulate the training of the forces, especially of the admirals or generals who will lead them, and to watch over the discipline which it is the purpose of military education to produce. He should be the organ through which the army or navy, supplied as regards men and equipment by the Minister of War, is controlled in its action by the Government. Custom gives the name Minister of War to the member of the Government who supplies an army with men, weapons and stores. It gives to the minister who controls the army's action the title of Commander-in-Chief. The essence of his office is that in controlling the action of the army he acts with the authority of the Government. It is vital to the success of the Government that he should have the mastery of the form of action with which he deals and should be completely obeyed by his subordinates.

It has been said that government started as Kingship. There seems in the history of most nations to be a time when kingship breaks down, either because the king fails to obtain victory in war—his chief business, the purpose for which men needed a king—or because he mistakes his kingdom and people for a private property which is to serve his pleasure or to carry out purposes which his people do not share. That is resented and a change takes place. The truth is then proclaimed that a king is the servant or minister of his people, and the idea dawns that the population of the country is a community with a common life and a common welfare. The State is held to be not the king's possession but a Commonwealth; and government is regarded as the

management of the nation's affairs carried on in trust for the whole people.

The British Government of modern times is the result of the assertion of this view. Little by little during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the power of the kingship was put into commission, and entrusted to a committee called the Cabinet, which reached its full development during the reign of Queen Victoria. It is worth while examining the system as it was worked during the half-century previous to the War now going on. Its essential part was authoritatively described in 1889 by Mr. (now Viscount) Morley in his *Life of Walpole*. The Cabinet is a committee of which the members are chosen by the Prime Minister, who assigns to each of them the headship of one of the great offices or departments of Government. Each minister so long as he has the Prime Minister's support has full authority over his own department; whenever the matter to be decided is of great importance he confers with the Prime Minister, who, if need be, consults the Cabinet. If the minister is overruled by the Prime Minister or by the Cabinet, he is expected to resign. Thus the several ministers are the organs of the Cabinet for managing the various departments of Government, and the Prime Minister secures the co-ordination of the work of them all.

The Cabinet is responsible to the House of Commons; that is to say, a vote of censure of the House of Commons upon any action of Government in any department leads to the resignation of the whole Cabinet. There is no other responsibility. There is no such thing in practice as the responsibility of an individual minister to Parliament. If he is censured the whole Government falls, and so long as the Government does not offend the House of Commons no single minister can be upset except by his colleagues. The first mark of the Cabinet, says Lord Morley, is collective, united and indivisible responsibility.

This was, in form, at any rate, an admirable machine for the work of government. For each great branch of business it had a special organ—a minister, one of its own body, the head of a great office with a large staff. It had a co-ordinating organ—the Prime Minister. So long as it had the confidence of the House of Commons, it had the full and absolute authority required.

For the management of a war it seemed satisfactory. There was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to watch the world and to give warning of coming danger; there were the Secretary of State for War to raise and maintain the Army; the First Lord of the Admiralty to raise and maintain the Navy, and the Prime Minister to take care that they worked in harmony. Under the Secretary of State for War was a Commander-in-Chief of the Army, with his several great assistants—Quartermaster-General,

Adjutant-General and the rest, and by his side a colleague, the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, charged with the supply of munitions.

But the effectiveness of a form of government depends (as Lord Salisbury in the speech which I quoted at the outset plainly hinted) upon the manner in which it is worked. The machinery of 1870-1888 produced results so unsatisfactory that long before it was subjected to the strain of war it had to be reconstructed.

The cause of the failure lay in the choice of the persons upon whom the working of the system depended, the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief.

The system had in form one defect. The Commander-in-Chief was not a member of the Cabinet or Governing Committee. He could of course be consulted by the Secretary of State for War as regards the proper use of the Army in case of action; he would certainly not be present at the meetings when questions of policy were discussed, so that he would have no opportunity for pointing out at the inception of a new policy what that new policy might involve by way of preparation for possible conflict. The Secretary of State for War had the duty of raising and maintaining the Army and supplying it with all necessaries; and along with it what was thought perhaps the still more important duty of presenting the army accounts to Parliament and there defending them. He was the link between the Cabinet, the Treasury and the House of Commons; he was also the only link between the Cabinet and the Commander-in-Chief.

Under this system fit preparation for a war and right conduct of the operations could be secured only if the Secretary of State were himself a master of war; or if, not having that qualification, he made himself in all that regarded war the mouthpiece of the Commander-in-Chief. This would have involved of course a Commander-in-Chief chosen for his mastery of war.

The practice of the Constitution did not lead to the selection of a Cabinet Minister for mastery of the art or business carried on by the office over which he was to preside. The Cabinet had grown up as the instrument for obtaining possession of the supreme executive power by one party in the State. Its one and indivisible unity was necessary to enable it to present a single front either to the King or to Parliament. Accordingly the sole criterion for the choice of a minister was fidelity to the party, coupled of course with the qualities or advantages that make a man useful to his party, oratorical power, the popularity which it brings, and the influence of wealth or of a title.

Membership of a party is at the best a matter of opinion, a very different thing from knowledge. A man's opinion is his view in regard to a subject on which there is no means of determining

the truth, for in matters of opinion two men, both of them well-educated and each of them of good sense and ability and honour, may hold opposite views. That is certainly not the case in regard to some of the most important things in life. The use of force, for instance, is subject to the laws of dynamics, and as to what they are a difference of opinion does not exist among those who are acquainted with the science. As regards the policy of a foreign State a difference of opinion between two observers would show merely that one at least of the two had not observed with accuracy.

The Secretaries of State for War and First Lords of the Admiralty, chosen as devotees of their party, knew nothing of war and therefore could not devote themselves to preparation for it, so that both Services ceased to be organised or trained for the one function for which they exist.

The Commander-in-Chief was not a master of war. He was a royal Prince appointed on no ground of military qualification. The cause of his selection is to be found in Sir Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*. In 1850 the Duke of Wellington expressed his wish that he should be succeeded as Commander-in-Chief by the Prince Consort. He thought that with the daily growth of the democratic power the Government grew weaker and weaker, and that it was of the utmost importance to the stability of the Throne and Constitution that the command of the Army should remain in the hands of the Sovereign, and not fall into those of the House of Commons. The Prince Consort declined the position and the Duke of Wellington was succeeded by a competent soldier—Lord Hardinge. On Lord Hardinge's death, however, in 1856 the Duke of Wellington's theory prevailed, though instead of the Prince Consort, another Prince—the Duke of Cambridge—the Queen's cousin, was appointed Commander-in-Chief.[1] The motive of the selection was not any supposed fitness of the person appointed to win victories in case of war, but a relationship to the Queen which seemed to guarantee that, in case of attempted revolution, the Army would be used in defence of the Throne and not in obedience to the wishes of the House of Commons.

The weakness of the machinery was not due to the influence of the representative system. On the contrary, the efforts at improvement were caused by that public opinion or national will to which the representative system aims at giving effect. The Crimean War had revealed the lack of any effective arrangements for war, and the historian Kinglake, in his seventh volume, published in 1880, described the symptoms and their cause. He

[1] *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. ii. p. 255; vol. iii. p. 501.

answered Lord Salisbury's subsequent question as to the cause of failure in the Walcheren Expedition.

> The three more immediate causes [he wrote] which thus brought grave misfortune to England were:
> (1) Her want of apt knowledge.
> (2) Her choice of an inefficient commander.
> (3) Her want of power to keep a momentous war secret.

These were the symptoms. The malady lay in divided authority. The Crown had still clung to its direct authority over the Army, while in regard to the Navy and all other national business its authority was exercised through and by the Cabinet. The inquiries that followed the Crimean War had led to the establishment of the machinery existing between 1870 and 1888 already described, as well as to many improvements within the Army, especially the reforms of Lord Cardwell, entirely due to the pressure of public opinion.

At the close of this period began the attempt to put life and vigour into the machine which had ceased to do its work. The impulse came not from the Cabinet but from the people—a sure sign that the leadership had failed. The remarkable achievements of the Prussian Army in 1866 and 1870 had been perceived and the demand was made that the Government should bring the Army and the Navy to a condition of efficiency. As a result of this popular observation, and of various breakdowns during the expeditions to Egypt and the Soudan, changes were made in the Army system, all of which I pass over, except those which concern the machinery of Government for the general management of the Services and for the preparation and conduct of war.

The first results of the popular demand or agitation for improvement were two Royal Commissions, known by the names of their chairmen, as that of Sir James Stephen and that of the Marquis of Hartington.

Sir James Stephen's Commission made criticisms and sound proposals. The criticisms were to the effect that the Secretary of State could not possibly do his work because he did not understand his business—war; and that the minister charged with supply, the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, was in a similar position. The system, moreover, had no definite object. The proposals were that a Commission of competent persons ought to be formed to lay down a standard of what was necessary; and that a competent head of the supply services, a soldier of the highest eminence, should be appointed. This report was treated as waste-paper.

The Hartington Commission concerned itself in the first place with repudiating the idea of the Duke of Wellington that the Sovereign should exercise some direct control over the Army.

The Commission laid down that the authority of the Sovereign over the Army could be exercised only in the same way as any other power of the Crown, through a responsible minister. The leading idea was, therefore, to strengthen the position of the Secretary of State for War. The first principle laid down was 'the recognition of the responsibility to Parliament which rests on the Secretary of State.' The account which I have given of the Cabinet will, I trust, have satisfied my readers that the responsibility of any single minister to Parliament is a myth. What the Commission aimed at was to assert the authority of the Cabinet over the Army. This was quite right, because no army and no branch of Government can be effectively controlled or can be made efficient so long as there is a doubt as to who is its master. In the early years of Queen Victoria's reign the Duke of Wellington had thought that there might be a quarrel between the Queen and the Government; he had tried to secure that the Army should be on the Queen's side. But after she had reigned fifty years the possibility of such a division had ceased to be worth thinking of. The power of the Sovereign was exercised without question through the Cabinet. The position of the Commander-in-Chief had become a false one on account of the wrong principle which had governed the appointment made in 1856. The obvious remedy was to make a new appointment and to choose a General for his mastery of war. But the Hartington Commission was not thinking of war; the only reference to war in its report was to point out that, when the country was at war, the practice was to appoint a Commander-in-Chief in the field, and to ignore the nominal Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In other words, the Commander-in-Chief devoid of generalship was well understood to be a mere figure-head. But instead of proposing to make the office a reality the Hartington Commission proposed to abolish it; and the report alleged as the reason for wishing to do so that the Commander-in-Chief was, on military matters, the sole adviser of the Secretary of State—in other words, that he held the precise position which alone in case of war would give a prospect of success, assuming that the holder of the office was competent to perform its duties.

In 1895 the Duke of Cambridge resigned the office of Commander-in-Chief; thereupon the Government of the day appointed Lord Wolseley to succeed him; but in making the appointment the Government changed the nature of the office. All the principal assistants of the Commander-in-Chief—the Quartermaster-General, the Adjutant-General, the Directors of Fortifications, and of Artillery—were withdrawn from his authority and made the direct subordinates of the Secretary of State. In this way, at the moment when the Government had chosen a qualified General

to be Commander-in-Chief, and when they gave him that title, they at the same time transferred the powers which that name denotes from the officer so called to the Secretary of State for War, who was not a soldier at all. This change was defended by Mr. Balfour, basing his view upon the Report of the Hartington Commission.

> If the Secretary of State [said Mr. Balfour] is to take official advice from the Commander-in-Chief alone, it is absolutely impossible that he should be really responsible; in this House he will be no more than the mouthpiece of the Commander-in-Chief.

But, as we have seen, the responsibility of any single Cabinet Minister is a mere fiction. And it is difficult to see how a Secretary of State for War—not himself acquainted with that difficult business, and also completely sane—could wish to be anything else than the mouthpiece of a soldier the master of his trade. Nothing could more conclusively prove that in 1895 the Cabinet and the House of Commons did not regard war as a serious matter with a view to which the arrangements made in time of peace ought to be framed.

If it were true that the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief were duplicates of one another, no doubt one of them should have been abolished, but the solution proper for war was to establish the true distinction between them as concerned the one with supply and the other with command, and to make the Commander-in-Chief a member of the Cabinet.

Be that as it may, the results of the system adopted were unfortunate, for in 1899, when the South African War was impending, the Secretary of State and the Cabinet failed to listen to the sound advice of the Commander-in-Chief, with disastrous consequences. When the war was over Lord Wolseley was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief by Lord Roberts, with the same restrictions on his scope as had been imposed upon Lord Wolseley. The system gave satisfaction neither to the Cabinet nor to Lord Roberts, and in 1904 a fresh change was made.

The office of Commander-in-Chief was abolished and its authority and functions were transferred to the Secretary of State. The various high officers at the War Office who had been the assistants of the Commander-in-Chief became the assistants of the Secretary of State, the political officer unacquainted with war. They were at the same time formed into a council (the Army Council), of which the Secretary of State was chairman, with one of the officers, called the First Military Member of Council, as his deputy. The Order in Council authorised the Secretary of State to reserve for his own decision any matter which he thought fit—in other words, to overrule any or all of the military members of his council. The opportunity of the change was utilised to make

an improvement in the arrangements of the War Office. The business of the design of operations and all that belongs to it, as well as of military education, was concentrated in the hands of the First Military Member of the Council, entitled Chief of the General Staff of the Army. At the same time was created the post of Inspector-General of the Forces, with the duty of reporting to the Army Council on the condition of the troops, their training and fitness for war. The Inspector-General had no authority over the Generals commanding the troops or over the Chief of the General Staff.

The essential point in these changes was the constitution of a General Staff and the establishment of its Chief in a position of primacy among the military officers who formed the Army Council. This was a reconstitution of an organ which every army requires; every commander divides up the multifarious business which he has to transact into a number of departments, each of which is managed for him by an officer who has his confidence. The most important of them is that in which his orders for the movement of his troops are drafted, and in which also the reports he receives about the enemy are collected and sorted by a Scout-master. The head of the whole department used to be called in the eighteenth century the Quartermaster-General. He was the confidential assistant of the commander in his work of generalship—in the use of his army as a weapon for striking blows against the enemy. The other departments were the commander's agencies for the maintenance of discipline, for the distribution of the supplies received from home or collected in the country, and for the rest of the many cares which beset a commander in his work of moving a mass of men as large as the population of a great city from one end of a foreign country to the other. No commander can dispense with a Quartermaster-General and a Scout-master; and those who hold these posts must be thoroughly instructed in all that concerns the possibilities of the enemy's action—the nature of the country through which the army moves, the methods by which the various parts of an army can most advantageously march, encamp, and fight. In a word, they must be adepts at generalship. Accordingly the constitution of a General Staff combining these functions was bound to give a fresh stimulus to the military thought of the Army, to set a number of officers thinking about the reality of war and to give them the impulse to bring its training and organisation into line with its mission, which is, after all, to fight. So important is the work of a Chief of the General Staff that his office has been called in the eighteenth century the soul, and in the nineteenth the brain, of an army.[2] But these metaphors are not to be taken too literally.

[2] See the author's essay entitled *The Brain of an Army*, pp. 192-198.

The Chief of the Staff is the commander's principal private secretary, and the commander who has to rely on him for his thought and for his inspiration is hardly the man for his post. In any case a brain without a will does not make a satisfactory man, for it is the will that is the real man, and it is the commander who is the soul of an army. His function is to see the war as a whole with his mind's eye, to grasp all the theatres of war in one comprehensive view and to embrace in his vision the whole of the operations from the first breach of the peace to the treaty which is to restore peace. To realise this vision, to make actual the potentialities which he divines, is the commander's calling. It involves not only knowledge but authority, and a commander must unite both in his own person.

The Government which in 1904 reconstructed the War Office made two mistakes: in forming a General Staff it forgot that a General Staff is an organ for a particular purpose—operations; and that, if an organ is to perform its function well, it must have no other. By making the Chief of the General Staff the First Military Member of the Army Council, the Government threw upon him the responsibility of supervising the work of his colleagues, the heads of the other military departments. It thus saddled him with the cares of administration, and thereby prevented him from devoting his whole time and attention to the pure generalship which is his special business. Accordingly it obliged him to depute his own work to a subordinate—the Director of Operations. Moreover, it cut the directorate of operations into two parts—one for operations in the United Kingdom, and another for operations abroad. Thus the art of generalship was not in reality given that first place in the whole system which properly belongs to it.

But a far greater mistake was the abolition of the Commander-in-Chief, and the consequent divorce between knowledge and power. All power was given to the Secretary of State, who so long as he was a political personage could have no knowledge of war, and all the knowledge of war was left to the General Staff, which had no authority of its own.

In 1914 the outbreak of war with Germany illuminated the situation like a flash of lightning, and the first act of the Government was to abandon the civilian Minister of War and give the office of Secretary of State for War to Lord Kitchener, who thereby became, in fact though not in name, Commander-in-Chief. The members of the Government thus showed an appreciation of the needs of war, by making the soldier upon whom they relied for the conduct of the War a member of the Cabinet; so that he could himself direct the whole of the military operations with the entire authority of the supreme executive.

Every man has the defects of his qualities; Lord Kitchener's commanding talents were accompanied by an inability to appreciate the division of labour. He took the whole work into his own hands, not only that of command or general direction but also that of supply, and instead of relying upon the heads of departments—the Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant-General, and the rest of them—he attempted to go into every matter himself and settle it without the aid of the department that existed to deal with it. Where before there had been a Staff without a Commander there was now a Commander without a Staff. The Report of the Dardanelles Commission proves Lord Kitchener to have been unaware that the problem of an attempt to force the Straits had been studied by the General Staff, and the conclusion reached and recorded that the operation was hardly practicable. Moreover, Lord Kitchener's almost lifelong absence from England had left him no opportunity of making himself acquainted with the modern conditions of the Army. I am assured that when he undertook to raise a New Army he did not know the character of the Territorial Force, and thereby failed to make the most of its excellent organisation for recruiting and other purposes.

That brought with it an unfortunate consequence. The War had not been going on many months before there were fighting side by side troops and officers of three categories: the original Regulars, who were serving before the War; the Volunteers or Territorials; and the so-called New Regulars. The French Revolutionary Army of 1793 had had all these categories. The French amalgamated them and abolished all distinctions between them; and in that way formed the wonderful homogeneous army with which Napoleon conquered the greater part of Europe. This amalgamation brought with it, as nothing else could have done, *la carrière ouverte aux talents*; and the rise of that galaxy of Generals which surrounded Napoleon. In our own case we know that since the War began all the best minds of the country, all the best spirits, have become officers of the Army. Those who joined in 1914 have by this time had an experience, especially of the actual fighting, which surpasses that of the oldest veterans before 1914. Yet I am told that it is still regarded as an advantage in selection and promotion that a man should have been before the War a professional officer. The only advantage that ought to exist is superior knowledge of the work to be done and greater skill and devotion in its performance. If and when an officer who was formerly professional has acquired these advantages, the Army ought to have the benefit of them. But where all alike are offering their lives for their country, no other consideration ought to exist than the fitness of the man for the work

he is to do. I am sure that those officers to whom the search for victory is the ruling motive entirely agree with me in the view that it must not be regarded as the monopoly of a caste. Nothing is worse for a national army than professional trade-unionism, the real militarism.

Lord Kitchener's brave effort to do too much had one good result. It led to the formation of the Ministry of Munitions, a first recognition of the wisdom of distinguishing between supply and command.

When the country was startled and shocked by the loss of Lord Kitchener, the Government fell back upon the machinery of the Army Council and the Chief of the General Staff, which had been at work from 1904 to 1914, with the sound addition, made by an Order in Council of January 1916, that the orders of the Government to the commanders in the field should emanate from the Chief of the General Staff.

The most recent change of ministries brought with it a further modification. A Secretary of State for War was appointed without becoming a member of the supreme executive—the War Cabinet—and apparently from that time on the Chief of the General Staff has communicated directly with the Cabinet.

I cannot help thinking that the completion of the development would be reached if the Chief of the General Staff became, under whatever title, a member of the supreme executive committee. The General Staff would then in all probability become an independent office for military direction or command, while the maintenance and supply of the Army would become the work of a minister of military administration and supply, with which the Ministry of Munitions would be closely associated. In that way the two functions—command and supply—would each have the place indicated by experience and the theory of war.

I have made no mention of the Cabinet Committee of Imperial Defence, of which from time to time much has been heard and said. It is probably an excellent institution for keeping the representatives of the Dominions in touch with the ideas of the Imperial Government and for enabling them to explain their own ideas. But I am too much a disciple of those whom I may venture to call the Old Masters to put faith in mixed bodies of this kind for the direction of operations.

The opinions on this subject of the two greatest of strategical critics were clear and strong. Nothing is so bad, in the judgment of Jomini, as a council of war either at the headquarters of an army or at the seat of a Government. The only function that can be assigned to such a body is that of adopting the bases of a plan of campaign. This is in any case a necessity, for every

Government must consider the outlines of its plan of campaign. But even here a certain unity of military judgment is required.

On this subject the most weighty judgment ever expressed is that of the author of the classical treatise *On War*, who writes:

> None of the main plans which are necessary for a war can be made without insight into the political relations; and people say something quite different from what they really mean when they talk of the harmful influence of policy on the conduct of a war. It is not the influence but the policy which they should blame. If the policy is sound—that is, if it hits the mark—it can affect the war only in its own sense, and only advantageously; and where this influence diverts the war from its purpose the source must be sought in a mistaken policy. . . . To ensure that a war shall answer fully to the intentions of policy, and that the policy shall be suited to the means available for the war, there is, where soldier and statesman are not one and the same person, only one good means—namely, to make the Commander-in-Chief a member of the Cabinet, so that at the critical moments he may take part in its deliberations and decisions. . . . Extremely dangerous is the influence in a Cabinet of any military officer other than the Commander-in-Chief. It can seldom lead to vigorous commonsense action.[1]

Not less instructive are the words of Marlborough, which I quote from his letter of the 2nd of August 1705:

> *To the Pensioner of Holland*
>
> Meldert, 2nd August, 1705.
>
> Sir.
>
> I am very uneasy in my own mind to see how everything here is like to go, notwithstanding the superiority and goodness of our troops, which ought to make us not doubt of success. However, it is certain, that if affairs continue on the same footing they now are, it will be impossible to attempt anything considerable with advantage, since councils of war must be called on every occasion, which entirely destroys the secrecy and dispatch upon which all great undertakings depend; and has unavoidably another very unhappy effect, for the private animosities between so many persons as have to be assembled being so great, and their inclinations and interests so different, as always to make one party oppose what the other advises, they consequently never agree.
>
> I do not say this because I have the honour of being at the head of the army, but it is absolutely necessary that such power be lodged with the general as may enable him to act as he thinks proper, according to the best of his judgment, without being obliged ever to communicate what he intends further than he thinks convenient. The success of the last campaign, with the blessing of God, was owing to that power which I wish you would now give, for the good of the public, and that of the States in particular. And if you think anybody can execute it better than myself, I shall be willing to stay in any of the towns here, having a very good pretext, for I am really sick.
>
> I know this is a very nice point, but it is of the last importance, for without it no general can act offensively or to advantage, or discharge with honour the trust that to the world seems to be reposed in him.

A review of the arrangements for the direction of the Navy in war can be compressed into a very few words. During the

[1] Clausewitz, *Von Kriege*, Book VIII. ch. vi. B.

last great war, in the epoch of Nelson and Napoleon, the action of the Navy was directed by a Board which represented the Lord High Admiral in Commission. Another Board was entrusted with the duty of supplying the ships and stores which formed the material portion of the Fleet. But before the beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria, these two bodies were amalgamated into one, which combined the functions of command and supply. The Chairman of this Board of Admiralty was the First Lord, the Cabinet Minister, a political personage unacquainted with war. Its other members were four Sea Lords, one or more Civil Lords and a Secretary. The political chief, the First Lord, had power, with the concurrence of one other member of the Board, to act in the name of the whole committee. In 1895 I ventured to criticise this arrangement by pointing out that it failed to provide the Navy with a Commander-in-Chief for war, and suggested that the First Sea Lord should be made Commander-in-Chief and be given authority in peace and war to issue all orders for the distribution and movement of ships and fleets; that his should be the office in which should be prepared all orders to the Admirals commanding squadrons or fleets, and that he should be selected on the sole ground of his strategical and tactical qualifications for this duty. These criticisms and this proposal were supported, for a few weeks only, by the Navy League, with the net result that the First Sea Lord was formally recognised by the Government as its naval strategical adviser. But there was no consistent attempt to select a First Sea Lord on the ground of mastery of naval operations, and no attempt whatever to relieve him of the many administrative duties to which it was impossible he could properly attend if he really devoted himself to strategical problems and to the study of the operations of a future naval war. Mr. Churchill, indeed, on becoming First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, created at the Admiralty an office akin to that of the Chief of a General Staff of an army, but the head of this office was not made a member of the Admiralty Board, and occupied a comparatively subordinate position.

During the course of the War there has been some slight development. The Chief of the Admiralty Staff has been brought into closer relation with the First Sea Lord, whose function as strategical director of the Navy has been emphasised, though he still seems to be more deeply immersed in general administrative business than is consistent with complete concentration on the business of a strategical direction, which ought always, in my judgment, to be inseparable from his position. Authority without strategical insight must be expected to fail in war; for without the judgment produced by a life's study of the operations of war, no man can hope to solve happily the problems which war pre-

sents. But no insight will avail unless it is coupled with authority. A strategist who has not the power to have his solution carried out and put into execution is not a commander.

The words of the late Captain Mahan, written nearly thirty years ago, cannot be too often recalled:

> While a Government is responsible for its choice of the chief naval commander, it must depend upon him for the enforcement of discipline and for the choice of measures at once practicable and adequate to compass the ends of the war. Upon him more than upon any other must fall the responsibility of failure; for he knows or should know better than the Government, what the Fleet can be made to do, what the state of discipline really is, and what his own capacity to carry out the one and support the other. Only through him can the Government act. When it disregards or overrides without displacing him mischief ensues; but the correlative of the generous, confident, and hearty support it owes him is on his part unceasing intense effort, or resignation.

The Government has lately appointed a most distinguished administrator to be First Lord of the Admiralty. It is beyond doubt a wise move to appoint an administrator to be the head of the administrative business of the Navy. And this, according to my reading of the lessons of history, would be best accomplished by reviving the distinction between supply and command. Command should be the function of the First Sea Lord; his should be the voice to explain in the Cabinet his design for the conduct of the Naval War; his the voice communicating that design to the naval officers afloat. If the administrator must also be a First Lord, it might conduce to a better understanding of his functions if he were to be called the 'First Shore Lord.'

There are two delicate points which I have hitherto passed over. The first is, the place, in a geographical sense, of the Commander-in-Chief of either Service. Should he be at the headquarters of the principal army or of the main fleet, or should he remain at the seat of government? I suggest that this should be left entirely to him. The modern facilities for movement from place to place and for the transmission of documents—even of considerable length—make it easy for a commander to communicate his views from one place to another.

The great difficulty consists in the selection of men qualified for supreme command. To produce leaders is the chief function of national education; to discover them and to put power into their hands is perhaps the highest and the hardest function of the statesman. For there is no selection without rejection. The task is, however, less difficult in war than in peace because in war everyone understands the application of the precept 'by their fruits ye shall know them.'

The general answer to the question raised by the title I have chosen is that the Cabinet system of the late nineteenth and the

early twentieth century is a machine suitable for the conduct of war, provided the Cabinet is a council of heads of the great departments—under the presidency of the Prime Minister—and provided also that each minister is a master of the subject with which his department is concerned. Its efficiency is diminished in proportion as the members lack the necessary command of their subjects, and by the presence of members (other than the Prime Minister) having no departments to supervise. Only the head of a department can be fully in touch with the problems that arise in it; and the opinion of a person deprived of that touch is apt to be in the nature of advice in the air. I view therefore with some misgiving the recent arrangement by which the Cabinet is to a great extent cut off from the great offices which carry on the several branches of the actual business of government, and by which a secretariat is interposed between the supreme governing committee and those offices.

The story which I have told of the attempts of Governments carried on during a quarter of a century to set in order the machinery for the direction of the Army and the Navy, illustrates what I believe to be the chief weakness of our national life—the want of faith in knowledge. The educated class, which the democracy has found in almost hereditary possession of the machinery of legislation and administration, has relied on good breeding and a liberal education, of which the hall-mark was and is the Degree of one of the Universities—especially the Honours Degree of one of the older Universities. Such an education undoubtedly develops the powers of the mind and produces ability. But the members of a Government require more than ability; each of them requires a mastery of a subject, of the art or science upon which are based the activities of the office which he aspires to direct, and of its application. This mastery is to be had only through a long apprenticeship—the devotion of the best years of a man's life to the profession to which he is called. In the Army and Navy the leading has suffered because the officers received a professional training without the basis of a previous liberal education such as the Universities give to their better students. That can be remedied now, if the Government wishes, because the New Armies contain all the young men of liberal education whom the country has produced, and among the officers, old and new, of the expanded Army, will be found when search is made a Carnot, a Hoche, and even a Napoleon.

But far more dangerous than defects in the combatant Services, which remedy themselves in the hard if costly school of war, is the weakness of government that necessarily results from giving authority to men without knowledge or experience of the kind of business over which they are set. There are only two

methods of forming a committee for governing a nation—for directing the nation's work. One is that hitherto practised, by which a personage distinguished by party services, or by anything except mastery of the business which he is to superintend, is placed as Cabinet Minister at the head of a department, while its permanent chief, presumably the competent man, is made his subordinate, his adviser whose advice he may reject. This is government by incompetence. It has been accompanied by inefficiency and confusion and can lead only to Defeat. The other method is to appoint as Cabinet Minister at the head of each department the most competent master of the work which that department has to do. The old wrong method was due to conditions which made the consideration of party all-important. It may be doubted whether, worked on that method, the Constitution is as satisfactory as the late Lord Salisbury thought it for the production of happiness; assuredly it will never produce victory. But in war the mere thought of party is treason.

Unless the spirit in which the Constitution has been worked for the last fifty years is changed within the next six months, the Constitution and those who have worked it will disappear in defeat and revolution. To-day the submarine and the aeroplane are telling all men that the alternative is between defeat and victory. Victory cannot be won by a Government of amateurs. A Government that seeks victory must begin by entrusting the conduct of the War to men who understand war.

SPENSER WILKINSON.

LET WOMEN SAY!

AN APPEAL TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS

THIS is first and foremost an appeal to the House of Lords to deal courageously with the Woman suffrage clauses in the Electoral Reform Bill, and in the second place an appeal to Conservatives, Conservative men and women, of all classes, and, if one may put it so, of all parties, to strengthen their hands in doing so.

For in using the word Conservative I desire to use it in a sense as nearly non-party as possible. Both the great parties in this country are in my belief necessary and indispensable, since they represent permanent tendencies in the national life. Without Conservatism in the true sense, the 'Bolshevik' becomes our master; without Liberalism in the true sense, the forces of authority and government become a despotism, and mankind sets up a Kaiser—or a Collectivist republic.

We, in this country, through the Electoral Reform Bill are about—if it passes unaltered—to cripple disastrously the indispensable Conservative forces in this country. But to the reconstruction after the War, to the well-being even of the Labour Party itself, a due balance of power will be essential. The immense admission of new male voters to the register is itself a great step further in democratisation, which I, for one, have no fear of whatever. It comes as a climax of a long transforming process, which began in 1832. It has taken 85 years to achieve the full enfranchisement of the men of this country. Has it been at all too long? Has not the whole process been a gradual and natural one, providing, broadly speaking, for the political education of the old voters before the new are taken in? I believe that few political students would deny that this slow development of the male electorate has been on the whole greatly to England's advantage.

But now, at a time when not one single woman possesses the Parliamentary vote, it is proposed to confer it at one stride on *six millions* of women. At a time, also, of supposed truce between parties and political interests; when it is a matter of simple good faith between the Government and the nation that no controversial legislation should be attempted during the War, and when

the Home Rule Act has been hung up for this very reason—together with a dozen other vitally important matters.

This then is the moment when the chance majority of three or four votes in the Speaker's Conference, combined with energetic party wire-pulling behind the scenes, and with a wave of sentimentalism in the House of Commons, which women in general, and the Suffragist leaders in particular, are the first to ridicule and disavow, has brought upon the nation, at one stroke, the most controversial, the most revolutionary of all possible changes—viz. the admission of six million women to the franchise of the British Imperial Parliament.

Let me substantiate the word 'revolutionary.' We are about to do—unless the Lords intervene—what no first-class European Power dreams of doing—neither France nor Italy, our Allies, neither Germany nor Austria, our enemies. Russia indeed has granted universal suffrage to men and women alike. The spectacle of Russia at the present moment must surely make the keenest democrat a little uneasy as to some of his or her favourite doctrines. We may learn at any rate, writ large, as we watch the Russian situation, what the vote of large masses of men and women, on whom the burden of political responsibility is suddenly thrown, can achieve in the way of destruction. Can anyone say that the experience is one to make the prospect of wholesale political change in any old and long-settled country more attractive or less anxious? Magnificent, on the whole, as the support given by the British working-class to the great causes represented by the War has been, are there not dangers, many and serious, ahead?—to none more threatening than to the more educated and more experienced strata of the workmen, and those dependent upon them. They stand to lose quite as much as the richer classes by anything that brings about any undue extension of what one may call without offence the 'Bolshevik' power in the State—the power, that is, of the less educated, and more excitable, the less skilled, and less responsible elements in our population.

At the same time we have this to consider. The less educated and the less skilled of our male proletariat have for the last three years given their blood and life without stint in England's struggle for existence. Whatever the risks may be of such national disturbance as may accompany the full admission to political citizenship of these as yet unenfranchised sections of her male population, Britain knows very well that she must face them and face them gladly. Men who on a thousand stricken fields have met death and mutilation, and almost intolerable hardship, for months and years together, have indeed earned their vote! Men who are called on to die for England are good enough to vote for her.

'Welcome'—says the country, to these new man and boy citizens who long before the Munitions Act was passed—and since—have gone into the very jaws of death to save her; and she says it with a full heart.

Moreover during these three years, the majority of these new voters, and thousands of the old, have been passing through the fierce discipline of war, which has made of them—as we know very well, who have watched the lads of our villages depart, and re-appear on their brief 'leaves'—new men, with a new self-consciousness and a new outlook upon life. Not brutalised by what they have seen and borne!—but sobered, trained, developed, with eyes opened to the greatness and variety of the world.

Well, the male supporters of Woman Suffrage, beginning with the Prime Minister, have been saying in the House of Commons—'Perfectly true, as to men. But—as to desert—women are in the same case. Look at what they have done for the War. They are making munitions, they are doing skilled engineering work, they are driving motor-cars, and staffing public offices—they too have earned the vote, and we will give it them, first as a reward, and then as an industrial protection after the War.'

Yes—they have done everything, but that *one thing* which we who have opposed the Parliamentary Suffrage for women *in this country*, have always maintained that, much as they might desire it—and who doubts the high heart of women!—it was impossible for women to do. The invasion of this country, or the victory of her enemies in the field, has only been prevented by the offering of life itself, by the blood and muscle, the physical endurance and suffering, which has alone, in the case of men, stood between Great Britain and destruction. The physical force argument—that physical force is the ultimate sanction of the Parliamentary vote—stands stronger to-day than ever.

Yet we are now proposing to give to women the vote which, if not to-day, then to-morrow, will enable them to decide, as a majority of the electorate, if men shall fight or not fight; and, whether the excitability of women is turned towards war, as in the Berlin of 1914, or towards peace, as in the Russia of the present year, will enable the organisers of the women's vote, aided by a male minority, to impose their decision upon a male majority.

And this is being done in the absence on military service of three millions of men, and of more than a fifth of the House of Commons!

'But the women voters will not be a majority,' says Mr. Walter Long. 'We have taken good care of that. Of course it would be a disastrous thing if there were a majority of women voters in Great Britain. But look at the age limit. That protects us.'

Can any reasonable man suppose for a moment that this slight barrier can last beyond the next Parliament? Mr. Henderson and his friends, to whose strong political pressure on the Government while Mr. Henderson was in the Cabinet the attitude taken towards the Woman Suffrage clauses—an attitude which ensured their success—is believed to be due, will take good care of that. The women's vote, to them, is merely so much electoral material which they mean to use for the purposes of the Labour Party, and if it does not yet give them all they want, one of the first uses they will make of the largely increased representation to which they are looking forward in the House of Commons will be to lower the age limit. The National Union of Woman Suffrage Societies, also, have officially announced their intention of agitating for the next step. 'Votes for women on the same terms as they have been or may be given to men,' was their object before the War. They will not have attained it, they say, 'even when the Representation of the People Bill has gone through; and they will, of course, continue to work for it.' Meanwhile the Prime Minister and Mrs. Snowden are at one in ridiculing what Mr. Lloyd George clearly regards as a temporary concession to the Conservative elements in the Coalition which supports him.

By the Parliament after next at the latest, we shall be face to face with the further demand, and the Labour Party by the help of the women's vote will be easily able to enforce it.

The majority of women voters over men which would then result is variously estimated. But given the war death-rate of men, in addition to the normal peace majority of women, and adding to it the inevitable withdrawal from an election, at any given time, of male voters who are doing the Empire's business abroad, the majority of women over men, I am told on the best expert authority, could hardly be less than two millions.

II

What have been the motives governing the Ministry and the House of Commons in what they have so far done?

Let us look at the matter fairly—and give every weight to the genuine sympathy and appreciation which was felt by the House of Commons for the work which has been done by women in the War.

But after all the business of the British Parliament and a British Government is *to provide for the safety of the British State*. On an impulse of good feeling, they have no right to give away what is not theirs to give—i.e. the interests of the future.

Meanwhile let anyone go into a great munition factory and try and find out what are the incentives which have brought these rows of bright and active girl-workers crowding to the lathes.

'They like the high wages and the excellent conditions of course,' said the Superintendent of a Government shell-factory to myself—'but there is much more than that in it!' They are working for their brothers and sweethearts, their fathers and husbands. They are working indeed with their hearts—the vast majority of them—for those they love; and all of them—small blame to them!—for the wages which mean a spending power they have never yet possessed.

What women of any nation could do otherwise—what women in the Allied countries are not doing as much? Yet the women of France and Italy, toiling in the fields, at munitions and in public offices, are not putting forward a great political claim, on the ground of their work, in the midst of a hideous war. Nor is it being put forward for them. They know what their men have suffered—how far more than themselves; they know what the effort of the men has been in the War, how infinitely greater than their own. So do our women; and if it had not been to the interest of a political party—who saw their opportunity—that this proposal should be made, this particular reason for it, at any rate, would never have been advanced by women themselves. Mrs. Fawcett has expressly repudiated it; though Suffragists in general have no doubt been glad to take advantage of the national enthusiasm.

But the War will end, we pray, some day, and male enthusiasm, which is rather an insult to women than a compliment, will die down. But the vote—with all its consequences—if the Bill passes in its present form will remain. *All its consequences for women and children*, above all. But to that I will return.

And for a time at least, till that majority of women voters over men, to which Mr. Long tells us he would never have consented, has been realised, only an insignificant fraction of the women who have done the work will under this Bill get the vote. The brave girls in the munition factories, the girls who have gone to France, the girls who are on the land, the Nurses and V.A.D.s, who are doing heroic work for the wounded, are, as a rule, many years under thirty. The change is being made and the vote is being claimed in their name. Supposing the Bill goes through, it will be many years before they get any advantage from it. But among the women who will immediately benefit—if it is a benefit—by their work, will be the women, who, in many cases, have not deserved well of the nation at all, the multitude of rich and middle-class idle women, above thirty, who, as the streets and shops show, still spend their mornings and afternoons in shop-gazing and gossip, and are doing no work for the War at all.

So much for the first plea put forward by those who voted for and supported the suffrage clauses in the House of Commons.

I do not doubt its sincerity on the lips of many good men for a moment. *But the real motive power behind the clauses*, so far as the House of Commons, and political parties are concerned, *has been simply political calculation.* Let my own party—the Conservative Party of Great Britain—take note of it.

Originally, when it was a question of the Conciliation Bill the calculation was all on the side of the Conservatives. As a prominent Unionist leader said to me a little while ago—'My Unionist friends used to say to me—"Why do you oppose it? It is we who shall gain from Woman Suffrage." They speak very differently now!' And indeed I think a considerable uneasiness among Conservative Suffragists, male and female, as to what they have helped to do, is already visible.

For clearly it is the slowly reached, but now fixed conviction of the Labour Party that Woman Suffrage, *in the form they have at last succeeded in giving to it*, is going to carry them into the Socialist promised land, which has been the real power at work in the Parliamentary Transformation Scene.

There have been, of course, many contributory causes; the genuine fear—for one—of generous-minded men, that women, without the vote, will be at a disadvantage, industrially, as compared with men, after the War; plus the unworthy fear of a renewal of Suffragette disturbances, if the question is not settled now.

But if the British State is not to be sacrificed to what I have called an impulse of good feeling, it is still less to be sacrificed to an impulse of fear—or rather the mere impatient wish to get rid of a nuisance.

III

And all this time nobody has thought of asking, with any thoroughness or system, *what women themselves desire.* The membership of the Suffrage Societies before the War was somewhere about 100,000. The imposing advertisement put out by them last July may be doubly discounted, (1) by the fact that the long array of Trade Unions and Trade Societies mean simply what has been already stated in this article—i.e. that Labour, and some of the most extreme sections of Labour, stand to gain largely from the women's vote, *as now proposed*, and still more, as the woman's vote will be, supposing the Bill becomes law, a very few years hence. And (2) by the equally true fact that the manifold women's societies named in the list are to a certain extent 'women in buckram'—that is, as everyone who has ever had much to do with social work knows, the same women, active, clever, and fanatically Suffragist, belong to a good many of them, and naturally wield a great influence. They vote as delegates on Suffrage

resolutions which in many cases have nothing to do with the purposes for which they were commissioned, and the real opinion of the various societies for social work, which they represent, supposing their members were adequately polled, must always remain extremely doubtful. This certainly was the case with the National Union of Women Workers, at the time when I belonged to it, before the War.

But now—*now*!—we have at last the means of ascertaining with some adequacy and exhaustiveness the real opinion of women. A fortnight ago an amendment, conceding the Municipal franchise to the wives of the present municipal electors, as well, of course, as to the present women ratepayers, passed the House of Commons *nemine contradicente*. The Bill, as the Speaker's Conference left it, contained the astonishing absurdity that while six million women were admitted by it to the Parliamentary franchise, no extension whatever was made of the women's Local Government franchise, which stood at about a million and a quarter. In other words, the wife of a workman, with very deficient education, with no time to read newspapers or go to public meetings, was to vote upon the details of a European peace, or the maintenance or dismissal of a British Government, of which she might not even know the names, or measures of revolutionary change affecting our fundamental institutions; but she was to have no voice in the administration of the schools to which her children went, or of the Evening Classes which were to fit them for the higher forms of work; in the housing and sanitation of the districts in which her employment and her husband's compelled her to live. She was to be left still without direct influence, in short, on all the manifold subjects bearing on her daily and practical life, which are dealt with by the enormously important Local Government vote; while she was to be given a free hand as a voter in the great Imperial questions, which, in nine cases out of ten, given the conditions of a working woman's life, it would be simply impossible for her to understand. Suffragists and Anti-Suffragists combined in the House of Commons to draw the attention of Sir George Cave to this extraordinary feature of the Bill. An amendment was brought in on Report, and passed without a division. Indeed it is well known that the most convinced Anti-Suffragists have incessantly worked and spoken, before the War, for the extension of the Women's Local Government vote. It has long been my own personal conviction that if the development of the public power of women had been steadily pursued along Local Government lines, instead of through the Parliamentary suffrage, infinitely greater results would have been obtained for the life and well-being of women than could ever be gained by the Suffrage movement.

The influence of John Stuart Mill, of Mr. and Mrs. Fawcett, and a very able group of Cambridge women, in the early days of the Women's Education movement, directed that movement towards the delusive aim of a sham equality with men, which in the course of years, as we see plainly from later developments, has become one of rivalry with men, tending in the case of many women to a position of active sex hostility. Whereas what the State really needed, in the field of public work and progress, was the complementary action, through different institutions, of men and women.

The unanimous vote of the House of Commons, a few weeks ago, together with the steps taken in recent years, and heartily supported by anti-suffragists, for increasing the number of, and removing restrictions on the election of women candidates to local bodies, brings into view two possible consequences among others.

First—nothing would be easier, with so large a constituency of women voters in the background, and with the increased number of women representatives on Local Government bodies, which is sure to result from the increased number of women voters, than to secure some Statutory body, chosen from these representatives, and brought into close connexion with Government and the House of Commons. Such a body, if it came into existence during the coming year, would probably have much more direct effect upon questions affecting women's labour after the War, than the use of the Parliamentary vote, entangled as it must be with a mass of Imperial questions and interests, would ever enable women to obtain.

This, however, I only throw out by the way.

The vitally important consequence which immediately affects the Bill before Parliament is that we have now got, through the large and unexpected extension of the Local Government vote, *a wide and democratic body of women*, whose registration will be put in hand at once, and from whom a really valuable Referendum vote can be taken.

I submit that this introduces a wholly new feature into the case.

One of the chief objections put forward on the Suffragist side to the adoption of a Referendum on the subject of Woman Suffrage used always to be that no adequate or recognised body of women existed from whom a Referendum could be taken.

That objection is now removed. The new Women Municipal Voters will provide such a body.

And hundreds of thousands of women throughout the country will be heartily grateful to the House of Lords if they will use their revising power to insist that these Women Suffrage clauses, fraught as they must be with immense and incalculable results for

the British State, shall not be passed into law before the opinion of women, at least, has been asked upon them.

The women of this country have indeed every right to be consulted before this thing is done. It is a step unique in our history; and the nature of the British Constitution, together with the circumstances of our Imperial power, makes it a peculiarly anxious one. Women throughout Great Britain are very anxious about the future; and especially while this vast struggle continues, are they troubled about the political and military safety of their country. The assimilation of three to four million new male voters by our loosely balanced Constitution, which has none of the checks and safeguards of the Constitution of the United States, and under which matters of the most vital moment to the State may be decided by a few hundred thousand votes, will of itself certainly strain our political machinery, and in ways which we cannot yet foresee.

Are we at the same moment to add to the risks entailed by the sudden admission of millions of mostly very young men to Imperial responsibility and power, the further risk of six million women voters, among whom nobody will deny that the average of political knowledge and experience is and must be—because of the conditions of their sex—much lower than the average among men? Do British women really desire to take the first step, which given the population conditions of Great Britain, and the aims of the extreme Labour Party, as lately defined by Mr. Henderson, must ultimately lead to a government determined by women—under Socialist guidance?

Let me appeal finally, as I began, to the true Conservatism of the nation, which exists in all parties, and is indeed our great protection against the risks of advancing democracy.

Sir Henry Maine insisted that 'Democracy is the most difficult of all Governments.' At a moment when the difficulties of democracy are thrown into ghastly prominence by the course of events in Russia, are we going deliberately to increase our own difficulties and risks in this country?

Well—*let women say!* That is my plea. For it is women's concern. It is mere bare justice to refer the question to them *before it is decided.*

That brings us to the Referendum.

I do not propose to discuss the Referendum in detail. The pros and cons of its use were much before the country in 1910 and 1911; and Lord Balfour of Burleigh's 'Reference to the People' Bill showed how it might be applied here. And politicians of all parties have frequently recognised, even when generally they disapproved of the Referendum, that Women's Suffrage was one of those rare and exceptional subjects to which it might safely be applied.

In this case I believe and hope that the whole course of controversy will tend to bring the Referendum to the front. The line taken by the Opposition in the House of Lords cannot indeed be exactly predicted. But in the end it looks as though the serious struggle will come on the question of a Referendum. The rules of the House of Lords will admit no doubt of the insertion of a Referendum clause in the Bill itself. But the rules of the House of Commons, under the Speaker's recent decision, will not allow the Commons to accept it, even if they wished, when the Bill returns to the Commons. At this point to have a Referendum Bill ready for immediate and simultaneous passing through both Houses would seem to be the policy most likely, *if the House of Lords stand firm*, to secure the actual reference of this great question to the people—*above all to women*.

For the Women's Referendum is in fact all that matters. If they really wish for the vote, no subsequent Referendum to men will deny it them. Nor would any of us who, in the interests of our sex, have opposed Woman Suffrage, continue to fight any further. But there is in fact no evidence as yet, worth the name, that more than a very active but comparatively small minority do wish for it.

IV

Assuming however that a majority exists in the House of Lords who are opposed to the grant of the Parliamentary franchise to women on its merits, or that a majority exists who would favour on its merits a submission of this issue to a Referendum, it remains to be considered whether action of this kind would be desirable in the interests of the House of Lords, and whether it could be carried through without damage to the cause of stability and order, and without adding fuel to revolutionary fires. Is the fact that this change was carried by a very large majority in the House of Commons a conclusive reason against any action in the contrary direction by the House of Lords?

In the view of the extreme sections of the Labour Party, as Mr. Henderson has lately explained, the acceptance of Woman Suffrage paves the way for 'revolution.' Its rejection by the House of Lords, or preferably its submission to the country by Referendum, on the initiative of that chamber, involves therefore an exercise of power which is not merely legitimate according to Unionist views of the Constitution, but is far smaller than the power conceded by the authors of the Parliament Act. That statute allows the House of Lords to delay for three years a measure which has already been submitted to the country at a General Election, and which is sent up by a House of Commons fresh from contact with the people. In this case the proposed

action refers to the people a measure which has never been submitted to them, and which is sent up by a House of Commons which has three times prolonged its own life, is seven years old, and is less representative than any House of Commons since the seventeenth century.

It must however be recognised that action by the House of Lords will no doubt lead to an agitation in the country by the Labour Party and the Suffragists. Why should this be feared? They are responsible for raising the controversy: they themselves made the proposal for 'stealthy, unconsidered, precipitate change,' the very thing against which Mr. Asquith, as he said when he introduced the Parliament Bill, desired to provide a constitutional check. It should however be borne in mind that their agitation will be most effective against a mere blank negative on the part of the House of Lords; and will be largely disarmed if that House provides definite statutory means for the free decision of the issue by the people themselves.

The Peers have it in their power, if they stand firm, to insist on a Referendum. The Bill is required as an indispensable preliminary to the next General Election. The Government and the House of Commons will be under the strongest inducement to accept any reasonable changes made by the House of Lords, since the alternative is the loss of the Bill. I submit that the consultation of the country—but especially of women themselves—through a Referendum, is a reasonable change.

V

Perhaps in presenting this appeal on behalf as I believe of many thousands of my fellow country-women, I may be allowed a last personal word. Ever since the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century when I first began seriously to think over this question of Woman Suffrage, I have been absolutely convinced that Woman Suffrage was the wrong and not the right way to secure the welfare and progress of women, and that while a real equality of power in the State, dependent on a balancing of functions and of rights, might be obtained for women, through education, local government, industrial and social organisation, and the constantly increasing co-operation of women of all classes with Parliament and the Government, through these same great agencies,—nothing could be achieved, through Woman Suffrage, that could not be better attained in other ways; while it seemed to me certain that Woman Suffrage would tend to make women the mere political tools of men, and thereby to endanger the stability and safety of the British State.

Thirty years and more have elapsed, and I am quite clear that time has only strengthened the reasons expressed in the Manifesto

of 1889, published in these pages, of which, if I remember right, I wrote the greater part. Let me sum up in the shortest possible way what it seems to me these thirty years have proved :

(*a*) That women may just as safely as men leave their interests in the care of a man-elected Parliament of Great Britain. If their interests have sometimes been ignored amid the pressure of party politics, so have those of men. But, on the whole, the words of Mr. Asquith are still abundantly justified—'I challenge comparison of our Statute Book with any code of legislation in any part of the world in regard to the degree of protection and care which it gives, not only to the property of women and to the status of married women, but to the position of women workers.'

(*b*) That not votes but economic conditions and collective bargaining govern wages. The leaflets now being put out by the N.U.W.S.S., in which almost every class of wage-earning woman is promised increase of wages through the vote, seem to me one of those offences against truth and knowledge, on the part of those who know better, which are hard to forgive.

(*c*) That real improvement of the moral life and sex relations can only be achieved through religion, through education, and the growth of public conscience; and that as a matter of fact all the legislation of recent years on these subjects has reflected the advancing ethical conscience of both men and women. Much, I can well believe, is still to do, but it will be better done if women remain an independent and spiritual influence outside politics, than if they are themselves a haggling and bargaining force within it. Their increasing and legitimate power in such matters, closely connected as it is with their increasing education and training, is a solid proof of this.

(*d*) That the life of women being inevitably, by reason of their child-bearing function, turned inward towards the home, and that of man turned outwards towards the maintenance and government of the State, anything which involves the direct interference of women with the special function of men must in the long run be disastrous.

(*e*) That the majority of women over men in these islands is at the present moment so large, and will be so greatly increased by the War, that neither men nor women ought to venture any step leading to an electoral preponderance of women in a State with the Imperial responsibilities and the vast risks—as this War has shown them to be—of England.

(*f*) That the loosely knit Constitution of this country, where, up till now, little more than a few hundred thousand votes may decide an election, makes the addition of the greater ignorance of women to the ignorance or carelessness of certain sections of the male electorate, a far greater danger than it would be under the

Constitution of the United States, or in one of our Colonies, where men largely outnumber women, and the complicated problems of Imperial Government do not arise.

(*g*) That after thirty years of Woman Suffrage in the United States, the results are either negligible or disastrous. The Suffrage States cannot show any advantage over the non-Suffrage States. Colorado is much worse governed than Massachusetts, and no real connexion has been made out between drink, or any form of vice and corruption, and the denial of the Suffrage. Divorce is more rife in the Suffrage States than in the non-Suffrage. The wages in Colorado are 47 per cent. of the wages of men, whereas in Massachusetts they are 62 per cent. Out of 16 Prohibition States, 12 have adopted it with only men voting, and only four with the aid of women. And so on. The facts are by now so striking that the Woman Suffrage speakers are abandoning the 'results' argument and falling back upon that of 'natural right.'

(*h*) Lastly the history of the Women's Social and Political Union, and of the agitation conducted by them before the War, confirms all that older controversialists have said or prophesied as to the greater excitability and lawlessness of women when submitted to the strain of politics, than of men.

Such it seems to me are the hard facts which the past thirty years have brought to light. Another 'hard fact' for myself, no doubt, is that my view about the Suffrage has divided me in opinion, though not in feeling and affection, from many friends with whom I have worked in social or educational questions. Upon them and upon those advocates of the Suffrage generally, whose sincere and passionate belief in their cause I deeply respect, I would urge with all the earnestness of which I am capable, that should the House of Lords ultimately stand firm on the Referendum, they should join with us in endeavouring to ascertain the real opinion of women. If they are right, and women do overwhelmingly desire the Parliamentary vote, as shown by a Referendum decision, then the Suffrage will come with a general acquiescence and desire to make it work that nothing else could give. If not, do women wish to coerce women in the name of liberty?

So we come to the final plea—

Let women say! We appeal with all our hearts to the justice and determination of the House of Lords to seize this opportunity which the action of the Commons on the Local Government Vote has so happily offered.

MARY A. WARD.

RUSSO-GERMAN RELATIONS AND THE SABOUROFF MEMOIRS

(*Concluded.*)

THE human interest of the Sabouroff Memoirs primarily consists in their brilliant close-range study of the personality of Prince Bismarck by a mind that was perfectly capable, as we have seen, of holding its own with his in diplomatic manœuvre and argument, as also in their rich storage of the German Chancellor's opinions upon all the European problems of his day, which, little changed, are those confronting us to-day. 'Bismarck was a rough man, even in politics,' M. Sabouroff has said more than once to the writer, 'but his Conservative convictions were very sincere; he was opposed to Liberalism in any form. "There are five Great Powers; I must always strive to be one of three against two." These were his simple mathematics and politics. When at one period he saw that Germany could not agree with Austria, he thought of Russia and England. Then when he saw that Russia and England could not agree, he thought of Russia and Austria. But at one stage he was not averse to an alliance with England, if it had been possible.'

The historic interest of the Sabouroff Memoirs lies in the circumstance that they detail the endeavour of a diplomat deputed by a Germanophile Russian Emperor to carry to an extreme issue a policy that commended itself as little to his own Chancellor as it did to his people as a whole. No one has perhaps traced the stages of development in the quarrel between Prince Gortchakoff and Prince Bismarck so successfully as M. Sabouroff himself.[1] Realising that, if Prussia went down in the then imminent Franco-Prussian war of 1870, Russia would once again find herself in such a position of isolation as was her lot after the Crimean War —if indeed she did not have an Austrian-controlled Prussia added to the coalition against her—Alexander the Second agreed to neutralise Austria in the interests of Prussia and succeeded so well that, when the German Emperor William the First came to St. Petersburg in 1873, accompanied by Bismarck and Moltke,

[1] See article 'Russie, France, Allemagne (1870-1880),' by P. Sabouroff, *La Revue de Paris*, March 15, 1912.

his visit was an ocular demonstration of the sentiment expressed in his famous Versailles telegram to the Russian Emperor, 'After God it is to you that we owe our victory.' From that moment Alexander the Second felt for the first time politically at his ease in Europe. Russia had been restored to her old position in the world: such a coalition against her as she had known after the Crimean War was now no longer possible. Germany was something immensely stronger and more useful as a potential ally than the Prussia for whose sake he had risked much with Austria by placing 200,000 men upon her border. Small wonder that the idea of a permanent alliance with Germany became the master-conception of the policy of the Germanophile Russian Emperor.

In Russia, however, a generation had grown up for whom the Crimean War was only history, and who found themselves incapable of reproducing in their own consciousness the precise ideas and feelings of hatred that possessed the minds and hearts of those who had lived through the fall of Sevastopol. What they saw and felt was something very different—the establishment close at hand of a German Empire which might well upset the equilibrium of Europe, together with the instinctive feeling that in their own interests they must do something to save France from total destruction at the hands of a Power which had given proof of its strength in successively overcoming both Austria and France. And this was practically the state of mind and feeling of Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian Chancellor. At the commencement of the war he had stated his disapproval of the promise to neutralise Austria spontaneously given by his Royal Master, although he had been unable to prevent the measure, and so thorough was his mistrust of Bismarck and of his ingratiating promises that he counselled the Emperor to take immediate steps, whatever the risk, to annul the clauses of the Treaty of Paris relative to the Black Sea rather than await the definite victory of Prussia before doing so. The very success of this policy however only served to strengthen the substantial disagreement between Emperor and Chancellor. The former could not imagine Germany as an adversary, and on the contrary desired to negotiate an intimate and permanent alliance with her as the crowning act of his reign. The latter, uncertain of her, and foreseeing the inevitable relations in which the conclusion of the war of 1870 had left her with her defeated adversary, preferred to stand aloof, believing that Russia could maintain an attitude which might lead to her becoming the arbiter of European affairs. Nor had he long to wait. The rapid recovery of France so disconcerted Germany that she attempted to exercise threatening pressure upon France in 1875 and, when that country appealed to Russia, Prince Gortchakoff's opportunity had come. Lord Odo Russell,

the British Ambassador in Berlin, who was present at the interview between Bismarck and Gortchakoff, gave these impressions of it to M. Sabouroff: 'I confess that all my admiration went to Prince Gortchakoff: he showed himself superior in self-command, courtesy, finesse, and, I ought to add, breadth of view. Prince Bismarck evidently felt uncomfortable—like a horse champing at its bit. It was the first time I saw him curt in reply.'[2] Long afterwards Prince Bismarck, in referring to the incident and giving his explanation of the whole crisis to M. Sabouroff, concluded, 'Unfortunately Prince Gortchakoff did not wish to understand the situation, and preferred to score a diplomatic success at my expense.'

This incident was probably of capital importance in connexion with the subsequent relations of Russia and Germany. Russia had practically dictated to Germany as in the great days of the Emperor Nicholas the First! M. Sabouroff is convinced that at this time there first developed in the chagrined German Chancellor's mind the conception of a close alliance with Austria which ultimately proved the undoing of the hopes of Alexander the Second. It required a long period of preparation during which, as we have seen, Bismarck was far from being unsympathetic to Russia. But more than anything, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 and the fatal Russian indecision before the gates of Constantinople aided him in the working out of his scheme. The intention under the original Russian plan of campaign was not to go farther than the Balkans, and to create a limited Bulgaria. The Emperor and Prince Gortchakoff alike shrank from the possible international consequences of an extended campaign, and preferred to hold to the Russian traditional policy of 'eating the artichoke leaf by leaf.' Unfortunately the original plan was not adhered to. Soon after the crossing of the Danube, the Chief of Staff of the Grand Duke Nicholas demanded complete liberty of action in his operations as the indispensable condition of the success of the campaign. This request, so reasonable from a military point of view, could not be refused, but it led to a situation that had not been thought out in its entirety when the Russian army found itself bivouacking within striking distance of the Mosque of St. Sophia. What exactly happened from the Russian side has never been accurately disclosed. The Emperor instinctively felt what ought to be done. He gave the order to occupy Constantinople, and it was published in the Official Gazette on the very day that news came that the British squadron had entered the Dardanelles. But there was indecision at the Russian headquarters, and the golden moment irrevocably passed. M. Sabouroff has stated to the writer that the old Grand Duke Nicholas

[2] Quoted in article already cited.

was tired of the war, and not sufficiently alert; he did not occupy Constantinople in accordance with the instructions telegraphed to him, and the Emperor never forgave him. General Loris Melikoff told M. Sabouroff that on the occasion when he went to the Emperor to make his report on the trans-Caucasian part of the campaign, after the war, the Grand Duke Nicholas had immediately preceded him in audience. From the outer room he overheard the Emperor storming at the Commander-in-Chief for his failure to take Constantinople. The Grand Duke tried to defend himself by saying that the telegram had arrived too late. Shortly after, he came out of the imperial presence pale and agitated. When Loris Melikoff entered the royal chamber he found the Emperor in a slight faint, brought on by the vehemence of his attack on the Grand Duke.

Such were the circumstances, together with other incidents arising out of the Treaty of Berlin, which not merely quickened the desire of Alexander the Second for an alliance with Germany, but also, by working on the fears of Austria, made her more amenable to Bismarck's handling and, finally, impelled the aged Russian Chancellor to seek relief from the cares of office. In undertaking the mission at Berlin, M. Sabouroff was well aware that the Russian people as a whole had no sympathy with the German people. 'The policy of Alexander the Second,' he has said to the writer, 'was not sympathetically received by many of the Russian people. And the reason was the same then as it is to-day. Germany wants to absorb our commerce, and considers us as a colony for her goods. We must not change our policy again.' How broad and far-seeing was his own vision with regard to the ultimate solution of one of the thorniest questions of that and our own time may be gathered from the concluding paragraph of the letter[3] to his friend Baron Jomini, referred to in the previous article[4]: 'During the last (Russo-Turkish) war, while every question was still in suspense, I had submitted the idea of a confederation of all the little States already created, and yet to be created, in the (Balkan) peninsula. That would have been, in my opinion, the best arrangement for putting an end to the race jealousies, and removing the influences that are hostile to us. But this idea was lost in the general conflict. Our negotiator of the day sacrificed all other considerations to the creation of a Greater Bulgaria. I had secured the co-operation of the principal political elements in Greece in order to win over that country to the idea of a confederation in return for an increase of its territory. But all that is past, and this is no longer the moment to discuss these great problems of the future. They will

[3] Of date May 1880.
[4] *Nineteenth Century and After*, December 1917.

present themselves some day or another; let us hope that it will not be for some time to come. For, as you say, repose is not so much a matter of principle for us as a practical need of the first order. So let us give thanks that the Emperor leads us in the paths of peace.'

The immediate continuation of the Memoirs deals with the joint actions of the Great Powers on the initiative of Mr. Gladstone in connexion with the carrying out of certain clauses of the Treaty of Berlin, the requirements of which had not been as yet observed, particularly on the part of Turkey. This involved some months' postponement of the particular negotiations on which Prince Bismarck and M. Sabouroff were engaged. The latter was naturally somewhat anxious as to the probable attitude that Austria would adopt to the proposals about to be presented to her, and had been reassured by Bismarck that, if questions arose about the Straits in any acute form, Germany would be found at Russia's side. So little difficulty did Bismarck seem to foresee in coming to an arrangement between the three Powers on the Near Eastern problems that he broke out in praise of his old idea: 'Thus at last we shall be able to form that solid monarchical *bloc*, and feel no longer any concern about the internal convulsions with which the Western Powers may be troubled. The three Emperors together are sufficiently strong to defy all agitations abroad, and sufficiently great lords to live content with the patrimony of their ancestors.'

There follow many pages dealing with the accounts transmitted to M. Sabouroff of Prince Bismarck's conversations with Baron Haymerle, the Austrian Foreign Minister, at Friedrichsruhe in August 1880. From these it is evident that Austria did not intend to be hurried, that she considered Bosnia and Herzegovina as her possessions already, and that she was anxious to have Russia give a proof of good-will in advising the Serbian Government to be more amenable in connexion with certain negotiations that were going on at that moment with Vienna—and so on through several vital questions of the day, with hints of dreams of a future shifting of her centre of gravity in the direction of Salonica. Sabouroff turned over each point, and considered how he would answer it. 'Serbia is the sole judge of her own interests. We would willingly give Austria a proof of good-will in refraining from advising counsels of resistance at Belgrade. But we can hardly take upon us to decide for the Serbians what best suits their economic interests.' The thought of the Austro-German alliance concluded in the preceding year drove him to these reflections in view of the possibilities in the Near East: 'The Germany of our time is following the same policy that the Prussia of Frederick the Great adopted in proposing the partition of Poland.

Turkey is, however, a more difficult body to divide up; but the tendency at Berlin has been the same these hundred years, viz. to create bonds of mutual connivance between the three Empires. Frederick the Great was the "honest broker" before Bismarck.'

It is not permissible to trace in any detail the multitudinous fluctuations through which these political negotiations passed, for they are the burden of the Memoirs. But nothing comes out so manifestly at this stage as Bismarck's fears of British policy in the Near East. There were numerous points of outstanding difficulty between Austria and Russia which he hoped to be able to clear away, but his main attempt was admittedly directed towards preventing Great Britain from pursuing any line of action which could bring up prematurely the great Eastern questions upon which as yet Austria and Russia did not see eye to eye. For it was just these questions to which he was looking for assistance to bring about the *alliance à trois* on which he seemed to be set. The process of time however only seemed to add to the numbers of points of difference with Austria that seemed capable of degenerating into cases of active discord, and Sabouroff realised that Bismarck had indeed much to do. Nevertheless he was evidently very hopeful. Delay gave Russia more time for recuperation financially and economically, as also for making good the naval and military losses incurred in the Russo-Turkish war. Again, Bismarck had said to him on two occasions, 'I do not share the prejudices of the other Cabinets on the subject of the danger of handing over Constantinople to Russia.' His colleague Radowitz had also assured him that in a recent conversation with Prince Bismarck he had found him 'completely converted again to his old sympathies for Russia. In speaking of the *Dreikaiserbund*, the Chancellor had said to him that he did not see any objection to Russia realising her most daring dreams in the East, on the one condition that she let Austria alone, and did not dispute in any way her sphere of influence in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula.'

In one of the letters to Baron Jomini, dated November 11, 1880, M. Sabouroff states the views that he then held upon the necessary relations of Russia and Germany. It is apparent that his friend had been arguing for a policy of political isolation. To this the Berlin Ambassador replies quite shortly and decidedly: 'For the moment I shall confine myself to saying to you that your arguments in favour of isolation have not convinced me. Since we are flanked by a Great Germany, it is probable that we shall only be able to live beside her either as allies or as enemies. There is no middle course, or else it is one on which we could only maintain ourselves by a miracle of balancing, as on the edge

of a knife. For myself, I prefer a system of sincere *entente*, especially if it assures us substantial advantages, both in the present and in the future.'

From this stage onwards it becomes apparent that doubts are beginning to rise again in M. Sabouroff's mind as to whether Prince Bismarck is conducting the negotiations with absolute sincerity so far as the relations between Russia and Austria are concerned. At one time he receives corroboration of the situation as he would like it to be through a third diplomat—in this case an Englishman (Lord Granville)—which makes him wonder why he should have any doubts. 'At Friedrichsruhe, Prince Bismarck confided to him the real reason why he actually desired the maintenance of peace in Turkey, and could not associate himself with any act even of a collective character which could have raised again the whole question of the Orient. Germany wished to reconcile the interests of Russia and Austria in order to prevent a quarrel between these two Powers. That is a laborious task which demands time. It would be upset by a premature catastrophe in Turkey. At this point Prince Bismarck made a remark which markedly impressed Lord Odo Russell. He said to him that he wished to remain, as in the past, the friend of Russia, that his alliance with Austria did not offer any hindrance to this, and that, should there be occasion, he intended to give very liberal support to the interests of Russia in the Eastern question.' On another occasion M. Sabouroff argues himself into the position that even to entertain a doubt is a sign of weakness. Nevertheless when things now go so slowly that he fears there is some real obstacle, he tries to get at the truth by questioning Bismarck about the Austrian attitude; what did he think of Haymerle's primary condition that *pourparlers à trois* could not begin until after the settlement of all outstanding questions? Is the latter acting in good faith, or is he simply insincere and trying to get out of things? Bismarck's reply takes the form of one of those very interesting characterisations in which the Memoirs abound. He did not think that Haymerle was acting in bad faith, but he was timid; he was not accustomed to deal with high politics; he feared its responsibilities. An article in a newspaper produced more impression on him than the great advantages yielded by a maturely contrived political system. He had consented to negotiations, but he would never take the initiative in them. 'When he was here, in this very place, he was like a schoolboy impatient to escape from school, and thinking of nothing but of how to get out of the trap as well as he could without leaving too many feathers behind.'

All this indicated to M. Sabouroff that Austria scented the danger of a possible relaxation of her relations with Germany—

relations which she had believed she could make exclusive until she had to come to realise that Bismarck had other strings to his bow—and he even admits that he thought that if he simply held on in his present course of action, the Russo-German relations for which he hoped, would in the course of their development act as a natural solvent on the Austro-German alliance. Accordingly such a conversation seemed a good opportunity to attempt to learn more about the import of the Dual Alliance. He approached the subject by suggesting that Haymerle perhaps did not particularly care to enter the proposed understanding, considering that Austria was sufficiently protected by her treaty of alliance with Germany. 'Sure of that protection, she may wish to defer this new combination to the Greek Kalends, while avoiding offending your Government by a direct refusal.'

'The Prince replied with a certain animation: "Austria would be very much deceived if she thought that the security resulting from her relations to us was complete. I can assure you that that is not the case. Our interests compel us to prevent her being *destroyed*, but she is not guaranteed against attack. A war between Russia and Austria would place us, it is true, in a most embarrassing position, but our attitude in such an eventuality will be determined by our own interests, and not by engagements which have no existence. Our interests demand that neither Russia nor Austria be mortally wounded. Their existence as Great Powers is equally necessary to us. That is what will determine our conduct, should occasion arise."' Sabouroff naturally concluded from the above statement that Germany was not bound unconditionally by an offensive and defensive alliance, but that she reserved the right to intervene either after the first encounter or during the peace negotiations.

It was on the occasion of a later conversation, when the two diplomatists were reconsidering some serious changes in the details of their project, that the subject of the future and its infinite possibilities seems to have come simultaneously into their minds. It was indeed only natural that they should attempt to estimate how far their negotiations would, if carried out, lead after all to any real solution of the Near Eastern problem. On this occasion Bismarck appears to have been unusually communicative and self-revealing. He began by saying that if there had been any real statesmen at Vienna, with large outlook, he would not have hesitated to undertake to draw a line of demarcation on the map of Turkey between the Austrian and Russian interests, and that to the satisfaction of both parties. 'But the Austrian ministers are the most timid in Europe: they are afraid of any question which is not a question of the day, and one would never reach any result with them by a premature discussion.' And

then he went on: '"To-day we ought to be content with our projected arrangement which offers us the great advantage of keeping Austria better in leading strings, and forcing her, should occasion arise, into an *entente*. When that arrangement has become an accomplished fact, then imagine a situation like that which led up to the Crimean War. If Austria were tempted to join with England against Russia, would she dare to do so without asking us if we will remain neutral? Our answer would be prompted by the actual arrangement, and Austria would not be able to think of budging. Suppose that a successful campaign carried you to the Bosphorus. I have already told you how I think about such a situation. I flatter myself that I was the first in Europe to break with the old tradition with which the Westerners inoculated all the Cabinets, viz. that Constantinople in the hands of Russia would be a European danger. I consider that idea false, and I do not see why an English interest ought to become a European interest. As to German interests, they will decidedly not be affected by this eventuality, and I believe, on the contrary, that the Russian nation will become most serious converts to the cause of peace when its ambitions will at last have reached their goal, and that, having attained possession of Constantinople, it will be convinced of the vanity of all earthly things (*von der Nichtigkeit aller irdischen Dinge*); as I am," he added with a sad smile.'

'Is not our fortune strange—I will even say stupid—with regard to Constantinople?' M. Sabouroff remarked to the writer, when describing the above scene to him some time after the Revolution; 'once we stood outside its gates and did not enter: later Germany consented to our having it; and now when England and France are agreeable, and we could probably have had it, we refuse to entertain the idea!'

The articles of negotiation had by this time reached a more or less definite and agreed form as between Prince Bismarck and M. Sabouroff, although certain modifications favoured by the Russian Court, which had again been consulted, required some very convincing argumentation before they were finally accepted by the German Chancellor. M. Sabouroff has preserved the outline of his statement in this connexion, the opening sentences of which are significant in view of August 1914: 'We undertake to see to the localisation of any war between Germany and France, or between Austria and Italy. It is very possible that England will place herself alongside of France if, for example, you violate the neutrality of Belgium from strategic motives.' The above was written by M. Sabouroff on the 10th of January 1881, and no one will easily suppose that the idea occurred there and then for the first time.

The negotiations are next described as they presented them-

selves from the Austrian side. It is quite apparent that Haymerle had not passed out of the stage of raising initial objections to the whole scheme, with the details of which he had not even yet been made acquainted. M. Sabouroff was informed of the course of events from time to time by Prince Bismarck who read extracts to him from the despatches of the German Ambassador in Vienna, in which he recounted his conversations with Haymerle. The latter was very outspoken. 'There is only one real influence in the East—that of Russia. We feel it at every step. Each time we wish to urge an Austrian interest, we come up against the hostile action of the Russian agents. Under those conditions, we run the risk of always becoming the dupes of Russian diplomacy if we let ourselves become entangled in a Treaty of Alliance. Is Prince Bismarck himself really convinced of the sincerity of Russia?' And so on. Yet as the result of Bismarck's criticism of each of Haymerle's principal objections, M. Sabouroff felt satisfied with the progress made.

About this time the Emperor William gave his distinct and cordial approval to the negotiations, suggesting that there should be complete understanding between Bismarck and Sabouroff before direct overtures were made to Austria. With regard to procedure at Vienna, Bismarck's idea was that the best way to deal with a man of Haymerle's temperament would be to present the project in the form of a proposal made by Germany. A refusal by Austria would be more difficult in that case, and on the other hand, if the proposal did not come from Russia, a refusal, if such there were, would not produce the same irritation in any future direct Russian dealings with Austria as it would if the initiative had come from Russia. The form of a collective Russo-German proposal would have a slightly threatening look, and as these countries did not wish to displease Austria, but on the contrary sought to draw her into an *Entente à trois*, it was much better to choose the form that would be most conducive to that end. 'I could only agree,' adds Sabouroff, 'to all these explanations, knowing how much the Prince prided himself upon his *savoir-faire* : being at ease about the substance, I was not much concerned about the form.'

Part of the lighter reading in these Memoirs for the twentieth-century student is certain to be found in the sections recording the manœuvres which Bismarck employed to produce the maximum of effect upon the Emperor Francis Joseph and his Foreign Minister in connexion with the presentation of the proposals for their acceptance. It is apparent that Bismarck was determined that they should be accepted. When M. Sabouroff ventured to say he hoped that a refusal on the part of Austria would not prevent Russia and Germany from carrying out the

negotiations between themselves, leaving an open door for Austria should she later change her mind, Bismarck replied at once 'That is just my idea. If you had not said so to me, I intended to make the same proposal to you. Besides this will give me a new means of putting pressure upon Austria, and forcing her hand by the highly disagreeable prospect for her of a separate *entente* between Germany and Russia.' He did not expect a refusal although he was quite prepared for evasions.

In a letter to another of his friends, dated January 22, 1881, M. Sabouroff gives his own impressions of Austria as evidenced in the negotiations up to date. He thinks that he now has all the data necessary to form an exact opinion about Haymerle's attitude. At first, when the latter had no suspicion of anything unusual in the relations of Russia and Germany, he was very cold in his reception of the general proposal to reconstitute the *Dreikaiserbund*. But now that he realises that Russia and Germany are evidently working out something together, and that possibly, after all, Russia may have something more to offer Germany than Austria was apparently able to do last year, he may be driven to act in a manner contrary to his earlier attitude simply from fear of being left out in the cold. 'Austria gives me the impression of a timid little gambler; everything goes well so long as he only puts down his few *sous*. But a bigger player joins in, with substantial stakes. The look of matters changes, and the honest broker from Berlin naturally feels a greater interest to make up a game with a more serious partner. There, in a couple of words, is the explanation of the modification in Bismarck's attitude during last year. A promise of neutrality on our part is a much more important stake for him than all the assurances of a Cabinet as nervous and changeable as that of Vienna.' Throughout the Memoirs nothing is so obvious as the disdain that both the negotiators feel for the 'ramshackle empire,' and yet it is always Bismarck who says the really brutal things. Sabouroff sounds him on one occasion as to his views with regard to the length of time that should be set for the validity of the new treaty and the guarantees that should be included for its loyal observance. He himself suggests an alliance of two against whichever third proposes to violate the treaty. 'That will come of itself,' replied Bismarck, 'since we are three. But to formulate an idea like that under that particular form would be mutually offensive. It would be a way of saying that we suspected one another. Frankly, the only Power that would have any inclination to default is Austria. That is why, with her, an *alliance à trois* is preferable to an *alliance à deux*.' 'This,' adds M. Sabouroff, 'seems to me a most eloquent funeral oration over all that took place at Vienna a year ago.'

Some days later M. Sabouroff was invited by Prince Bismarck to come and hear the report of the issue of the negotiations as detailed to him in despatches from Prince Reuss, the German Ambassador at Vienna, who in the end had been entrusted with the actual conduct of affairs both with the Emperor and Haymerle. It becomes evident from the succeeding pages in the Memoirs that Haymerle was determined not to be pushed into any premature acceptance of the document, and was on the contrary resolved to subject it to very minute and patient examination. What, to begin with, was the actual genesis of the different parts of the project? He wanted to know in particular which parts had been supplied by Russia and which by Germany, and so on. At the same time he begged Bismarck not to be afraid of his 'passion for analysis': the project would not suffer by it. Reuss stated that he had informed Haymerle that the project in its actual form was the result of extended laborious negotiations; that in consequence it was not a mere draft which could be easily modified without risk of compromising the whole matter, and that he must therefore warn the Baron Haymerle about the danger of making too sweeping amendments. 'Reuss,' remarked the Chancellor, 'exceeded his instructions there. With a man of Haymerle's disposition, there was bound to be danger in offering him a dish with the words "You must take this or leave it." One would get along better by discussing the matter with him. It does not do to frighten a timid man too much: rather you must help him forward, stroking him with your hand. Let us see what he proposes. If it is something unacceptable, I shall take it on myself to decline without even referring the matter to St. Petersburg. If it is debatable, I advise you to enter into discussion, and rather than refuse straight off, to propose counter-amendments.'

In running through the despatch of Prince Reuss, the German Chancellor came to a passage, which M. Sabouroff states he read 'without the least hesitation,' in which Haymerle expressed his desire to know what changes Prince Bismarck thought would be introduced in the agreement reached between their two Governments in the preceding year at Vienna, as the result of this *entente à trois*. This request, of course, referred to the terms of the famous Dual Alliance, which were only made public in 1887, and to which Bismarck had referred before in conversation with Sabouroff, as we have already seen.[5] In Bismarck's Autobiography[6] he deliberately makes the following statement with reference to this Treaty: 'The Emperor's chivalrous temper demanded that the Czar of Russia should be confidentially

[5] *Nineteenth Century and After*, December 1917, p. 1118.
[6] *Bismarck: His Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. ii. p. 268.

informed that in the event of his attacking either of the two neighbour-Powers he would find himself opposed by both, in order that Czar Alexander might not make the mistake of supposing that he could attack Austria alone. I deemed this solicitude groundless inasmuch as the Cabinet of St. Petersburg must by our answer to the questions sent us from Livadia have already learned that we were not going to let Austria fall, and so our treaty with Austria had not created a new situation, but only legalised that which existed.' It is not easy, however, to believe that Alexander the Second would have sent a trusted Ambassador on a special mission of this nature if he had known the exact details of the league entered into by Germany and Austria against him. Sabouroff, certainly, knew nothing of the terms of the alliance, whatever he may have suspected. Some confirmation of these conclusions may be gathered from Wertheimer's *Life of Count Julius Andrassy* (vol. iii. p. 294), who was the Austrian Foreign Minister at the time of the conclusion of the Dual Alliance, and Haymerle's predecessor. He is quoted as saying that he would rather renounce altogether the conclusion of the new agreement than intimate the terms to the Russian Court. The following was his suggestion of the procedure that should be adopted in order that Russia should have no excuse for asking to see the exact terms of the treaty. 'The Kaiser Wilhelm, after the treaty has been signed and approved, should communicate fully to the Czar the Memorandum drawn up and signed by the two Ministers of Germany and Austria-Hungary.' In this Memorandum, he argued, the idea of an agreement was implicit. In a footnote Wertheimer quotes a statement from Marczali, who published the Memorandum in an article in the *Deutsche Revue*, to the effect 'that not this but a shorter Memorandum was sent to Petersburg,' adding that so far as he is aware, Marczali's statement is inexact.' It is abundantly clear, however, that the vital significance of the Dual Alliance had not been disclosed to the Czar. Sabouroff's eyesight had not deceived him: there had been an Article or Part I. And even now Prince Bismarck's reference to Haymerle's query was as follows: 'I do not know why they are always anxious to make a mystery about that transaction. I could make one exactly similar with Russia at any moment without Austria being offended by it. What happened? I said to Andrassy that the maintenance of Austria as a Great Power was in the interests of Germany, that Germany could not allow Austria to be wiped off the map of Europe or indeed reduced to the status of a third-rate Power. Germany is surrounded by great States. Their number makes their power, for the more numerous they are, the greater their difficulty in forming a coalition. At that time the Pan-Slavist tendencies in Russia were making me uneasy,

[1] See also Arthur Singer, *Geschichte des Dreibundes*, p. 52 ff.

perhaps with no good reason. I asked myself what would be the direction of Russian policy under an empire with these tendencies, and a Franco-Russian alliance with the destruction of the unity of Germany as its avowed object was one of the dangers that I dreamt of in the future, and which resulted in letting me see clearly the advantage of preserving Austria as a Great Power. Andrassy from his side gave me like assurances. All that I said to him I had already said to Oubril in 1877 when Prince Gortchakoff had the question put to me as to what would be the attitude of Germany in the event of a war between Russia and Austria. The interests of Germany mark out a course of action for us in these similar circumstances from which we cannot deviate. We have to take care that neither of these two Powers is wounded to the death. They are both necessary to us.'

There follow many pages dealing with the Austro-German discussions of the projected Treaty which dealt with practically all the outstanding difficulties in the Near East. The three Emperors were all in agreement as to the advisability of the understanding, but as Haymerle continued to let the weeks go by in endless discussion, Sabouroff came to feel the force of Bismarck's remark that the Austrian Minister was 'not an easy dove to tame.' The difficulty was that while he indulged his 'passion for analysis' to the full, he steadily refused to submit any alternative statement. Bismarck began to be impatient and adopted various measures to bring him to a decision. Finally he sent written instructions to Prince Reuss in these terms: 'You will say to Baron Haymerle that I have directly undertaken for the Russian Government to secure from Austria a "Yes" or "No." I must have a definite reply. The Russian Ambassador has been waiting for it for three weeks and still I am not in a position to give it. Say also, that in the event of a refusal, I am in no way disposed to share with him the responsibility for the consequences to which that refusal may eventually lead. Austria will bear that responsibility herself alone. Already there has been sufficient embellishment of the theme of coolness in the relations between Russia and Germany, and I for my part will take care not to give any further pretext for such a supposition. Baron Haymerle must understand once for all that, if he refuses, he does so at his own risk and peril.' At the same time he dealt finally with the principal Austrian objections and indicated that Haymerle might fix the period of duration of the Treaty. In the end the latter yielded on all the main issues with one exception. But the death of the Emperor Alexander the Second gave him a further opportunity to continue to send in amendments upon it and other less important details.

On returning from Petrograd in April, after attending the

obsequies of his Imperial Master, M. Sabouroff found Prince Bismarck in a state of mind in which he was determined to inform Haymerle that there could be no more discussion, and that he must either accept the Treaty as it now stood, or leave it. With regard to the term of three years which had been proposed by Vienna as the period of duration, he was of opinion that the Austrian statesmen would appreciate the advantages of the arrangement by the end of that term and would consent to its renewal. 'When Austria,' he added, 'has worn that flannel next her skin for three whole years, she won't be able to take it off without running the risk of catching cold.'

Nevertheless these final stages in the negotiations proved the most difficult. Austria wished to have her relationship to the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar as definitely established as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia demurred. Bismarck came out quite unreservedly upon the side of Austria even if he employed arguments that Sabouroff felt to be 'a little Machiavellian.' 'We shall make a mistake if we keep Austria from compromising herself by committing to writing these demands of hers, which will only embroil her with the Western Powers, and furnish complicity with us in any future Eastern crisis.' M. Sabouroff however stood firm while adroitly striving to lay the burden of unreasonableness upon Haymerle. Bismarck thereupon took advantage of an illness to send his son with a message indicating that he had reached the limit of his patience and strength, and that he could no longer continue to serve as intermediary in what were now mere disputes about words and turns of phrases. There follows a remarkably able letter from Sabouroff to Prince Bismarck, the result of which was that the latter agreed to resume the negotiations, and on the basis of a compromise suggested by M. Sabouroff the matter was at last definitely settled. It appears that Bismarck took steps to have the Emperor Francis Joseph informed that 'the sole reason for his recent resolve to have nothing more to do with the negotiations had been the obstinacy of Baron Haymerle.' Corroboration of this is found in the circumstance that the Austrian Minister, in submitting his final acceptance of the Treaty in a form agreeable to the Russian Government, definitely intimated that it was by the express command of the Emperor Francis Joseph that the final difficulties had been removed. At 5 o'clock on Saturday, June 18, 1881, this important Treaty was signed at Prince Bismarck's residence. 'At the moment of signature the German Chancellor recollected that it was a propitious date, the day of the Battle of Belle-Alliance (Waterloo). I recollected that it was also the anniversary of the first victory in the reign of the late Emperor—the day of the great assault repulsed under the walls of Sevastopol, June 18, 1855.

And as the Austrian also had to have his victory on that date, I recollected for him, as we left the house together, that it was the day of their victory of Kolin over Frederick the Great.'

The later developments may be very briefly summarised. In 1884 the Treaty was renewed for a further term of three years, subject to one slight modification. Alexander the Third would have liked to have it renewed for a third term, particularly with Austria. As a matter of fact the understanding became closer with Germany, especially as Bismarck was endeavouring to negotiate a 'reinsurance' treaty with Russia, unknown to Austria, providing for neutrality in case either Power was attacked by a third. In this he succeeded. 'Then came Caprivi in place of Bismarck'—the words are M. Sabouroff's, 'and said that it was not necessary to make a separate treaty with Russia because Germany was on good relations with her. There followed still other councillors who began to smile towards France, but whether it began with Russia or with France I do not know. Bismarck was very shrewd in advising Austria not to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina when Count Kalnoky wished to do so in 1889-1890, inasmuch as it would have caused irritation in Russia. He said in effect, "Occupy the provinces; what more do you want?" And this is what Aehrenthal did later. Only, Austria had no *right* to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina when she did, inasmuch as the Treaty of 1881 was not renewed after 1887.'

The above recital of German methods may be left to suggest its own conclusions. One inevitable result was the present European War.

J. Y. Simpson.

THE ENEMIES OF CHILD LIFE

DURING the present World War we have been sacrificing our national capital, of men and money, to an unexampled extent, and it is being realised that the restitution of national prosperity after the War will come early or late in accordance with the number of young and capable workers who will be available for the many parts of the nation's work.

The wanton destruction of life in war has led to a general appreciation of the value of child life: and it is not surprising, therefore, that, while national economy has been advocated in other directions, the Local Government Board has urged the continuance and extension of social work for the welfare of mothers and their infants; nor that, although the work accomplished in this direction is but a fraction of what is urgently needed, it has been greatly extended throughout the country, notwithstanding the war-time difficulty in securing social workers.

Considerations not merely economic have, I think, helped to bring about this change.

The movement has been assisted by our common pride in the achievements of our men—from crowded towns as well as from country hamlets—in the stress of battle. These achievements have given the lie to the shallow and facile assertions of national decadence which had been dinned into our ears, and have proved that our men are worthy of our noblest traditions and are ready to sacrifice their lives for great impersonal ends. In the light of this national experience we at home have been led to realise more fully the obligations of our communal life which were crystallised by Mr. Asquith in the words: 'Every society is judged and survives according to the material and moral minima which it prescribes to its members.' Is it too much to hope that hereafter, in peace as in war, we may appeal successfully to the collective self of the community as well as to self-interest? Then in peace, as in war, evil will be overcome by good, and the avoidable horrors of peace, which are only less serious than those of war, will disappear.

Among the horrors of peace, stand foremost the suffering and loss of life of mothers and their infants. These arise from our national neglect of means to safeguard their welfare. Now that

we appreciate more fully that the mother is the maker of the home, the link between the past and the future, the transmitter of life and civilisation, and that each child may not irreverently be named a Holy Child, the protection of mother and child will become to an extent not hitherto attained an all-important part of future work to secure the welfare of our nation and of civilisation.

I propose to review the chief dangers to the integrity of family life and to indicate some remedies. In a single article it is impracticable to discuss all the factors concerned, but as these evils centre in and around the home, it may be possible by considering them from the standpoint of the home to obtain a view, more or less in perspective, of some of the chief enemies of maternal and child welfare, and thus assist social workers in co-ordinated effort on the most profitable lines immediately open to them.

The family is the resultant of the union of man and wife, and finds its greatest happiness in the nursing and tending of the children of the union. The first elements in the success of the family are the health and character of the parents; and as I shall not further discuss his share in the family responsibility I may here remark that in our efforts at securing child welfare we are too apt to neglect the father. A new and useful sphere of labour is open to welfare workers, that of giving instruction to fathers which will bring home to them the privilege of fatherhood and its associated responsibilities, the inability of a mother to do the best for her children if a large proportion of the family earnings fails to reach the domestic exchequer, the need the mother experiences for rest and for the assistance of a 'mother's help' at certain periods, and the moral as well as pecuniary aid which the father should render in building up family welfare. Why should not addresses on these and similar points be given at men's meetings and clubs, at 'pleasant Sunday afternoons' and so on; and why should not the assistance of the public press be obtained for occasional paragraphs on the above and similar points?

It is convenient to consider the enemies of child life under two headings: 1st, those affecting the infant chiefly through the mother during pregnancy and in the weeks immediately following childbirth: 2nd, those arising during the rest of infancy and in the next four years of life.

I

Research in recent years has already shown that many of the conclusions as to inherited disease will need revision, in the light of our increasing though still imperfect knowledge of the effect on the unborn infant of infection, injury, and malnutrition, which are as truly environmental in character as the effects of bad food,

of overcrowding and uncleanliness after birth. Much good work on these lines has been done by Dr. Routh and others, and I am hopeful that the pathological investigations now in progress on behalf of the Local Government Board on this particular part of infant mortality will shed additional light on a still obscure subject.

Do Infants 'Start Fair' at Birth?

The child's prospect of health is very largely determined by his environment in the first weeks after his birth and by his maternal environment before birth. Daily experience does not support the statement that infants are born in a fairly equal state of health. This is shown by several converging lines of evidence.

(*a*) We know that syphilis prevails very unequally and that it is an important cause of illness of the mother or of still-birth of the infant and of serious disease in infants born alive. The prevention of this disease and of gonorrhoea, the venereal disease which is a chief cause of sterility and suffering in women, is of such great importance that it is not too much to ask the father of every bride to insist, before his daughter's marriage, on the receipt from the prospective bridegroom of a certificate of freedom from venereal infection. A large share of the unhappiness of married life could in this way be avoided. The facilities now provided in all our chief centres of population for the treatment of these diseases, and the associated educational propaganda as to their prevention, constitute an advance of the first importance in the march of preventive medicine. Every social worker who joins in stimulating the activity of local authorities and of hospitals in the treatment of these diseases, in educational and moral work, particularly with the object of securing an equal standard of sexual morality for both sexes, is doing invaluable work for child welfare and for national progress.

We know less of other forms of intra-uterine infection; but there is increasing evidence that infections materially affect the intra-uterine health of the infant.

(*b*) The statement that infants at birth 'start fair' receives no support from the statistics of still-births. Still-births number on an average about 3 for every 100 live-births; but the proportion is as high as 8 or 7 in some towns; and it can scarcely be believed either that the higher proportion in these towns will not be associated with inferior health in infants born alive in the same towns or that this higher proportion cannot be reduced. There is no doubt that preventive medicine can greatly diminish the number of these still-births, not only in the areas in which they are more numerous than the average, but also in areas in which their number is relatively small.

(*c*) The enormous variations in the incidence of illness and deaths of mothers during pregnancy and in childbearing illustrate the same point. The map facing p. 12 of my Report on Maternal Mortality in connection with Childbearing (Cd. 8085) brings out this point. The fact, for instance, that in many Welsh counties seven mothers, while in London only three mothers die for every 1000 infants born; that in towns like Dewsbury, Rochdale, Huddersfield and Oldham 6 to 8 mothers, while in Poplar, Shoreditch and West Ham only 2 to 3 mothers, die for every 1000 infants born, is only reconcilable with the assumption that a large proportion of the mortality is avoidable. These deaths are associated with a lamentable amount of sickness and weakness in mothers who survive, often protracted over many months, and it is inevitable that excessive sickness and mortality of mothers should mean at least a corresponding excess of sickness and deaths of infants both before and after birth.

(*d*) The evidence as to the effect of maternal malnutrition on the unborn infant is not so clear. Illness during pregnancy necessarily involves malnutrition in the mother; the amount of such illness varies greatly in different districts, and although it is highly probable that if the foetus is ill-nourished it is so to a markedly less extent than the mother, it must share in some measure its mother's condition. Dr. Darwall Smith's investigations point to a relation between malnutrition in the mother and excess of still-births; and even if it were assumed that severe malnutrition of the mother during pregnancy had no detrimental effect on the health of the unborn infant, its harmful effect on the mother's capacity to suckle her infant is demonstrated by repeated experience.

A similar line of remark applies in respect of the employment of women in advanced pregnancy in occupations involving strain and over-exertion. There is, at present, little evidence of the relative frequency of misplacements and other complications of childbirth under varying circumstances of industrial occupation; but, here again, anything which diminishes the ability of the mother to nurse and tend her infant after its birth must be regarded as an enemy of home life.

(*e*) The mortality statistics for the first week and the first month after birth display once more the error of the assumption of an equal start in life at birth. The mortality statistics, it must always be remembered, are merely an index of the much larger amount of sickness which may or may not end in death.

The number of deaths under 1 week and under 1 month, as will shortly be shown, varies enormously in different parts of the country and in different social circles. If therefore, as is reasonable, it be assumed that the larger portion of the deaths

occurring during the first month and still more during the first week after birth are due to accident (including malnutrition) or disease during pregnancy or at the time of birth, it is abundantly clear that infants do not 'start fair.'

The general conclusion is that many infants are condemned to death before birth; that a large proportion of these deaths can be prevented; and that, of the infants who survive to be born alive, a large number are handicapped from birth by their unfavourable ante-natal environment and by the evil circumstances in which they were born.

Variations in Vitality in First Month after Birth

The deaths under one month of age deserve further study. It has recently been stated that there is substantial constancy in their number (in proportion to the number of births), and that about three-fourths of these deaths in most areas are unavoidable; and we have been commended therefore to devote our attention preferably to other parts of infancy.

Even were the deaths under one month of age equally distributed geographically and socially, it would not follow that their number could not be reduced to a much larger extent than one-fourth. A constant death-rate is not necessarily irreducible; but in fact there is no such constancy in the number of deaths under one month out of a given number of infants born alive.

The statement that there is substantial constancy in the death-rate from all causes during the first month after birth is based primarily on a remark by Dr. Stevenson of the General Register Office to the effect that 'the chances of survival seem to differ but little at birth in town and in country,' made in commenting on the average experience of all rural and all urban districts in the aggregate. In his annual report for 1916, a proof copy of which is before me, Dr. Stevenson furnishes the necessary correction for the unjustified inference as to equality of geographical and social incidence of early infant mortality, in the following statement:

> The approximate equality of mortality in the first month of life, however, only applies as between the towns as a whole and the rural districts as a whole, and is partly due to the fact that the excess in mortality manifested by the county boroughs even at this age is largely offset by the low mortality of London. As between London and the county boroughs Table 15 shows an excess of mortality at this period in the latter amounting to 24 per cent. This ratio is a very constant one, having varied only between 20 and 24 per cent. during the six years 1911-16. The constant superiority of the London figure is, of course, a very definite indication that the mortality of the other large towns is to a considerable extent preventable, even at this age, and that without making any allowance for the extent, which may be large, to which London mortality is in

itself preventable. This conclusion is confirmed by the figures for individual towns during the period 1907-10 published in Appendix II. of the Second Report on Infant and Child Mortality of the Medical Officer of the Local Government Board.

Certain statistics of experience in London and Brighton of persons in various social positions are available on this point.

(1) The experience of five groups of population in London was collected by Dr. Hamer, the groups being arranged in accordance with the percentage of children in each borough who were scheduled for education in the Council schools (varying only from 82 to 97 per cent.). The death-rate under one week in these five groups varied from 18.3 to 22.0 per 1000 births (a difference of 12 per cent.) and under one month from 28.7 to 34.0 per 1000 (a difference of 12 per cent.). Between the death-rates under one month in Hampstead and Shoreditch the difference was about 25 per cent.—a considerable range of variation.

(2) The Brighton experience is stated to show fairly equal death-rates under one month in various social strata. The detailed figures with which Dr. Forbes has courteously supplied me are necessarily on a small scale. They show a difference of 40 per cent. between the death-rate of infants under one month in the poorest families and in the better-to-do, but the two rates are identical in the first week after birth, a result which is not surprising in view of the fact that in Brighton midwifery and medical attendance are of exceptionally high quality, and the death-rate of mothers from diseases and accidents associated with pregnancy and confinement is only 3 per 1000 births as compared with 6 or even 8 in some other parts of the country.

(3) In my Second Report on Infant Mortality (Cd. 6909) are given the death-rates in 1907-10 of infants under one month for 212 towns and 29 metropolitan boroughs. The following extreme instances are taken from that report. The death-rate under one month per 1000 births varied from 61.0 at Workington, 58.0 at Blyth, 57.7 at Batley, 56.7 at Dewsbury and 54.7 at Todmorden, to 25.9 at Watford, 27.1 at Hornsey, 27.2 at Penge, 27.9 at Reigate, 28.0 at Holborn and so on.

(4) In the same report and in an earlier report are given the death-rates for the same urban areas and for counties during the first week after birth. These may fairly be ascribed almost entirely to pre-natal conditions or to complicated or neglected parturition.

The following examples may be given. In Durham and Northumberland out of every 1000 infants born nearly twice as many die in the seven days after birth as in Hereford and Kent. In individual towns the contrasts are even greater. Thus in Workington out of every 1000 born 41 die before reaching the end of

the first week, in Hornsey only 16; in Dewsbury 41 as compared with 18 in Hampstead; 38 in Batley, only 17 in Heywood, and so on.

Similarly the death-rate from premature birth and congenital defects varies within wide limits, as for instance between 43.6 per 1000 births in Todmorden and 14.6 in Watford.

(5) The merest tyro in statistics is aware that average death-rates for large masses of population may conceal extreme variations in the constituent experiences. The need to study variations as well as averages is shown by the extreme variations given in Dr. Stevenson's special study of early infant mortality in the annual report of the Registrar-General for 1911. He found that the death-rate among infants under one month, per 1000 births, varied according to occupation of the father from 30.2 in the upper and middle class to 46.5 in miners, which means a difference of 54 per cent. in these particular instances.

These results, like the experience of the individual towns quoted above, are average, and conceal much greater variations when the statistics are sub-divided. Thus, as shown in the Table below, the death-rate is at least seven times as high in certain groups as in others. The table has been prepared as follows: In 1911, omitting a few unclassified cases, there occurred 843,293 births, which Dr. Stevenson classified according to the occupation of the fathers, and set out their experience of infant mortality. In the following table the different occupational groups given in Dr. Stevenson's detailed table, have been classified according to the death-rate under one month per 1000 births.

England and Wales, 1911

Groups of Occupations in which the Death-rate of Legitimate Infants under One Month per 1000 Births was	Number of Legitimate Births in each Group		Number of Deaths under One Month	Average Death-rate under One Month per 1000 Births		Extremes in each Group
Under 15 . .	1,859	20,931	12	6.5	20.5	.0–10.3[1]
15–20 . .	4,720		86	18.2		15.4–19.6
20–25 . .	14,352		330	23.0		20.2–24.9
25–30 . .	34,671		968	27.9		25.2–29.6
30–35 . .	128,510		4,221	32.8		30.0–34.9
35–40 . .	313.015		11,679	37.3		35.0–39.9
40–45 . .	138.871		5,834	42.0		40.1–44.9
45 and over .	207,295		9,806	47.3		—
—	843,293		32,936	39.0		—

It will be seen that 207,295 (24.6 per cent.) of the total births occurred under circumstances involving a sacrifice during the first month after birth of nearly 5 per cent. of the infants born;

[1] A group of 487 births.

while for 20,931 (over 2 per cent.) of the total births the corresponding sacrifice was only 2 per cent. of those born.

Among the occupations of parents whose infants had a death-rate below 25 per 1000 births in the first month after birth were the following: artists, merchants, glove makers, woodmen, envelope makers, doctors, copper miners, motor mechanics, hosiers, boot dealers. Among those having a death rate over 45 per 1000 births during the same period were waiters, scavengers, costermongers, labourers, navvies, oil and colourmen, brush makers, textile workers, dressmakers, laundry workers, coalminers, metal workers and boiler makers, lead workers. The list, which might be greatly extended, is suggestive of preventible causes of mortality. There can be little hesitation in ascribing a large share in the excessive early infant mortality in some of these occupations to alcoholism in the father with consequent neglect of the mother and the malnutrition in the infant which is the common lot of the children of the drunkard.

It is noteworthy that the total 105,130 deaths of infants in England and Wales in the year 1911 were distributed as follows:

Under 1 month	32,936
1–3 months	19,647
3–6 months	20,988
6–12 months	31,559
	105,130

Of the total deaths in infancy, nearly one-third occur in the first month, and it may be added about one-fifth occur in the first week after birth. A relatively small percentage gain in these early weeks is therefore an actually great gain.

The first three groups of births in the table on the preceding page, forming 2.5 per cent. of the total births, were associated with a death-rate under one month of only 20.5 per 1000 births. Had this experience been shared by the entire community, the deaths under one month would have been 17,288 instead of 32,936, and the total infant mortality for 1911 would have been 106 instead of 125 per 1000 births.

It is evident then, that whether the deaths during the first week or during the whole of the first month after birth are taken as the test, there are enormous variations in mortality. To regard the greater part of the mortality at these ages as inevitable is contrary to the teaching of our current national experience.

A word is desirable in passing on the assumption that, the death-rate under one month being fairly constant, three fourths of it is probably irreducible. If the death-rate in Watford can even according to this unfounded dictum be reduced from 26 to 19, and that of Workington from 61 to 45, why should 45 be the

bed-rock minimum in one town and 19 in another? There is no reasonable doubt that both these figures can be surpassed, as shown by Dr. Stevenson's occupational statistics; and that at present a large avoidable loss of life in still-births and in deaths shortly after birth continues, associated with a large mass of avoidable suffering on the part of mothers.

Are not these lives to be saved and is not this maternal suffering to be prevented? If so, how is this to be brought about?

Most important beginnings have been made. The Maternity Benefit under the National Insurance Act assists in so far as the money is devoted to skilled assistance and domestic aid for the mother during the lying-in period. The grants by the Local Government Board of 50 per cent. of total approved expenditure by local authorities and voluntary agencies for securing medical and nursing assistance, including hospital treatment for expectant mothers, and during and after their confinement and for their infants, have opened up the possibility of most valuable work in alleviating the lot of the mother and in safeguarding her health and that of her infant. The extent to which the work is being carried out varies according to the degree of activity of the responsible local authorities. That further subsidisation of maternity, especially in the form of actual services, is desirable, I have no doubt.

As social workers, we cannot refrain from continued and increased effort until the mothers who suffer unnecessarily and whose infants die soon after birth in excessive numbers are raised to the level of their more favoured sisters in these respects. To bring this about the combined efforts of doctors, midwives, hospitals, health visitors, monthly nurses and home helps will be required; and their work is urgently needed for the improvement of our national life and efficiency.

I can only refer in passing to the lot of the illegitimate infant, who even under favourable financial circumstances commonly lacks not only paternal, but also maternal care. In 1915, the births of 36,245 illegitimate infants were registered in England and Wales; and of this number one-fifth died during the first year after birth, or double the number among a corresponding number of legitimate births. It is a grave reflection on our social organisation, a responsibility shared in varying degree by the majority of voluntary agencies for helping unmarried mothers and their infants, by lying-in hospitals, and by the poor law—that such help as is given implies most often that the mother is separated from her infant, and that thus the infant loses its most favourable means of health, and the mother loses the buttress against lower moral fall, which the personal care of her infant would give.

II

So far I have dwelt only on a few of the personal elements in the welfare of the family. These in actual life cannot be separated from the environmental conditions in and about the home. The personal elements themselves, in so far as they consist of infection, malnutrition, or injury during intra-uterine life are environmental. Before as well as after birth circumstances and personal factors are so closely inter-related as to make it folly to minimise the influence of one or the other in the making of the home.

After birth certainly infection is the greatest enemy of child life.

Under existing conditions the majority of deaths in the first five years after birth are due to infection, including catarrhal infections of the respiratory tract. The larger part of these deaths are preventable.

ENGLAND AND WALES

Proportion of Total Deaths at ages 0-5 *due to*

	Per Cent.	
Congenital debility, etc.	23.0	
Measles	7.3	
Whooping-cough	5.0	
Other acute infectious diseases	5.0	57.9 per cent.
Tuberculosis	5.3	
Bronchitis and pneumonia	19.5	
Diarrhoeal diseases	15.8	
All other diseases	19.1	
	100.0	

The fact that more than half of the total deaths in childhood are caused by communicable diseases goes far to explain the common excess of child mortality in towns, communicable diseases as shown in the following table causing a greater mortality in larger and smaller towns than in rural districts (Report on Child Mortality at ages 0-5, 1911-14, Cd. 8496, page 16).

Comparative Mortality in Rural Districts (=100) *and in Towns*, 1911-14,

From	Rural Districts	Larger Towns	Smaller Towns
All causes	100	151	134
Measles	100	250	200
Whooping-cough	100	129	115
Bronchitis and pneumonia	100	166	139
Diarrhoea	100	213	187

The four diseases or grouped diseases here enumerated are responsible for 48 per cent. of the total deaths in childhood; and it is within the mark to state that the influences in town life favouring direct infection and incidentally lowering resistance to

attack and to death from attack are very largely responsible for the difference between child mortality in town and in country.

It must be borne in mind that three-fourths (78.1 per cent.) of the total population of England and Wales is subject to this excessive urban mortality of children.

The reasons for the excessive average loss of child life in towns are not far to seek. First and foremost must be placed the prevalence of artificial feeding of infants, which is probably greater in towns than in rural districts. Whether so or not, artificial feeding of infants is associated with much greater danger to the infant in towns than in the country. The milk supply of towns as a rule is staler, poorer, and more contaminated than that obtained in country districts near the source of supply. The freer inter-communication of population in towns implies more frequent and more massive infection; this affects the death-rate not only from measles and whooping-cough, from diarrhoeal and from respiratory infections, but also from tuberculosis. In addition, housing in towns implies overcrowding to an extent not occurring in rural districts, increasing the risk of infection and lowering resistance to it.

The preceding tabular statement shows averages, and to conclude that urban life is necessarily associated with excessive child mortality would be to fall into the same mistake as has been exposed in the preceding remarks as to the death-rate in the first month after birth. It can only be said that health, though attainable, is attainable with greater difficulty in town than in country.

There is no single factor external to the home which can with accuracy be stated to be common to all the towns or parts of towns experiencing excessive child mortality. Different urban communities under general atmospheric and climatic conditions which are indistinguishable show great variations in child mortality. Thus:

(1) Industrial towns within the same county, sometimes within a few miles of each other, show widely divergent child mortality rates. The map of Lancashire facing page 2 of Cd. 7511 strikingly illustrates this point.

(2) Equally marked differences in child mortality rates occur in contiguous wards of the same town. Thus, in contiguous wards in Middlesbrough, the child death-rate (at ages 0-5) per 1000 births in 1911-14 was 369 and 146 respectively, and in contiguous wards in St. Helens was 354 and 200. Similarly, differences in infant mortalities of wards or other areas in boroughs (under 1 per 1000 births in 1911) of 213 and 113, in Manchester of 204 and 110, in Shoreditch of 123 and 163, Stepney of 106 and 189, and Islington of 85 and 162 cannot be explained on the ground of general atmospheric conditions.

(3) The experience of the Peabody Block Dwellings as to infant mortality during the four years 1913-16 is interesting. For the data enabling me to prepare the following table I am indebted to Mr. Crouch, of the Peabody Trust. In a parallel column is given the total infant mortality for the same period in the metropolitan borough in which each group of Peabody Buildings is situate.

—	Number of Peabody Buildings	Number of Births in these Buildings	Infant Mortality per 1000 Births	
			In these Buildings	In the Entire Borough
Borough of Stepney .	3	243	74	122
„ Finsbury .	3	330	67	133
„ Lambeth .	2	252	83	104
„ Southwark .	3	221	81	122
„ Westminster .	7	557	86	92
Ungrouped . . .	7	423	71	—
London	25	2026	77	103 (London)

In nearly every instance the infant mortality in the Peabody Buildings is markedly lower than that of the surrounding population. The difference may be due to the fact that the families in these dwellings are selected; but the explanation is to be found largely in the cleanliness and sobriety of their population, in the sanitation of the dwellings, in the absence of overcrowding, in the provision for each tenement of the elementary structural requirements of a healthy life, and in the supervision exercised over the dwellers in these Buildings.

(4) In towns and districts which have few industries and in which atmospheric conditions are semi-rural there are similar contrasts. Thus, in 1916, the rate of infant mortality ranged in different wards of Croydon between 48 and 91, of Walthamstow between 77 and 108, and of Brighton between 52 and 90.

(5) It is noteworthy that in Germany the rural is higher than the urban infant death-rate, as shown in the following table:

Germany.—Infant Mortality Rates

	1914	1916
Average of 26 towns, each with more than 200,000 population	153	130
Average of all towns with more than 15,000 population	155	133
Average of smaller towns and rural districts	167	161
Berlin	151	118

Throughout Bavaria and the greater part of Germany the rural is higher than the urban infant mortality. In the towns of

France the infant mortality in towns of 5000 inhabitants and over in 1912 was 111 and in the rest of France 103.

Doubtless atmospheric pollution is inimical to health, but that it occupies a relatively low place in the causation of excessive child mortality is clear from a comparative study of all the available facts.

Attempts to ascribe the whole evil to one cause must fail, because they are not consistent with all the facts of a complex social problem, in which functional and structural obstacles to health in each household are intermingled. Insufficient wages, alcoholism, thriftlessness, ignorance, lack of pure milk, all bear their part in varying proportions in different instances; but the chief difference between urban and rural life is in housing, especially in regard to overcrowding, and in opportunities for human organic poisoning and infection.

The present process of steadily increasing decentralisation of our urban populations will, I hope, become more marked, as railway and road facilities for travelling increase. With increasing use of electrical power we may anticipate wider spreading out of the great industries of our towns. But improvements in these directions will necessarily be slow. Meanwhile, as regards the supremely important point of overcrowding, the housing in towns, on the average, is profoundly less satisfactory than that in rural districts. This is shown in the following summary table from the last census report:

Proportion of Various Tenements, 1911

—	England and Wales	Aggregate Urban Districts	Aggregate Rural Districts
Percentage of tenements consisting of—			
One room	3.2	3.9	0.6
Two rooms	8.3	9.0	5.5
Three rooms	13.8	14.1	12.9
Four rooms	24.7	23.1	?
More than four rooms	50.0	49.9	—
—	100.0	100.0	100.0

It will be seen that out of a given number of families more than six times as many live in one-roomed tenements in towns as in rural districts, and that an excessive proportion of urban families live in two-roomed tenements. (See also page 93.)

Nearly one-seventh of all the families in towns occupy only one or two rooms, and every function of domestic life, including birth and death, is carried on under these cramped circumstances. The amount of crowding in these rooms, furthermore, is much greater

in towns than in the country. To the general depressing influence of town life is added the deleterious influence of crowded rooms.

However extensive may be the housing schemes of the near future the poorest part of the population in large numbers will remain for years to come near their work in the older and inner wards of our towns; and the life and welfare of hundreds of thousands of children depend on the conditions under which they are allowed to live.

The experience of some of the inner wards of our industrial towns shows that under central town conditions it is practicable to secure an infant mortality much lower than that of 1915 (90 per 1000 births) for rural England.

Incidentally, it must be remembered that this comparatively low rural death-rate comprises a large mass of preventible mortality. In Oxfordshire in 1915 the infant death-rate was 63 per 1000 births, and in some of the rural counties of Ireland, a still lower infant mortality is experienced. In these instances the non-aggregation of houses which are often insanitary greatly diminishes risk to human health from organic contaminations and from infectious disease.

That towns may approach the infant death-rate of rural districts is shown by current experience. Five metropolitan boroughs (1911-14) have infant death-rates of 74 (Hampstead), 82 (Lewisham), 83 (Stoke Newington), and 84 (Chelsea and Woolwich).

Fifteen great towns are in a similar position, including not only such dormitories of London as Hornsey (67) and Ilford (70), but also industrial towns like Swindon (85) and Reading (89). Among smaller towns, residential towns like Woking (66) and Finchley (67), as well as towns like Brighouse (75) and Rugby (77), come in the same category.

But in every one of these towns there are districts and streets in which there is still excessive infant mortality;[3] just as streets, the inhabitants of which experience a low infant mortality, are interspersed in industrial towns experiencing a general high rate of infant mortality. If the necessary remedies are applied in the areas of excessive infant mortality this, even in industrial towns, will ere long be reduced to 50 per thousand births.

What is the explanation of the differences just cited? The chief enemies of child life are within the home itself, and they may be classified as functional and structural, though in practice these must be considered together. To attach exclusive importance to persons or to conditions is to invite failure in social reform.

[3] Thus in 1911 the infant mortality in Hampstead varied in different wards from 69 to 92; in Chelsea, from 79 to 149; in Woolwich, from 64 to 110; in Finchley, from 71 to 96; in Hornsey, from 55 to 109; in West Ham, from 79 to 171; in Tottenham, from 81 to 160.

Often the chief enemies are the parents themselves, and their default is vitally serious as they are responsible for bearing as well as for rearing their children.

Some of the parental enemies of child life have already been mentioned. They may date from before marriage, the seeds of youthful indiscretion bearing baneful fruit in the children of marriage. Infection, injury, including over-fatigue, and deficient nutrition before birth mean that, even if the infant is born alive, his life is handicapped from its onset. Inadequate care of mother and infant during the lying-in period and during the next month or two is a common cause of infant mortality by failure of breast-feeding or otherwise, and the provision of nurses, of 'mothers' helps,' as well as of maternity homes and of convalescent hospitals, for lying-in mothers whose needs are exceptional, and especially for mothers whose breast-feeding is temporarily endangered, are among the practical reforms at which many of us are working.

Alcoholism as an Enemy of Child Life

Personal faults in the parents are responsible for a large portion of the total excessive child sickness and mortality. Intemperance stands easily first in this category. If a diagram for a long series of years be constructed an almost complete correspondence will be seen between the curves of annual national infant mortality, proceedings for drunkenness in terms of population, and *per capita* consumption of beer and spirits. The experience of individual families in every town in the country confirms the view that alcoholism is a chief enemy of family life. The wife is robbed of the wages which should go to maintain the family, she becomes ill-nourished and can neither bear nor rear healthy children; as time goes on the husband's wages diminish with the decline of his economic value, a dwelling of two rooms or even of one room is occupied when four are required for health, and the children are not only semi-starved, but are exposed to infection in concentrated doses, and if they survive grow up enfeebled and inefficient members of society.

But as I have remarked in a recent report (p. 66, Cd. 8496) intemperance is a symptom of social evil as well as its cause. It not only results from example and habit acting on an individual of feeble will power, but it is also a common result of the toxaemia of over-fatigue, the habit of excessive drinking being acquired in the foolish attempt to counteract fatigue by this means. Excessive drinking is a product of uninteresting surroundings, and more particularly of bad housing and of domestic discomfort. The consideration of intemperance, therefore, cannot be separated from that of housing conditions, and in the search for the easiest point

at which to break the vicious circle of influences dragging parents and children down there is need in some instances for direct attack on intemperance, and in others for equally vigorous attention to the avoidance of chronic over-fatigue, to improvements in housing, and to the provision of wholesome means of recreation.

Much more than hitherto can be effected in the fight against intemperance, as a chief enemy of child life, by means of direct restriction of the sale of alcoholic drinks. The experiments of the Liquor Control Board already have had some success as shown by Lord D'Abernon's reports; and continuance and extension of restrictions under war conditions will give important guidance in the more drastic control which must form part of the future programme for ensuring the welfare of mothers and their children.

Industrial Employment of Married Women

Among other functional enemies of child life is the industrial employment of married women. The collective work of wives and mothers in factories and their less obvious work as charwomen and day servants have become a serious obstacle to family life on older lines; and one of our most pressing current problems, especially under war conditions, is to secure the retention of the mother for the family or to safeguard the children in her absence. Over a million women have been added to the ranks of occupations outside homes during the War, of whom more than one-half are engaged in munition works.

Before the War the chief occupation of women happily was in family life as shown in the following figures:

Census, 1911

Of the 7,307,019 women aged 20–45	Married	were 58.4	per cent. of the total.
	Unmarried	„ 39.2	
	Widowed	„ 2.4	
Of the 4,116,311 women aged 45 and over	Married	were 56.8	per cent. of the total.
	Unmarried	„ 14.1	
	Widowed	„ 29.1	

It will be seen that more than half of the total women during and after child-bearing ages were married; of all the unmarried women over 20, 58.4 per cent.; and of all the married women over 20, 10.3 per cent. were industrially employed.

It would open too large a subject to discuss the steadily increasing refusal to bear children or more than two children in married life; but I must point out that we are approaching by rapid steps a time when our population will have become stationary like that of France, or will only continue to increase in virtue of the immigration of races whose outlook on life is diverse from

ours, and whom we should regret to see occupying Greater Britain for lack of sons and daughters of our own.

In reconstruction after the War it is evident that in the interest of both mother and child home-making and home-keeping, child-bearing and child-rearing will need to be encouraged; and if, as is not unlikely, the proportion of industrial employment of married women does not go down to the *ante-bellum* level, special steps will need to be taken to assist in maintaining the efficiency of home life. If married women are to be employed largely in industrial life, this should be under conditions which do not risk the future of our national life. In this connexion the provision of nurses and of mothers' helps, whether by co-operative means or otherwise, has great importance. It is not suggested that these can replace the mother; even when the mother is at home, such assistance is needed from time to time.

Circumstances and character constantly react on each other; and I doubt whether most of us would be more successful in child-rearing than the poor if we lived under their conditions. It is essential therefore that, in attempting to improve present conditions, we should assist in providing all mothers with the minimum functional and structural requirements of family life.

I have already mentioned some of the functional needs. Let me now enumerate some of the structural needs.

Reference to official reports will show the vast extent to which these structural needs are still neglected, although great improvements have been effected; and experience shows that healthy child life is possible even under dense urban conditions of life.

First, may be enumerated those requirements the enforcement of which is or should be the duty of the Sanitary Authority.

The list of requirements set out below is not complete, but it emphasises points of special importance in the present connexion. The list presupposes a system of official inspection to secure the provision and maintenance of minimum requirements.

1. The prompt and efficient removal of house refuse.
2. The enforcement of paving of yards, and the general control of structural defects of the dwelling affecting health.
3. The reduction of street dust and noise to a minimum.
4. The more complete control of industrial, including smoke, nuisances, and accumulations of horse manure.
5. The provision of a pure-water supply and of gas and electric light at minimum prices.

Secondly, the more important domestic physical conditions for healthy family life may be enumerated as follows:

1. An adequate kitchen and living room, possibly the two in one room.
2. Satisfactory sleeping accommodation for each member of the family.
3. Arrangements for the cool and dustless storage of food.

4. A separate drinking-water tap within or for each dwelling, and a sink for washing and for the disposal of waste water.
5. Separate water-closet accommodation for each family.
6. Satisfactory storage for coal and a movable covered ash-bin.

With the fulfilment of these conditions it becomes practicable to insist that each tenant shall maintain—

7. Strict cleanliness within the dwelling.

I have not included a bath-room and bath in my list of minimum requirements, not from lack of appreciation of their importance, but because of the need for stating only minimal requirements for tenements as well as for separate houses. Nor have I emphasised methods of co-operative housing, to which we must look in the future to assist in enabling the mothers of our wage-earning classes to avoid over-fatigue and ill-health in themselves before and after the birth of their babies, and to avoid excessive illness and mortality of these babies.

Among such co-operative arrangements may be mentioned joint wash-houses for a block of cottages, an accessible crèche for temporary charge of young children, a joint system of supply of hot water, and at the least a supply of hot water over the sink of each individual dwelling. Why not also an organised co-operative system of bakehouses and kitchens for cooking dinners, as well as of 'mothers' helps,' arranged on strictly local lines, so that wives and widows without children may regularly assist mothers whose children at present receive inadequate care? There is ample scope on these and similar lines for the organising skill of women, and already there are signs that this skill will, ere long, be turned to this end.

The non-fulfilment of the conditions enumerated above and the associated functional insufficiency of home life, which chiefly occurs in dwellings of unsatisfactory type, are responsible year by year for a holocaust of child life.

On page 88 I have already stated what proportion of the total population are living in inadequate tenements. Let me now state this in terms of actual numbers. In 1911, of the total population of England and Wales, 2,580,814 persons were living in one- or two-roomed dwellings, and of this number 1,015,841 were living overcrowded in the sense of more than two persons per room; 4,429,119 persons were living in three-roomed dwellings, and of this number 1,023,925 were similarly overcrowded.

I have not separately discussed ignorance as a factor in causing excessive child mortality. Although ignorance exists in all classes, and the activities of health visitors and others are needed to minimise it, we are doing the unfortunate occupants of unsatisfactory dwellings a far-reaching injustice when we pose as their superior instructors, without lending a hand to secure for them

the minimum conditions of a healthy home life which I have roughly enumerated.

The advice of the health visitor as to food storage and preparation can scarcely be followed when there is no pantry. Domestic cleanliness, an indispensable condition of health, becomes difficult if not impossible, if not only is there no supply of hot water except what is heated on the fire, but each pail of water has to be carried from the yard or basement to a second or third floor tenement, and if liquid and solid organic refuse has similarly to be carried down several stairs. In the central parts of our larger towns a large part of the total dwellings consists of such sub-let houses. Can it be wondered that, in the absence of satisfactory storage of food and of coal, without water supply, sink, and water-closet special to the dwelling, the mother gradually becomes disheartened and despairs of cleanliness; and that consequently children are victimised by infectious dust or by grossly contaminated food, and diarrhoeal and respiratory diseases, which are always excessive in dwellings of this class, follow as a natural consequence?

If middle-class families lived under similar conditions in every respect their record would differ little; ignorance of personal hygiene is widespread, let us help in dissipating it; but let us not, in a spirit of class complacency, forget our duty to secure for every family the elementary conditions of healthy domestic life.

The Advantages of Urbanisation

In previous pages I have emphasised the evils associated with the commonly prevailing conditions of town life.

Let us turn to some of the advantages of urbanisation. Urban life has rendered available auxiliaries to family life, which can be made to go far to counterbalance its evils. Among these the school and the hospital stand pre-eminent, though many other municipal and voluntary agencies also are valuable auxiliaries of home life. The home is the base of family life; the city is the larger home, and the institutions of the city are good and useful in so far as they conduce to the health, efficiency, happiness and character of its constituent families. The best hope that prompt remedies will be applied for removing the dangers to childhood, within the home and in its city setting, consists in the realisation by every family in the city that they are co-partners in responsibility for the functioning of the city as well as members of a single family.

When this view-point is fully realised the whole of city life will become satisfactorily related; and its activities will be

directed towards ensuring the efficiency and welfare of each family. On the official side the National Legislature, the Central Government, the Local Public Health Authority, and the Local Education Committee; on either the unofficial or voluntary side, the public Press and literature, free libraries, religious agencies, social agencies for the improvement of health or morals, means for recreations and pleasure, will be woven into one co-operative whole for the common weal. It is scarcely necessary for me to emphasise the important share which will be increasingly taken in this co-operative effort by members of Parliament and of local authorities, including a much larger proportion of women, by the medical officer of health and medical experts in the scholastic and other special branches of public medical work, by the sanitary inspector, the school teacher and attendance officer, the mother's help made available by co-operative effort or otherwise, the health visitor, the domiciliary nurse, the school nurse. Their efforts and the efforts of others whom I have failed to enumerate can be fitted into a complete system less chaotic and wasteful of effort than our present arrangements, when the necessary readjustments of central and still more of local government have been made, and the entire population have fully realised the responsibilities and privileges of their citizenship.

I will only emphasise separately the special need for organic continuity between the home and the city, when sickness invades the household. Before 1911 this country had travelled far in the direction of provision of medical aid for its population. Public Health, Poor Law and Education Authorities, supplemented to an important extent by voluntary hospitals, had provided in institutions a considerable proportion of the medical treatment which only the rich can afford in their own homes, and which not even the rich usually can obtain under such satisfactory conditions as are found in many of our hospitals. The National Insurance Act has carried us further by arranging for subsidised domiciliary treatment for about one-third of the total population. The principle of free treatment for all comers has been accepted in the treatment of venereal diseases in the interest of the community; and it is evident that we shall travel further in the provision of medical aid, chiefly at the expense of the State. The arrangements mentioned above require to be adjusted and made more generally available; and when this is done, so far as sickness is concerned, the unity in function of the city and the home will have been secured. A prophet is not needed to warrant the assertion that ere long this communal copartnership will be realised, and the hospital will then be regarded, for all patients for whom it can provide better facilities for treatment than private houses, as the home during sickness.

I have emphasised the importance of improved housing as a means of securing the welfare of mothers and their children. Let us think of housing in its wider sense as a problem in two divisions, housing for the sick and housing for the healthy. Special housing in hospitals is needed for the sick when the nursing and medical care needed are not obtainable in the home of the patient; and, while leaving ample scope for voluntary effort, it will be true economy to place this provision in the same category as our water supply and municipal services and make it a general charge on the community.

In no department of medicine is increase of such extended hospital-home provision for the sick so much needed as for parturient women, and for them and their infants, as required, in the first months after the infants' birth. How much sickness of mother and infant would be avoided if this duty were to be frankly undertaken for all mothers who desire it! I have no space to go into detail on this point; but if it be borne in mind that more than 2½ millions of the total population of England and Wales are living in one- or two-roomed, and that 4½ millions are living in three-roomed, dwellings (see page 94), and that in such a town as Tynemouth over 60 per cent. of the births occur in dwellings comprising one or at the most two rooms; that within these one- or two-roomed dwellings birth and death as well as every other function of life take place, my readers will agree as to the urgent necessity for further provision of maternity homes for a large proportion of the families throughout the country.

Progress already made

In the preceding pages I have dwelt chiefly on the enemies of child life. It is well, however, to recall the gigantic progress already made to secure the welfare of childhood. In the years before this became, happily, a fashionable subject, in which all are interested, a large number of sanitary authorities and a still larger number of medical officers of health and sanitary inspectors were labouring successfully in this field, and I wish to place on record our common indebtedness to these public health workers.

The combined result of their work and of the steadily improving social conditions of the people is shown in the following statement, and in the diagram on page 13 of Cd. 8496.

Comparing the average experience of 1871-75 with that of 1911-15 and stating the death-rate of the earlier period at each age as 100, in 1911-15 the

Death-rate at the age	0–1	had become	71
,,	,,	1–2	,,	59
,,	,,	2–3	,,	50
,,	,,	3–4	,,	47
,,	,,	4–5	,,	50

Stated otherwise these differences mean that if the death-rate at ages 0-5 of 1871 had prevailed in 1916, 200,000 more deaths would have occurred in this year than in fact were experienced.

A great task still, however, lies before us. There is still a great loss of child life which can be prevented by means at once available; the sickness and defects found so commonly among school children can in large measure be prevented if the necessary measures are adopted in earlier childhood: and a large mass of industrial and social inefficiency in adults can similarly be obviated. This may cost money; but health, when we have paid for it as a community, is always cheaper than disease; and within limits we can have as much health as we are prepared to pay for.

In the preceding pages I have attempted the almost impossible task of reviewing a subject in which is embraced the entire social problem of to-day. I hope, however, I have shown ways in which the family may be conserved and may be made happier and healthier. To this end realisation of the unity of the family, the city and the State is needed. It is only by continuous co-operation of the forces embodied in these words that complete success is rendered practicable. To secure the nation the mother must be safeguarded. The welfare of the child depends on her welfare: and unless she is protected from disease and from over-fatigue during pregnancy as well as while her family is young, this end will not be secured.

This object is nearer achievement than at any past period.

We are most of us determined that all unnecessary suffering and loss of life of mothers and young children shall be ended.

Let us have an end of the false truisms which still gain currency: such as 'The tenants make the slum.'

Do they make houses back to back? Are they responsible for narrow courts and streets, to which the sun has scant access? Are they responsible for insanitary closets, absence of separate water supply, and unpaved yards, deficient scavenging, etc.?

Huxley once said that if *la misère* were to remain a characteristic of our advancing commerce and civilisation, he would hail the advent of some friendly comet to sweep it all away into nothingness. No such need arises. Although it is true, as St. Paul has it, that 'up to now, all created things groan and suffer together,' the groans have become fewer and less loud, as witness such outstanding events as the abolition of slavery, the improved position of women, our greater care for the sick, the wonders achieved by preventive medicine, the greater regard for humanitarian conditions of industrialism.

It is becoming less common for a negative answer to be given

to the question each of us needs to ask: 'Am I my brother's keeper?'

The cash nexus of life is having intertwined in it a moral nexus which, whatever may be the intermediate turmoil, misunderstandings and disturbance, promises a future consolidation and conformity of effort of employers and employed, and eventually the realisation in our daily life that 'we are members one of another.' 'The thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns.'

It is more true of our work in protecting maternity and childhood than of any other work that (as Macaulay once said of science) 'the point out of sight yesterday is the goal to-day, and will be the starting point to-morrow.'

In this work we can all help.

ARTHUR NEWSHOLME.

FACT VERSUS *DOGMA:*

AN APPEAL TO THE CHURCH

I VENTURE to make an appeal to the Christian Church, and indeed to every religious organisation which accepts the Bible record as historical, to take a reasonable and open-minded view of certain phenomena, more or less associated with supernaturalism, which are being inevitably forced on their notice, and which have happened, not in the past only as their documents record, but in the present also. For upon these experiences among the living generation they cannot avoid forming some kind of practical judgment, even if that judgment be only of a partial and temporary character.

I must prelude my appeal by grateful recognition of the enlightened and friendly attitude of many individual clerics, whose understanding and sympathy are of high value; but it is not to individuals, it is to the whole body of Christian Ministry of every denomination, with its unrivalled opportunities for personal teaching and influence, that I want to speak. Especially do I want to attract the attention of the Episcopal leaders of the Established Church who wield a legislative power in the land and exert a far-reaching control.

Ministers may well hold that religion stands in no need of being bolstered up by new facts; they may also try to think that no new facts can be serviceable for the strengthening of faith, even if those facts turn out to be in rather close correspondence with things narrated in the ancient records; because undoubtedly those records are to many of the faithful sufficient.

Yet they can hardly hold that as a matter of fact scientific exploration has no effect at all on the beliefs of mankind. They have often deplored an outburst of scepticism, and have attributed it to the researches of science: they now appear ready to deplore a wave of too easy credulity as due to a similar cause. Most extremes are deplorable. But however immune devout disciples in the central fold may be, it cannot be truly said that scientific investigation has no influence on the faith of ordinary people.

Now it cannot be denied that the Church has on the whole opposed discovery: she has always detected and emphasised its

evil rather than its good. It is not possible effectively to question the statement: conspicuous instances are too flagrant. Astronomy was the first science to incur censure and awaken ecclesiastical displeasure; the position of the earth as one of the heavenly bodies had to be established in spite of anathema and persecution. Now at length that particular science is fully accepted; the constantly increasing display of the glories of the heavens, as they are gradually unfolded by discovery, is welcomed; some priests are active investigators; and recognition of the fact that the truth in these matters is far more wonderful, far more conducive to awe and devotion, than anything which the unenlightened human mind could conceive, is universally conceded. So it must always be when the human mind, putting aside its vain imaginings, is confronted with the truth. Yet it is noteworthy that even in Milton's time the pious and angelic attitude was to discourage inquiry into what were then regarded as occult mysteries; for when Adam inquired about the heavenly bodies, and whether they or the earth really moved (*Par. Lost* viii), the Archangel Raphael, while giving a hint of Copernican truth, thus advised:

> But whether thus these things, or whether not,
> Whether the sun predominant in heav'n
> Rise on the earth, or earth rise on the sun,
> . . . . . .
> Solicit not thy thoughts with matters hid,
> Leave them to God above, Him serve and fear;
> . . . . joy thou
> In what He gives to thee, this paradise
> And thy fair Eve: heav'n is for thee too high
> To know what passes there; be lowly wise:
> Think only what concerns thee and thy being—

thus virtually expressing the feeling of many centuries that 'the proper study of mankind is man,' and that all else savours of profane inquisitiveness into things intentionally concealed:

> This to attain, whether heav'n move or earth,
> Imports not, if thou reckon right; the rest
> From man or angel the great Architect
> Did wisely to conceal, and not divulge
> His secrets.

The contention that investigators are trespassing on forbidden ground, and seeking to learn things which they were never intended to know, sounds to the ears of psychic inquirers strangely modern and familiar.

Geology was the next science to grow up under ecclesiastical ban. The aeons of the past during which the earth has existed, as read from the record of the stratified rocks, the slow evolution of plants and animals, the long period during which man has

contended against natural disabilities, the gradual rise of every species from pre-existing forms—all this has had to make its way in the teeth of educated opposition. And it is to be feared that the derogatory epithets applied by orthodoxy to advancing knowledge have had the untoward result of helping to foster the growth of that spirit of atheism which they were intended to condemn, and have awakened too often a spirit of genuine though equally intolerant disgust with religion and all its works.

Surely it is permissible to ask the leaders of the Church to-day whether an obstructive attitude is always to be persisted in until the forward drive of lay opinion is too strong. Shall we never be at one? Is it not true that in every age the science of some preceding generation is being assimilated by theologians, and the mistrust of contemporary discovery is perceived to have been ill-founded? Yet in every age also, some more recent branch of inquiry suffers under ecclesiastical ban, and progress has to be made in the teeth of opposition. That which has been denied or mistrusted in the past is ultimately recognised as harmless—nor harmless only but edifying; while that which is being denied or mistrusted in the present seems of a different genus, having no kinship with its predecessor; and it feels incredible that that too can ever be accepted as not only true but helpful.

True, it may be sorrowfully admitted that not ecclesiasticism alone resents and resists new truth; there is a certain amount of scientific orthodoxy also, which, if it abandons an obscurantist attitude, abandons it with difficulty, and shows a tendency to ridicule as well as to reject everything lying outside its own domain. But the causes of this kind of hostility are intelligible, they represent a non-permanent condition, and can sometimes be traced to nothing worse than over-specialisation.

So far as scientific incredulity is based on real disbelief in the truth of the new statements—the only worthy ground of opposition—so far as the opponent really thinks that the innovator is being misled and is either deceiving or deceived, scientific conservatism may be justified and may be doing some good. It may call for more and better evidence, it may constrain to the examination of rival hypotheses, it may point out possible flaws. All this, when accompanied by serious study, is legitimate and helpful. The attitude of the most prominent members of the Society for Psychical Research, for instance, has often been of this critical and caution-compelling kind. They wish to hasten slowly and securely; their conservatism is more or less judicial. They may err of course, they may deny things at one time which later they find it necessary to accept, they cannot altogether escape the weaknesses of fallible humanity; but they do

not consciously seek to discourage inquiry, nor do they usually try to smother unpalatable facts. Their scepticism is of the laborious and painstaking order.

There is, however, a cheap and easy variety of quasi-scientific negative dogmatism which is not the result of direct study, and is based on nothing better than prejudice. This, though sometimes held by men who are otherwise scientific, is not really scientific scepticism at all: it is much more nearly akin to the ecclesiastical variety, which seeks to oppose new facts with dogma. So far as it has any logical foundation, the syllogism tacitly underlying such prejudice is something like this:

The general outline or scheme of the Universe has now through much labour been revealed to us by Science.

Certain alleged heterodox facts do not fit into the scheme of Nature as we know it.

Hence they are not real facts at all, but superstitious fictions.

My suspicion is that *both* the premisses of this argument are false; I anticipate that the best-evidenced of the new facts will be found less alien to recognised truth than is generally supposed. Many phenomena which white men can bring to the knowledge of a previously isolated 'savage' race are much more alien to the previous knowledge of that race than are these facts to orthodox science: and conversely, when pioneers are opening up unexplored territory, it is no valid argument against the genuineness of the specimens they bring home to say that at first sight they appear uncouth and unfamiliar.

But whatever doubt may exist about the minor premiss in the above syllogism, there ought surely to be none about the falsity of the major. The range of our knowledge of the Universe is great, but the range of our ignorance certainly greater. The scope of dynamical investigation on Newtonian lines hitherto has been magnificent, but there are vistas beyond. Into these even the Newtonian telescope cannot pierce: they can be appreciated perhaps more clearly with the eye of a child. Newton would have been the last to deny it: well he knew that the illimitable ocean of undiscerned truth only began with the pebbles on the shore.

So much for present reference to the attitude of a few men of science, whose enthusiasm for their own splendid field of work has for a time dimmed their vision and limited their outlook into regions beyond. In this article it is of the nature of a digression. We must return to the more purely ecclesiastical attitude.

It may be urged that, so long as any men of science are unconvinced, it is safe and wise for the Church to regard heterodox proceedings with doubt and dislike. Well, it is admittedly a dilemma, but it is never really safe and wise, though it may be

excusable, to ignore or deny truth. The burden of judgment cannot really be cast on the shoulders of some other group; it is we—as Carlyle might have said—it is we who will be damned.

Besides, the orthodox clerical position is quite different from that of orthodox science. Dislike and denial of any kind of real or apparent supernaturalism ought surely not to be able to flourish in an ecclesiastical atmosphere. Most religious doctrine is saturated with supernaturalism: hence, as far as that goes, there need be no complaint. Nor indeed is there complaint on that ground. Religious controversialists complain rather that it is the wrong kind of super-nature which has to be invoked. They claim not that the facts are untrue but that in their modern form they are diabolic; that it is not the powers of good with which we are dealing in psychical inquiry but powers of evil. Some leaders of the Roman Church are voluble in this direction, though the lives of their Saints should give them pause. The attribution of any unwelcome power to the agency of Beelzebub is not a new device, it is a very ancient and respectable accusation. Indeed, remembering certain historical instances, it is difficult altogether to refrain from regarding a claim of this kind as rather an excessive kind of compliment. Not to go higher, the inspirations of Joan of Arc were officially attributed to the machinations of Satan. Such an opinion, however, is not really a judgment based on the facts, it is merely a *prima facie* prejudice against them. It is not held by the few churchmen who have experienced or studied the phenomena; the element of good in them then becomes manifest.

An element of evil may be associated with them too. Yes, indeed, there are few things of which undiluted good can be predicated—certainly humanity itself is not one of them; and these facts are closely connected with humanity, they illustrate those human powers and aptitudes which extend beyond the common range. Strange would it be if there were no risk attaching to the use of such powers; incredible if they were wholly and unmitigatedly and completely good. Every good thing may be prostituted. Religious worship is no exception. Religious forms and ceremonies, in the past at any rate, have done harm: some of their practices, involving lust and cruelty, really have deserved to be stigmatised as diabolic.

As a last resort it will be urged that the weaker brethren must be warned and kept aloof. No doubt. People in authority are bound to consider expediency to some extent; fanaticism must be discouraged, fools must be warned off. But the weaker brethren furnish too ready, too cheap and easy, an excuse for obscurantism; consideration for their stupidity ought not to be allowed to suffocate the truth. And really the feeble-

ness of the weaker brethren may be exaggerated: some of it is imaginary; more of it is inoculated rather than ingrained; it often turns out to be largely the result of false teaching. Eliminating actual cases of feeble-mindedness, and excepting irrational crankiness of the extreme variety, the average human mind usually responds innocently enough to truth when properly set before it. And the truths revealed to psychic inquiry are, many of them, not recondite: they are truths of simple experience, and, moreover, they are so closely connected with religious beliefs and practices that really theologians and divines and pastors ought to be able to judge of them for themselves and welcome them if true. Religious leaders ought not to shelter themselves behind the temporary opposition of the more materialistic camp of orthodox science. Nor should they hesitate to learn enough about the evil side of the subject to be able to help people in distress and deal intelligently with difficult cases. But it would be well to learn from reputable, not from superstitious, sources. Moreover, they are in honour bound to look into these things and ascertain if they be true or false; for surely occurrences which have happened in the past ought under suitable conditions to happen again; and if nothing like them ever does occur, if present-day tales of their occurrence are false, the historical narrative on which they pin their faith is bound to be discredited. Using the term 'miracles' in a popular sense for the moment, if by uniform experience it is found that 'miracles do not happen,' then it will be concluded that they never did happen, and our outlook on the Universe will be restricted to the commonplace and the familiar. If there are no new events similar to the old, then it must inevitably be thought that ancient historians were mistaken and that the strange old events never really occurred. This is, indeed, largely the present attitude of most educated people. Things at one time expected are now incredible, so incredible that even present-day testimony about them must be discredited unless the cumulative proof is overwhelming. To this end all newly asserted facts must be rigorously scrutinised. If disbelief in them is the right attitude, let that disbelief run the risk of inquiry and be definitely substantiated.

Strictly speaking, epithets like 'old' and 'new' are not applicable to genuine facts of Nature; continuity must reign in the Cosmos; and it is men's attitude to truth, not truth itself, which alters with time. If phenomena are spoken of as new, the meaning can only be that they are newly urged upon acceptance as present varieties of ancient happenings, not that there is anything new in the facts themselves: recognition and emphasis may be new. All facts in science, whether they be Radium or X-rays or Electrons, or anything else, are as old as

the hills, and, indeed, much older; there are no new truths, save in a subjective sense, though in that sense the phrase may be excused. The only novelty about them is that humanity has either just discovered them or has newly awakened to their actuality in the living present. Wherever that has happened, the old-new facts have inevitably become a subject of vivid controversy. Are they base and unworthy imitations, or are they genuine manifestations, of truths which for some time have appeared dormant?

One reason for rejecting them wholesale is that they cannot readily be fitted into our present scheme of natural knowledge. That is a sound reason for regarding them with suspicion and scrutinising their credentials: it abundantly justifies controversy. But the controversy ought to turn, not on the supposed consequences of a phenomenon, but on whether a given phenomenon does or does not belong to the domain of fact; inquiry should be directed to the question whether its asserted occurrence is or is not true. That ought to be the main thing to be determined, even by those who are professionally more interested in practice than in theory. Human longing may establish a *prima facie* case, on the basis of an inherited instinct or unexplained intuition, but it is no valid proof of reality. Preconceived ideas ought not to be appealed to, either for or against the truth of phenomena. In Science facts must be supreme.

Yet there are conscientious opponents of new facts who fail to recognise the vital supremacy of truth, and who will not contemplate evidence which seems to lead in an undesired direction. They entertain questions of policy, they discuss the bearing a demonstration would have upon ancient doctrines, they try to discredit a discovery by opposing to it preconceived opinions and dogmas, they chain themselves to a rock in a rising tide. The procedure is not safe; the chain must ultimately snap or their bark will be swamped; but for a time they feel steadfast and secure. Moreover, it is always possible that the coming trouble may be encountered by a future generation rather than by their own. For short-sighted or selfish individuals the anchorage-policy may seem satisfactory, but for a permanent organisation like the Church the result is likely to be disastrous.

What now are the main clerical objections to the facts of reputable mediumship? Not that the conditions are diabolic, and that all personalities encountered are bound to be evil; for this is not a statement that need be seriously considered. It is doubtful if any promulgator of this doctrine really believes it. If anyone does, it is either because he knows nothing about the subject, or because he has had some weird pathological experience

from which he makes too rapid an induction. Or it may be that he is an entire sceptic concerning the truth of biblical revelation; or else, which is more likely, his mind is in such a state of fog that he does not realise the way in which he is cutting the ground from under his feet.

If objectors claim that in all psychic phenomena, both normal and abnormal, there is liable to be an admixture of good and evil, that claim can be admitted readily enough: such a statement is true of everything human; and perception of the truth has led pessimists to despair of humanity, and misanthropes to hate mankind. But this is mere crankiness again: the business of reasonable people is to cultivate the good and eschew the evil, in every department of life. There is not likely to be any branch of activity so singular in character as to dispense with the need for ordinary caution.

The most eloquent and influential Episcopal opponents of the facts laid bare by psychical research—the detectors of impropriety in all practical procedure based on those facts, such as the holding of indirect conversation with discarnate people—raise other and more serious objections. They call the process 'necromancy,' and speak as if the whole idea of it were repellent and unwholesome. It becomes necessary therefore to ask them whether they will denounce as morbid the necromantic portion of the writings of great poets, of Homer, of Virgil, of Dante? The central portion of great writings is often devoted to communion with the dead—actual visits to Hades and conversations with both good and bad. Is there no element of truth underlying such ideas which may account for their perennial interest and justify their high literary value?

And then as to mediumship. What else was the function of Circe in the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*? of the Cumaean Sibyl in the sixth book of the *Aeneid*? of the Guides in Dante's Trilogy?[1] I really do not know what reply they will make to the above triple question; the adjective 'pagan' is no answer,

[1] As Viscount Bryce has said, in the April *Fortnightly Review*:

'In each of these three Nekuiai the motive and occasion for the journey is the same. Something is to be learnt in the world of spirits which the world of living cannot give.' He goes on: 'In the first, it is to be learnt by a single hero for his own personal ends. In the second, Aeneas is the representative of the coming Rome, its achievements and its spirit. In the third, the lesson is to be taught to the human soul, and the message is one to all mankind. The scene widens at each stage, and the vision expands. The historical import of the second vision passes under the light of a new religion into a revelation of the meaning and purpose of the universe.'

The similarity, the contrasts and developments in the treatment of this great theme, at three different stages in the world's history—facts familiar no doubt to scholars, and not unknown even to me from conversations with Myers—are well and clearly emphasised by Lord Bryce in the rest of this article.

even if it were applicable. Indeed, one would have thought that Christianity, by partially diverting attention from happenings to the discarded body and tending to concentrate more on the risen soul, would have justified and vivified a belief that the living and the departed were still all one family, and all equally servants of a God to whom death and time were as nothing compared with life and absolute being; and therefore we might have supposed that Christianity would prepare our minds for freer and easier and happier intercourse with the departed than the highest pagans could think possible.

Alas! no. Strangely enough the greater number of modern representatives of ecclesiastical and official Christianity take no such view. They seem to limit spiritual intercourse to the distant past, and treat the dead as for practical purposes non-existent. They cannot think that God is not the God of the dead, in a narrow and preposterous sense—though truly excuse might be found in some liturgical restraints for misrepresentation even of that sort; no, but they do say that the Founder of Christianity would have discountenanced even our most devout and humble methods of communicating with the dead, would have condemned as impious every form of necromancy.

That last statement they might as well put into the present tense; for if there is one Survival which they are all ready to admit, and one mode of living intercourse which they desire to encourage, surely the survival and the communion and active assistance of that August Personage constitute the chief factors of the Christian creed. But, taking it in any tense, if we could be really assured that every kind of necromancy or dealings with the dead were by such high Authority discountenanced, it would be serious enough. I should be the last to deny that. But, judging from the historical record, is such an assurance well founded? Is it not utterly contradicted by the gospel narratives taken simply as they stand?

Consider first our own present position. Suppose we are appealed to by a bereaved mother who has lost her son in the War and who is grieving hopelessly at his loss? What can we do to comfort her? Those who can derive full and complete satisfaction from the offices of religion do not so appeal. Where that high consolation suffices, no more is necessary. But often it does not suffice; what can we students of the scientific side of the subject do then—those of us who have been gradually led to a mature positive conviction? We can endeavour to instruct the mother that her son is active and happy and longing for her to realise the fact and to cease from undue lamentation. Occasionally we can do a little more; for by the kindly assistance of persons with the gift of quitting their body or some part of

their body for a time, and allowing it to be controlled by some experienced personality more in touch with 'the other side' than we are, the bereaved mother can hold an indirect conversation with her son, through this strange telephonic or telepathic bodily instrument; and can thus, under favouring conditions, experience the reproduction of trivial well-remembered details and little personal touches, until she becomes assured of the truth of what we have said.

That is the most, or let us say the most, that we can do. But what did Christ do in like case? Did he content himself with preaching resignation and submission, as do so many of his present-day official disciples? He may have done so in some cases, but certainly not always. According to the record he did not so treat the distress of the Widow at Nain. On the contrary he interfered with the processes of nature, he challenged the supremacy of death, he restored the discarnate spirit to its abandoned body, and enabled it to continue in earthly surroundings, not for an hour or two as is permitted to us, but apparently for years.

We do not hear of a charge of necromancy being substantiated against this exertion of power, this interference with a funeral and resuscitation of a corpse. At least, one does not read of any ecclesiastical objection taken in this case. But when, later on, it came to the raising of Lazarus, some days after actual burial, objection was vigorous. For that event roused too much interest, a number of people were influenced by the astounding miracle, and the Chief Priests seem to have been genuinely annoyed. Whatever they called it, it was surely a most flagrant instance of real necromancy. Ah! but, I presume clerical opponents will say, that is different. Yes, indeed, different it is; and how the worn-out and decayed body could be re-vivified, re-fitted for the re-reception of its animating principle, its lesions healed and its health restored, is more than we can say; but that does not make it less a case of necromancy—rather more. Never in our rudimentary dealings with the dead do we think for a moment of resuscitation of a corpse. All that we can do has to be done by the unconscious and exceptional and partly vicarious activity of the living.

The gospel instance most akin to our poor dealings with the subject—the event which was accompanied by communion with men long since departed this life, who appeared in visible and audible and fully materialised form, is the striking event known as the Transfiguration. Therein the Master himself allowed his occult mediumistic faculties full play, and conversed, we are told, with Moses and Elijah.

Do people believe it? I confess I should be bound to disbelieve not only this but all these strange stories, were it not

for my own experience on a far lower plane. Far lower as it is, yet it is sufficient to make me realise that the things asserted in connexion with the Transfiguration are possible, and under the stress of an overwhelming Personality may have actually happened. The historical evidence being assumed good enough—and naturally as to that I am no expert—we may assume that these things did occur. Anyhow we must be right in assuming that Christian Ministers believe in their occurrence. Why then pretend that Christ objects to every kind of dealing or holding communion with the dead—with the dead who are not extinct but keen and vivid and intelligent? Do they imagine that he takes no pity on the bereaved mothers and widows of to-day, and that he objects to our lame but not unavailing efforts to bring them comfort by utilising the facts brought to our knowledge through patient and reverent scientific inquiry?

For myself I am quite sure on this point; and I venture to say that those who misrepresent his attitude, denouncing so kindly and helpful a form of activity as the work of Beelzebub, are unconsciously and with the best intentions blaspheming. We cannot restore the dead to earthly life; no, we can do nothing with their bodies; but we can prove that they themselves are still 'living,' in some sense not fully formulable at present, but so that their individuality and their affection and their character persist; and with difficulty and caution we can hold converse with some of them for an hour at a time—to the great comfort and happiness of those on both sides of the veil.

Will any High Priests of the Christian Church set their face against this kindly possibility, and denounce it as devilish, or as forbidden sorcery? If they persist in doing so, it will be at the peril not of themselves but of the Church which they hold dear. If the Church truly has the privilege of a permanently guiding Divine spirit, it surely ought to be ready to receive new revelations of Divine truth.

Christians surely have no excuse. The posthumous activity of the Forty Days, during which characteristic and impressive demonstrations of survival were made, the descent into Hell or visit to the spirits in prison, the appearance to Saul of Tarsus, cry out for recognition. These things have been the theme of innumerable sermons, and their moral is obvious. The amazing thing is that priests who believe in these events, who admit they really happened more or less as narrated, and who hold that the chief figure in these occurrences is as it were the Elder Brother of the human race, in whose footsteps they call on us to follow up to the level of our poor ability, can nevertheless dare to affirm that Christ sets his face against any communion with the dead, except perhaps with a few canonised Saints, and

can condemn in Christ's name our actually experienced phenomena.

Why can they not learn? Why can they never meet truth half-way with open hands of welcome? It is not as if the Church did not matter: as if it could safely be left behind and ignored. That is what many enemies desire and think probable as humanity progresses. But the Church of Christ matters a great deal. Not for nothing does it ramify in every town and village, and in its different branches permeate Christendôm. Who am I that I should venture to apostrophise the Church! It is no rebuke that I intend, but only an appeal; and even so I have no claim to be heard. If I were thinking of myself I would put my hand upon my mouth and be silent. But each one of us has only a short time here, and each must be held responsible if a sense of his own unworthiness makes him a traitor to the truth.

OLIVER LODGE.

TEUTON AGAINST ROMAN

'THIS judgment of the heavens which makes us tremble,' and which we name the World-War, is unfolding itself like a Shakespearian play scene after scene dispersedly, on many lines, yet not without a oneness of design all the more striking that no mortal planned or foresaw it. In deep concern we now look on at the last invasion of Italy. Where does it set us in the play? Is the Fifth Act opening? That may well be, from the soldier's point of sight. But speaking as a mere meditative person, occupied with causes rather than effects, and endeavouring from the 'figure of the thought' to give coming events a reasonably 'surmised shape,' I would say so, too, with a confidence founded on what has gone before in the general succession of incidents. I believe that the knots of this tragedy have been bound up and twisted together by the untoward happenings on the Venetian frontier into the War's central problem, real and ideal; and that we are thus beholding the last decisive situation. It is not a question of time. We shall have to make time or go under. The struggle is between contrary and fundamental ideas, armed by science with weapons never hitherto known; while on either side an instinct or a faith, profound as life itself and daring death dauntlessly, supplies the driving power. Three years ago, in a public Letter which has been widely circulated outside England, I summed up the controversy as 'Teuton against Roman.' To-day the title is more apposite still. The presence of Austro-German battalions on Italian territory, the visit of French and English Premiers to Rapallo, and the tardy but now sincere acknowledgment that for the Allies there is only one Front, justify my choice and compel the thinker to seek a supreme governing idea whereby each of the causes opposed shall be rightly rendered. Rome is the World-City, our true Metropolis, the Capital of Christendom; the Germans are, and prove themselves by their aims as well as their deeds to be, the successors of those Barbarians who wrecked ancient civilisation. We of the West have taken over from Rome, on both sides of the Atlantic, the best she had to give us in law, literature, art, and religion. To that type of perfection we cling. It shapes our ideal front, our necessary line of defence, beyond which anarchy

or tyranny reigns. Its deadly foe is Germanism. Therefore I hold 'Teuton against Roman' to be the issue.

When the War found us unprepared and bewildered, many voices babbled of its why and wherefore in confusing tones. But a light arose, menacing indeed yet breaking the darkness, out of books already extant in German; and the average man was taught by quotations from Treitschke and Nietzsche, Heine and Bernhardi, Bismarck and von Bülow, what the scope had long been at which Germany was aiming. An English professor of modern history, the late J. A. Cramb, though dead yet spoke, by his eloquent Lectures, of the spirit awake and stirring in German hearts; of a nation that 'in war itself saw life's greatest felicity'; of the sons of Odin who should fall upon the sons of Christ; and of 'conquered Galilee.' The dead professor, who knew his Teuton as very few English scholars had dreamt of knowing him, quoted to the purpose from Nietzsche, himself hating the Prussian, but hating the Christian infinitely more, and bent on clearing away 'the accumulated rubbish' of twelve hundred years. This gifted maniac, the Antichrist, as he called himself, of our latter days, had gone back for instances to Alaric and 'Dietrich of Bern,' that is to say, Theodoric of Verona; and he told the incredulous nations of Europe—for he was much read—as the professor views him, that 'while preparing to found a world-empire, Germany is also preparing to found a world-religion. No cultured European nation since the French Revolution has made any experiment in creative religion. The experiment which England with her dull imagination has recoiled from Germany will make; the fated task which England has declined Germany will essay.' And what religion? Again the eloquent lecturer proclaims it. 'In the East where she sought the grave of Christ she [Germany] saw beyond it the grave of Balder, and higher than the New Jerusalem the shining walls of Asgard and Valhalla.'

These words, delivered in 1913 to a London audience, were rhetoric, but also prophecy. Before the War Englishmen could hardly bear prophet or rhetorician out of party politics. Their 'dull imagination' admitted no figure of a Germany 'dreaming on things to come,' still less brooding on its Odin-faith and 'religion of valour.' That the learned men of the Fatherland were sapping Christianity in its foundations Oxford was well aware; but Oxford reported the attack in the mildest of terms and made of it an *excursus* in philology, not a struggle for life and death which the nations yet believing in Christ would have to enter upon. Our fatal good manners and academic habits can hardly fail at this time of agonised crisis to recall Hotspur's 'scented popinjay,' with his dislike for 'villainous saltpetre.' Oxford has now nearly ceased to be a University; its schools are made hospitals; its desirable young men are dying heroically in trench and charge. When,

after the War, a new generation comes up to our seats of learning, we may hope that the deference paid to German studies will be less extravagant. But rife as was the Higher Criticism, popular as speculative German idealism had undoubtedly been among our scholastic guides, the worship of Odin would have seemed to them grotesque. Nevertheless, among Teutons it had never died. The name might be extinct, the spirit under many transformations, as Heine perceived, was lurking in old Sagas and widespread superstitions, biding his time. The 'White Christ' had been brought into German woods and wilds by monks whose message announced peace on earth. Odin was the War-God, his gospel everlasting sword-play, and the monks called Odin a devil.

Do we smile at all this as merely Grimm's 'German Mythology,' a winter's tale to be told with pleasure in front of the Yule log blazing on Christmas Eve? Well, take a glance at Luther. Here is the Battle of the Nibelungs renewed against Rome and the South, its fury not to be tamed until it has torn Christendom asunder. That which the Barbarians inflicted on the Roman Empire, Luther dealt out to the Roman Church in full measure and brimming over. Luther's tremendous outbreak, with its fruit of anarchy in religion, was a German revolt from civilisation. And do not forget that the Olympian Goethe, while he affected a certain coldness towards Luther, was known as the 'Great Heathen,' who made a mockery of the Cross, and sneered at the 'fairy tale of Christ,' *das Märchen von Christus*. In Goethe we may discover Faust, the philosopher who pries into Nature's infinite book of secrecy, but thereby raises up Mephistopheles, the dark power, antagonist of saint and shrine and cloister, just as had been the monk of Wittenberg. Among Germans learning of whatever sort, classic, or biblical, or scientific, or antiquarian, has ended in breaking up the old established unities. But to the genius of the Fatherland its professors were never unfaithful. Odin lives and reigns in the seats of culture as in the camp, the court, the manor-house, in the Junker and the peasant, the prince and the politician. Call Odin Charles the Great, Frederick Barbarossa, Frederick the Second of Prussia, to them in each and all he is the living deity whom the Kaiser patronises as 'our good old German God.' In the pages of Professor Cramb we find what so startling an invocation cannot but mean, plainly and even fiercely brought out. 'The movement, the governing idea,' he wrote with enthusiasm, 'of the centuries from the fourteenth to the nineteenth is the wrestling of the German intellect not only against Rome, but against Christianity itself. Must Germany submit to this alien creed borrowed from an alien clime?' Evidently not, he would say.

How strange, how fantastic, it all sounds even when by dint of incessant repercussion from a host of journals the words themselves have grown familiar! We are at a loss to imagine by what enchantments a people akin to us, leaders in learning, proud of their Kultur, should be dreaming this day-dream, which turns the world back two thousand years. A national or tribal God we take to be frankly ridiculous at our stage of history. Suppose we translate its value into the language of Treitschke, the claim will still appear extravagant enough for a medical cure at Anticyra. Listen to him. 'Just as the greatness of Germany is to be found in the governance of Germany by Prussia, so the greatness and good of the world is to be found in the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind, of the German character. That is the ideal and the task of Germanism.' In other words, the civilisation of Europe has had its day. Make a clear path for conquering Odin. Grasping in his right hand the sword of an Absolute State, and in his left holding up the banner of this new-old Gospel, the Teuton rushes forth upon an anti-crusade that shall break our Christendom in pieces. Hear Treitschke once more, 'A nation's military efficiency is the exact co-efficient of a nation's idealism.' To minds of such a stamp war becomes a duty, and peace, save as preparation for triumph on the battle-field, a crime.

Why did we not learn from our great and famous teachers that Germany was forsaking European ideals, reverting to a dangerous pre-Christian type, and sacrificing the ethics of the New Testament on an altar raised to Odin? These teachers had spent years in Berlin, or at least had absorbed the philosophy and criticism of the Fatherland, blending them into the only religion deemed acceptable to modern men. How came they to overlook Treitschke and Giesebrecht and Waitz and Liliencron, with so many other prophets, major and minor, of the new dispensation? The answer to be gathered, for instance, out of Nietzsche is that English 'infidels, rationalists, agnostics, revolutionaries' were Christians after all. In the name of Gospel morality these advanced thinkers had assailed the clergy and the Churches. Rejecting dogma, they clung the more steadfastly to the Sermon on the Mount. But this was to make their own the essence of our faith, since it determined what mankind should live by. Still did they prefer the ideas of brotherhood, peace, self-denial—in short, slave-morality—before the heroic standards of pride and conquest. Galilee, not Germany, was the true home of all such tame idealists. They had not seen the significance of Thor's hammer. And I believe there is much in the fact that our so-called free thought on this side of the German Ocean was largely dictated by humanitarian motives. It is difficult to imagine John Stuart Mill, or George Eliot, or Lord Morley

wielding Thor's hammer with delight. However, that is not the whole explanation. We have yet to take into our account the very peculiar and effective stage play of the Kaiser himself. And here Luther insists on reappearing from the wings where he has been waiting too long.

For if the Kaiser is Odin's lieutenant he is also Luther's 'summus episcopus,' or supreme pontiff. The philosophers and historians who rule in German universities are free to undermine Christian tradition; they must not lay hands on the Evangelical Empire. Germany, though more than one-third of its people are Catholics, always stands forth in Europe as a Protestant State, not heathen but a champion of the Reformation, while the King of Prussia reigns 'by the grace of God' and is Head of the Church in all his dominions. Luther gave to the Prince what he took from the Pope. At the same time and by one stroke he handed over the control of ethics, under the name of mere 'political' virtues, to the royal Bishop and Shepherd of men's souls. Morality was not saving Faith; it belonged to the secular order; let the Prince look to it. The only visible Church was the State.

I am reciting facts notorious in history. And I perceive in them, as did Professor Cramb, though without his enthusiasm, the wrestling of the German spirit not only against Rome, but against Christianity itself. To make Caesar Pope is to write the charter of slavery in religion, and to bind the people in everlasting chains. They have no escape. The boldest yet simplest sentence in political wisdom ever uttered is 'Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's.' Of that divine distinction the guardian has ever been Papal Rome. Marking off the things of time from the things of eternity it is not, and never could be, the same which Luther set up between morality and religion. For morality (that is to say, the good works of a Christian people) flows from religion and is its necessary aim. But in leaving ethics as a mere element of policy and the police to a secular prince, Luther was banishing Christianity from public life, undoing the work of twelve centuries, and putting man-made law where the Law of God, binding prince and subject alike, had held sway. The Prussian King might be Frederick the Second, atheist and adept of Machiavellian principles, but he was officially bishop of bishops and supreme pontiff. The present Kaiser, whom this masquerade pleases, both as costume and instrument of diplomacy, has contrived with histrionic skill to act under its protection the most diverse parts. At home he is an Evangelical Christian, in Jerusalem a Crusader, in the Vatican almost a Catholic, and at Stamboul patron of three hundred millions of Moslemin. He has inherited the talent of Frederick the Second as an indifferent artist, but a consummate actor on

the European stage. Nor do I see any reason why he should not believe in himself as the mystic Lohengrin, Knight of the Holy Graal, a possible Constantine and Charlemagne, whose consecrated sword is at once powerful to defend and to lord it over the Church. It was the studied ambiguity of German thought, and the Emperor's conduct, which led English opinion astray.

But this contemplation evokes the vision of long centuries, medieval and modern, during which Rome was taught by hard experience what she might expect from the Teuton. And always I consider Rome in the twofold light of religion and civilisation, both committed by Providence to her keeping. Our creed is not to be divided from our culture. We know not Odin; we say to Thor anathema. It can never enough be remembered that none of the things which true civilisation prizes came from the Barbarians. They came from Rome. The city, the Law, the Bible, the arts and crafts, including the art of literature, and the very idea of a political constitution, with all that is implied in Christianity as a visible system, we owe to Latin missionaries sent hither by the Papacy. No doubt I shall be told from many sides, 'We can do without the Papacy now.' This, I venture to say, the events of every month since War began have been disproving. But let me ask decent God-fearing Britons, can we possibly 'do' with Odin, Thor, and the henchman of both, Germany's Kaiser? May it not be that, after four centuries of a rent and weakened Christendom, we have come to the point where Teuton hatred of our Gospel is at last fully revealed and shown to be the canker-worm at the heart of civilisation? Historic Rome is one with the West in all primary axioms, because alike Rome and the West accept the New Testament as their standard, however some nations or parts of nations may disagree on certain deductions from its teaching. But Germany, unless its own trusted guides have deceived us, cannot endure that teaching. I conclude, therefore, that the hourglass of time warns the West of peril to its long revered convictions, to its innermost sense of right, decency, and kindness, more threatening than it ever encountered in days past. For Rome, too, the peril is great. Call it by any name, Paganism, Lutherism, Monism, Modernism—and it appears in all these dreadful aspects at once—the storm is bearing down on the Catholic Church along the whole line. The German covets a spiritual world-empire with a Kaiser-Pope at the head of it. The true Pope, the 'Pater Romanus,' has claimed that empire since the Prince of the Apostles first set his face towards Rome. It is manifest that these two are contrary the one to the other. How can they come to terms?

A prospect opens before us far and wide. I desire to view it from the Roman height, now become again the 'specular mount'

of vision whence we may follow history in its winding links and courses. The isolation of Britain has been ended in politics by our alliance with Latins of Europe and America, with the United States, and the Near-Eastern Slavs. Would it not be well for England to revise its attitude towards Catholic Rome? The 'Roman Father' teaches and directs in religious matters something like three hundred millions of subjects, scattered through all nations. It is the largest voluntary association known since the world was. For the Pope has no means of coercing a single soul into submission. He does not choose the faithful; they by the College of Cardinals choose him. Neither is the Pope an hereditary King; he may be elected from any rank; he need not be an Italian; he is the one international chief, representing humanity, so these millions believe, before God and man. If the Church is the Fifth Monarchy foreseen by the Prophet Daniel (and through the centuries such has been its office) then the Pope is Vicar of that Kingdom. Englishmen would do well to remind themselves just now of what their brilliant essayist and historian told them concerning the Roman Church; for those wide-glancing sentences have a present application. 'She saw the commencement,' said Macaulay, 'of all the governments and all the ecclesiastical establishments that now exist in the world; and we feel no assurance that she is not destined to see the end of them all.' To none, except her divine constitution, is she bound of the forms and systems of rule anywhere in being. She is neither monarchist nor oligarchic nor democratic, in a political sense. If we trace back the line of the Supreme Pontiffs in an unbroken series, 'from the Pope who crowned Napoleon in the nineteenth century to the Pope who crowned Pepin in the eighth, and far beyond,' we may likewise draw the moral that all dynasties and empires are seen at the Vatican as changing phantoms of time, 'never continuing in one stay'; the fate of the Fifth Monarchy is not wrapped up in their rise or fall. Even the Holy Roman Empire, although created by the Papacy, has gone the way of all flesh. In some ever dwindling shape it lingered out its thousand years. But when its day was clearly done, Pius the Seventh crowned Napoleon, as Leo the Third had crowned Charlemagne, and Stephen the Third had bestowed the diadem of the Merovings on Pepin, that the title and substance of authority might go together. 'Let the dead bury their dead' is an axiom in the world of history no less than where it was first applied. But the constant dealing of Popes with Emperors during the Middle Ages will instruct us by example better than our own reasoning as regards the principles which have guided and must always govern the Papal policy.

English readers, we lamented with Professor Cramb, did not dream of looking into Giesebrecht's 'great history of the early Empire, with its vivid portraiture of the tragic figures of the Saxon and Suabian lines.' They might have taken advantage, but I fear that very few of them did, of the translation of Gregorovius, on *Rome in the Middle Ages*, which tells the same story, not without a bias against the Popes, and in deep sympathy with Suabian and Saxon. However, we possess the slighter sketches in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, admirably executed, though superficial in light of modern research, nor of much value to philosophers. The Kulturkampf of 1873 and the following years revived the name of Canossa, where Henry the Saxon did penance in the snow; and Bismarck, by a strong metaphor, was said to have journeyed to the same castle when Leo the Thirteenth proved more than a match for him. Since the Saxon line went out, the Papacy has known German Emperors of various pedigrees, Hohenstauffens and Habsburgs, Wittelsbachs and now Hohenzollerns. It must never be forgotten that the Papacy has had to make its account with facts which were none of its invention. I would quote Dante at this point:

> Vero è, che come forma non s'accorda
> Molte fiate all' intenzion dell'arte,
> Perchè a risponder la materia è sorda;
> Così da questo corso si diparte
> Talor la creatura, ch'ha podere
> Di piegar, così pinta, in altra parte.[1]

The sense of these lines is read in our English Hooker, when he teaches that 'the workman hath in his heart a purpose, he carrieth in mind the whole form which his work should have; there wanteth not in him skill and desire to bring his labour to the best effect; only the matter which he hath to work on is unframable.' And in prose Dante writes that such failure is 'clean beside the intention of God and heaven.' Our Catholic ideals are perfect; the Father of Christendom is a most attractive figure which has been often grandly realised; in St. Leo and St. Gregory the Great, in many of their successors down to Pius the Tenth—for we may not flatter the living. But how often has the matter proved 'unframable'!

So it turned out when the otherwise heroic idea of a Champion of Christendom, who should wield the sword of justice over all the world, was to be thrown into the raging maelstrom of medieval Europe. The 'matter was deaf' when the spirit called. Those German Kaisers in Italy numbered among them saints and reformers; but, on the whole, their record is one of Barbarian violence and dull tyranny. Rome is not likely to forget how it was

[1] *Paradiso*, i. 127-132.

burnt in 1085, thanks to the siege laid against it by the Saxon Henry the Fourth; how Louis of Bavaria defiled St. Peter's in 1328; how the troops of Charles the Fifth sacked and spoilt it in 1527; or how the German-descended Philip the Second of Spain despatched the Duke of Alva to threaten it in 1557. These are some of the titles to gratitude which Habsburgs and Wittelsbachs may proclaim by their heralds when they come up for judgment at the bar of history. The Catholic Church is, assuredly, not in their debt.

No Catholic writer would deny, on the other hand, that the House of Austria has rendered signal service to the cause in which he believes, both during the stress of the Lutheran troubles and in defence of Christians against the ever-invading Turk. The victories won by sea and land over this Eastern foe we celebrate still in our Calendar, where they shine like jewels. And how can we feel insensible to the magnificence of dignities and estates which even yet show forth in the Dual Empire what a glory long attended on the Crown, the clergy, the paladins of St. Stephen? That a Christian people should thus honour the Church is, in our judgment, as it was in Edmund Burke's, altogether fitting. We must on principle uphold an independent hierarchy against a bureaucracy manned by officials to whom religion signifies merely another province to be exploited. We maintain that there never was a voluntary system comparable to the age-long piety of the faithful, when they lavished their treasure to adorn the Holy Place and delighted in dedicating house and land under the crozier of abbot or bishop. It is not the Catholic nations that desire to see the Church plundered by law. That Church claims a high recognition in Catholic States; and it is her due. For she has created them, and she serves them well. Gibbon declares that the bishops made the Kingdom of France as bees make their honeycomb. As much may be said of all other Christian Kingdoms. Where would Europe stand now in the scale of humanity, had the Church expired when the Roman Empire fell?

Let not these remarks be put aside as a digression. They touch the very core of my argument. If they recall times forgotten, yet the facts which we must now control take their origin and quality from those times. Moreover, the great misunderstanding between Church and State in the West, which has wrought untold evil, throws wide open to Germanism and its plagues the field we are defending. The fault of the House of Habsburg is not that it protects the Church, but that it has failed again and again in its duty, down even to the moment when I am writing. Here are sad examples. Just as the French Revolution was on the point of breaking out, the Emperor Joseph, son of the heroic Maria Theresa, put in practice the new 'philo-

sophy of enlightenment' by dealing with religion as Henry the Eighth had dealt with it in England. He invented the system called Josephism, which frittered away the creed and imposed servitude on the clergy. The Pope of the day, Pius the Sixth, undertook a humble pilgrimage to Vienna, but he could not turn the head of the Holy Roman Empire from his anti-Catholic designs. Yet worse remains to be told. The partition of Poland blotted out a Catholic nation, increased the power of Prussia, greatly added to the perils of the West by bringing forward the Russian frontier, and is a crime chargeable on Empress and Emperor alike to their lasting reproach. As the Habsburgs did to Poland then, they are doing to Europe now. They have allied themselves with its deadliest enemies, with Prussians, Bulgarians, and Turks, for a doubtful reward. Their heavy guns enabled the Germans to capture Liége and Namur; their attacks from the air on Venice and other Italian cities have shown how ready they are to emulate the deeds of Kultur and have called out cries of horror from neutrals, as well as repeated protests from Benedict the Fifteenth; but all in vain. Since 1866, a full half-century, the Court of Vienna has deliberately made itself vassal and tool of a foreign Power at whose hands the monarchy had undergone shameful defeat. Forsaking its honourable friendship with England it has played a villain's part in building up that scheme of Middle Europe which threatens the British Empire as none other could. The foremost among Catholic States has acted as 'brilliant second' to the man who, detesting our religion utterly, is the chief bishop of Lutherism and, whether he knows it or not, is leader of the sons of Odin against the sons of Christ. Moreover, now when Jerusalem has been gloriously recovered by the valour of the Allies, we read assurances given from Vienna to the Turk that he shall get back the Holy Land again. An apostasy more ignominious from the living faith and apostolic deeds of St. Stephen and St. Henry has never stained the chronicles of Austria-Hungary. And what can be the end of it but the fall of the Habsburgs from Empire?

As the star of Austria droops towards the setting, behold another blazing up like a balefire in the firmament, a wonder and a terror, the Star of Hohenzollern, more dreadful to mankind than comet or eclipse of any previous era. This malignant power is embodied, as by some stroke of irony, in a comedian, a dilettante, a self-intoxicated and unpitying egoist, who has been not unjustly termed Caligula *redivivus*, by reason of his claim to do as he will with the universe. He has warned Europe in Egyptian style, 'I am Pharaoh; without me shall no man lift hand or foot in all the land.' His three hundred uniforms and thousand speeches, his journeyings and reviews and interviews, his prayers and

sermons, and at length his ultimatums scattered broadcast, have had one single object, to make of him the world's Pharaoh. To all past German imperial dynasties, Carlings, Saxons, and the rest, he believes himself the residuary legatee. By right of birth he should be King of England, Emperor of India, so his fancy runs. In any case Britain is decrepit. Germany has renewed her youth like the eagle, and the future belongs to her—as Professor Cramb told careless Britons, 'the hegemony of a planet' is Prussia's ambition and consequently the Kaiser's. But among the most splendid of prizes awaiting capture seemed to be the Catholic Church. He could never forget how 'one emperor after another was led south across the Alps in the attempt to make Italy a part of Germany; to govern Italy, and therefore the Papacy, from the Rhine; to make a reality of that which was called the Holy Roman Empire.' That attempt, it is true, ended in disaster. It underwent defeat, thanks to heroic Popes and Guelfs who were keen Italian patriots. But this dream of empire continues; and when William the Second entered the Vatican he trod its marble pavement like a conqueror. He brought no homage to Leo the Thirteenth; his attitude proclaimed him willing to give the Church some of the things which Germany still refused her, if she would accept the protection of this new Charlemagne and lean on him alone henceforth.

Leo the Thirteenth was well practised in medieval and modern history. The Kaiser's insolence at his first interview provoked a sharp judgment on that young man, in which Bismarck would have agreed. But when he came a second time he had learnt policy if not manners from an accomplished German Catholic scholar, the late F. X. Kraus; and the Pontiff noted a change, due to such superior coaching, in his behaviour. The rôle of Charlemagne was now much more aptly taken. Still, however, facts remained facts. The House of Hohenzollern had achieved greatness at the Church's expense from the very beginning and down to the present day. Its royal name of Prussia blazoned on its shield apostasy and sacrilege. By the ruin of Catholic Poland, the absorption of many bishoprics, the so-called 'mediatising,' that is to say, forcible annexation of Mayence, Cologne, and Treves, the ecclesiastical electorates of the old Empire, it had come to be one of the five Great Powers. And by the swift overthrow of Austria and France, both representative of Catholic interests to the world at large, this Evangelical Protestant Empire now dominated the Continent without a rival. Moreover, the man who had compassed a revolution so unwelcome to the Church was also the man who declined to raise a finger in defence of Pius the Ninth, when Italian troops stood at the gates of Rome in September 1870. It was Prince Bismarck who

replied to the Vatican Council by the Kulturkampf, who banished the Jesuits from Germany and drove into exile other religious communities, among them harmless women devoted to teaching and charitable works. He it was that did not shrink from casting into prison saintly bishops like Ledochovski of Posen, uncle of the present General of the Jesuits, as well as the then Bishop of Ermeland. These exiled men and women, whose only crime was fidelity to their religion, were never suffered to return. The struggle with Bismarck had indeed shown once more that no power on earth could overcome the Papacy entrenched within its spiritual domain. But a Prussian Emperor, laden with such *spolia opima* won from Catholic prelates and princes, was hardly fitted to be at home in the Vatican. And behind him loomed up the enemy with whose encroachments Rome had ever waged war—I mean the Absolute State. In Lord Acton's description of it, a military monarchy of a new type had arisen in Prussia to fulfil the idea of the Renaissance, according to which the State alone governs and all other things obey. 'Government so understood,' he continues, 'is the intellectual guide of the nation, the promoter of wealth, the teacher of knowledge, the guardian of morality, the mainspring of the ascending movement of man.' If the Kaiser at the Vatican represented all these things, what did Leo the Thirteenth, what did the Papacy itself stand for?

The Papacy stands for freedom from this omnipotent Caesar. It can never submit to any government 'undivided and uncontrolled.' Be the claim put forward by nation or empire, monarchy or republic, our creed, which Nietzsche called that of slaves, forbids us to acknowledge it. No grant of temporal advantages can bribe the Church to sell her birthright. When Napoleon had subdued the West and the Holy Roman Empire vanished as at cockcrow before him, Pius the Seventh was willing to consecrate the new order of things; but when Napoleon required from the Pope a declaration of war against England he found in Pius the Seventh an opposition which neither the loss of Rome nor imprisonment for years in an Alpine fortress could break. Leo the Thirteenth, again, made the best terms available on behalf of the twenty million Catholics in the German Empire. His successors have pursued a similar policy. But Leo the Thirteenth also did his utmost to preserve the balance of power in Europe by rallying French Catholics to the support of the Third Republic. It is well known how Pius the Tenth strove with Francis Joseph in the hope of averting the calamities which Austria driven forward from Berlin has brought on our unhappy time. Those who have been careful to read and collate the pronouncements of Pope Benedict

the Fifteenth cannot have overlooked his guiding motive, which is to keep the world-wide Catholic communion from being rent, as at the Reformation, into national antagonisms; therefore he declares himself, as regards the warring peoples, absolutely neutral.

It would be doing the Holy Father an intolerable wrong to suppose that he takes the Absolute State for the 'guardian of morality' or the mainspring of human progress. Being like St. Paul a debtor to all men, the office of the Pope is to furnish spiritual aid especially to the wounded, the broken and afflicted. Like an angel on the battlefield he stoops to comfort the suffering; and he bears no arms but the Sacraments. None among mortals are in his eyes the sons of Odin; all by his voice are called to be the sons of Christ. The judgments of the Holy See belong to a spiritual, not a secular, Court. I have no desire to exercise myself in these great matters, or in things too high for me. Persons in responsible station whether in Rome or elsewhere have already spoken. All I would now affirm is that, while the cause of the Allies is manifestly just, and no charge can be brought against English, French, Belgian, or Italian troops of violating the laws of war, innumerable facts known and proved by direct evidence show that the Germans have outraged humanity, trampled on its rights, and committed atrocities which cry to Heaven for vengeance. They had no justification, as themselves admitted, for invading Belgium; and the deeds they have done by sea and land damn them to everlasting fame. Before any Christian tribunal they stand condemned.

That is the conclusion of the whole matter. Principles bear consequences which events bring to fruition. The Catholic Church is not an abstraction, not a scheme on paper, but something very definite, rich with the spoils of time, self-centred and self-dependent. It is the oldest and still the greatest of European institutions. From all that has been said it appears, on the other hand, that Germanism not only is not Catholic but is the mightiest of anti-Christian forces, the religion of perpetual war, supported by millions of bayonets, determined to subdue the planet. Again the nations by an immense and unparalleled vote have resolved that Germanism shall not rule over them. They swear while capable of resistance never to take German culture or German religion for their own. The 'Papacy' will not surrender to Berlin its Papal prerogative of guarding morality or guiding mankind on the upward way. Most significant is the message of Benedict the Fifteenth conveyed during these dolorous days to his Romans, bidding them pray for the 'civil and Christian salvation of Italy.' This whole conflict turns on vital differences of creed. Whether Odin under his

many names or the Lord Christ shall win the mastery over men's minds is, I grant, the most significant problem of the twentieth century. We cannot make its terms too clear. For when they are seen in the sunlight we who hold the Christian faith to be man's salvation have no doubt of the issue, and we know how the line of battle must be joined. Civilisation is on its trial; and historical Christianity is moving by every path, be the hindrances never so formidable, to its rescue. The Allied nations furnish arms, the Church holds out ideals. The Cross which will break Thor's hammer has become a sword in the grasp of our new crusaders.

WILLIAM BARRY.

THE GERMAN OCTOPUS

UNDERGROUND Germanism [1] has indubitably won signal triumphs in the Italian *débâcle* and the Russian tragedy. Cataclysms designed to bring nations to the brink of ruin could only have been compassed, as we shall have occasion to show, by a tireless husbandry of their soil and a studied seduction of their people. Nor can these foul machinations, which have proved fruitful beyond the German dreams, be regarded as merely isolated efforts. There is overwhelming evidence that they are the tools of a concerted purpose. Germany's 'défaitiste campaign'—to use her euphemism for the most gigantic machinery of corruption known to history—has been, and is being, fought to-day behind every Front and amongst the people of every country, whether belligerent or neutral. It is as grandiose in conception as that dead dream of Pan-German Dominion of which it is the aftermath.

It must here be stated, with all possible insistence, that its menace is deadly and urgent, and that, unless the several belligerents of the Entente organise their civil armies, with a single purpose, they will risk disasters which will threaten their own national integrity, and imperil the existence of the Alliance itself. Their armies and navies may, on the eve of victory, crowning a bravery which beggars all the records of chivalry, find themselves robbed of the fruits by the shameful folly of the peoples they are defending from horrors unspeakable and a future which would be a living death.

The case for a Supreme War Council, so auspiciously inaugurated at Versailles—which it is needless to recapitulate here—applies with even greater urgency, if this be conceivable, to that for a Supreme Civil Council. The parallels between military strategy and civil strategy rest not merely on analogy but on logic. Both aim at the same objectives and both are equally destructive in their incidence. The disintegration of national solidarity is as fatal to sovereignty as the destruction of armies in the field. In a war of peoples the Front is not limited to the

[1] See 'The Peril of Underground Germanism,' by W. Morris Colles, *Nineteenth Century and After*, November 1917.

fighting lines, but is conterminous with the national boundaries. The strength of the British Empire rests upon the absolute integrity in *moral* of the peoples in each and every part of the earth which flies the British flag. A moment's reflection should suffice to make us all realise that we are vulnerable over an area which embraces half the world, and that we have, primarily, to safeguard the destinies of the four hundred and thirty-five millions who are under British sway. Our chronic divergence in politics, the breakdown of our party system, and, perhaps, that careless freedom of which we are so proud, leave us an easy prey, at this supreme crisis, to enemy agents astutely exploiting every ground of difference whether of race, religion, or class.

The Alliance itself, which adds such an enormous area to our trust, makes the task one which almost beggars the imagination, embracing as it does, on a rough computation, 1400,000,000 souls. The fighting Fronts of the Allies are long enough to impose an almost superhuman strain upon their joint fighting strength on land and sea; but the civil Fronts now embrace as much of both the Eastern and the Western Hemispheres as do not, willy-nilly, yield allegiance to the Central Empires. For the Allies are also the guardians of every neutral country and alone stand between it and enslavement. If Germany win the War, what will the independence of Scandinavia, Holland, Spain, and Switzerland be worth? The Allies are, too, for that matter, fighting for world-democracy—that is, for the right of every people, including enemy peoples, to rule themselves—against a malignant tyranny, a veritable apotheosis of despotism, resting its sanctions on a Rule of Fear, barren of defence before God or man.

The Rome Conference was convened to consider, as well as the co-ordination of military effort, the 'necessary measures to counteract the fatal propaganda conducted by the Austro-German emissaries amongst the Italians, and to ensure in future the defeat of these machinations before they materialise.' It is fervently to be hoped that the Inter-Allied Supreme War Council of Versailles has provided the machinery essential to the fulfilment of this aspiration. The eminent soldiers who are to advise the Allied War Cabinet, and their *entourage*, cannot, clearly, be expected to cope with political questions nor, primarily, with propaganda at all.

It may be safely affirmed that there has, in the past, been little or no attempt at the co-ordination of the Allied propaganda. British, American, French, Italian, Serbian, Roumanian, Japanese and, at one stage in the War, Russian propaganda systems have, of course, been at work. One and all were, however, primarily if not wholly, self-centred, scrappy, and isolated alike as regards direction, form and purpose, and

largely limited to national aims. It was inevitable, therefore, that their single or cumulative effects upon the course of the War, as affected by the hostile civil offensive, should have been so largely barren. The results of their action were frequently dissipated by divergencies in general purpose, or wasted in a futile rivalry. It must, therefore, be the first aim of the Allies to have done once and for all, for the sake of their common cause, with this conflict of ideals. We cannot deny that there are difficulties to be overcome in arriving at a working system. There are psychological distinctions which cannot be ignored. It is hard for the Latin mind and the Anglo-Saxon mind to see things eye to eye. Their *points d'appui* and their outlook do not coalesce. It is, indeed, no easy matter for us to view matters in the same perspective as, even, our Transatlantic cousins. But, with a cause so holy, so purely altruistic in both its origins and its aims, we have a bond of union which should serve to make all the elements of civilised mankind, whatever their 'diversities of gifts,' one band of brothers. We have to deliver the world from the menace of a people which knows not pity, that 'virtue of the law,' and is still boasting of its purpose to bring all nationalities into bondage to its own gain and its sole aggrandisement. 'Unity' must be our common beacon until this tyranny be overpast. Unity will make for strength. It will operate nationally as well as internationally. A Government or a country—there is a distinction and a difference—which is *ad idem* in fact, as well as in form, with the other Allied Governments, or countries, will be all the stronger at home as well as abroad. They will give each other mutual support, and will, one and all, be the better able to offer 'a single Front' to all attacks of cliques, or *claques*, or cabals, whether of home manufacture or of 'enemy origin.'

If we persistently neglect these first principles of strategy, our foes will continue to possess in the civil, as they have possessed hitherto in the military sphere, the undisturbed advantages accruing from 'unity of control,' a 'single Front' and 'interior lines.' There may be much that is simply amusing in the miraculous rapidity with which they are credited, by self-styled experts, with being able to transfer hundreds of thousands of men with their munitionment from the Russian to the Italian or French Fronts, but, so far as their propaganda is concerned, they can and do shift their attacks with such lightning speed that nothing but a practical system of co-ordinated counter-action can enable the Alliance to meet the manœuvre on equal terms. A Supreme Civil Council possessing the essential executive powers, and in the commanding position which pooled intelligence alone can secure, would be able to interpose at will sound civil tactics between the enemy and his political aims in every part

of the earth. Neither Great Britain nor her Allies are so poor in resource that they could not, 'an they would,' confront the enemy with an effective defensive and offensive plan of campaign. The mistakes of omission or commission in Russia, or Italy, to which we must return, can be prevented in the light of our sharp experience and of the warnings this conveys.

As matters stand it is indubitable that the Allies have been worsted in civil strategy in every one of the scenes which have flashed across the stage on which this mighty drama is being acted before the gaze of a bewildered world. It is a humiliating reflection, for all of them alike, that a people whose pinchbeck pretensions to superiority in arms, in science, in the humanities, have one by one been proved to demonstration to be as empty as the 'crackling of thorns under a pot,' should have won a long succession of triumphs. There cannot, however, be any shadow of doubt as to the fact. Nor, if we are content to 'wait and see,' will there long be any great uncertainty as to the consequences. This is no time for beating about the bush nor for mincing one's words. The facts call, and call loudly, for hard thinking and plain statement. If it can be shown that these calamities might have been or can be averted, it is not another occasion for simply seeking scapegoats whom we can drive into the wilderness of obscurity in order that they may expiate the sins of those who sit in the seats of the mighty. But, if the Allied peoples can really safeguard themselves against these manœuvres, all questions as to the responsibility for past blunders may be left for settlement after the conclusion of peace. It is foolish to wash any more dirty linen in public.

German propaganda has, of course, always been at work in both the *ante-bellum* and *post-bellum* epochs. Nor need these periods be very sharply distinguished. In both it was much more destructive than constructive. The writer has a vivid recollection of a proposition which reached a leader-writer on a leading morning daily newspaper in the year 1880, offering a substantial retainer conditional upon his securing the insertion in the journal in question of articles which would be supplied, from time to time, from a German source. The proposal was, of course, promptly communicated to the proprietors and incontinently rejected without thanks. The example is, doubtless, one of many.

But it is needless to labour the fact that Germany, from Bismarck to Hertling, has always sought to suborn the British and, for that matter, the world Press. We believe that her success in our midst was always grossly exaggerated. It may, however, be commended as an exercise to the curious to work out the identity of ownership of British journals, both past and present, which have come under the stigma of pro-Germanism. It may,

too, be suggested that amongst *post-bellum* 'pacifists' and pessimists will be found not a few *ante-bellum* apologists. From the same group comes the opposition to the adequate financial support of the War Aims Committee which is entrusted with British propaganda at home. At such a crisis as that through which we are passing it is almost beyond endurance that, under the poor pretence that the precedent might be utilised so as to foster present or future party activities, an organised attempt should be made to hamper a machinery obviously material to the defence of the Realm. The Government at last admits that a considerable number of very seditious organisations exist in the country, and are known to have been at work in many industrial centres, and especially in the South Wales coalfields, preaching peace and opposing conscription, for all the world as if their spokesmen were marionettes worked from the Wilhelmstrasse itself. All the while, too, German agents are known to be spending German money like water here in the despairing effort to bring upon England evils exactly analogous to those of the Bolshevik or Bolo pattern. It will be our own fault if we do not find a short way to combat these onslaughts and the efforts of those unworthy *fainéants* who appear to regard with equanimity a future with our necks under the heel of the Hun.

It is, however, proof enough, and more than enough, of this necessity, at the moment, to indicate in rapid outline some of the ways in which the German octopus has got its tentacles round a few of its victims since the outbreak of war. Each is typical. *Ex uno disce omnes.* Mathias Erzberger, who has throughout the War been in control of the propaganda office of the German Admiralty in the Budapester Strasse, Berlin, one of the most active of the German Government Bureaux, and run under the fostering care of von Tirpitz, has reduced chicanery to a science. All the buying agents of Germany in neutral countries, for instance, business men who already wielded immense commercial influence, were supplied with unlimited funds, which gave them the *entrée* to all social circles in any community, and at once utilised as war propagandists whose potentialities were not long in doubt. They proved themselves capable of manufacturing and manipulating neutral opinion to an extent which the isolated and haphazard efforts of the Allies were totally unable to keep in check. Armies of 'neutral' agents and malcontents of every colour were, and are, formed into systematised contingents for service on a strategical plan in belligerent countries. It has been computed that 15,000,000*l.* a year has been expended by Germany on propaganda during the War. All such estimates must, of course, be a mere matter of guess-work, and the point is not material

save as affording some measure of comparison between the enemy and the Allied estimate of the value of this weapon.

Now there appeared in the newspapers in July the following obscure paragraph which, at the time, attracted little attention and passed without comment:

> Two large advertising and press agencies have been formed—one in Berlin and the other in Essen. They are backed by large capitalists, among whom is Krupps. The aim of these agencies is pan-German propaganda at home and abroad.

The great armament firm at the time, as before and since, had its hands pretty full, and that it should have thought fit to add to its activities in this direction was not without a special significance. Krupps have, it is true, always recognised the power of the Press. The *Rheinische Westfälische Zeitung* has long been the property of the firm, and they are credited with a controlling voice in the *Tägliche Rundschau*, to say nothing of at least half a dozen other German newspapers. For that matter it may be safely suggested that Essen owns or controls many journals in belligerent as well as in neutral countries. Dr. Thorndike, the so-called Secretary-General of the firm, has, too, been openly at work in Switzerland in conjunction with Erzberger attending to the *Deutsche Propaganda in der Schweiz*, with a benevolent eye to the encouragement of German music as a side-line. The recently founded journal, the *Paris-Génève*, with which he had much to do, rather overshot the mark, and the Swiss Government intervened and confiscated its plant. But that was a trifling matter, since practically the whole German-Swiss Press, except a few dailies published at Zurich and Basel, is German-owned or German-bought. The peaceful penetration of Switzerland has, indeed, already reached the danger-point.

The *défaitiste* manœuvre which compassed the Italian *débâcle* and the campaign by which Germany aims at sapping the strength of all the Allied peoples one by one—to say nothing of the rest of mankind—known to have been organised at Berne, had, it may be suggested, Dr. Thorndike as its sponsor. Krupps, mainly, who have been 'bleeding Germany white' and piling up their *Blutgeld* all through the War, are now finding many millions of money which have given these machinations their intensive force. There is a significance in all this which must not be missed. A business organisation of these dimensions and efficiency, backed by huge resources—the Kaiser himself is more than suspected of being one of its big shareholders—is a menace which is more real than all the vapourings of von Kühlmann. Krupps have 'interests' manned by the picked men of the business world in almost every country. The owners of huge mining

and coal concessions, they have their managers or agents in every centre or market of the raw materials required for armament and munitionment. They hold large patent and other rights in this country and they have their agents here in our midst, of whom many, we do not doubt, have not only escaped internment, but remain an active source of mischief. There is not a single Allied country which possesses a machinery capable of meeting that of Krupps on equal terms.

The true lesson of German propaganda is, however, better learnt from concrete examples than from abstract generalities. The Caporetto disaster is, at the moment, as we have said. a signal triumph. It is, if you examine the facts, so far as these have been permitted to become known, perfectly obvious that such a harvest would never have ripened but for a careful sowing of the seed in the ground. The Italian soldiery, or rather that section who ran away or laid down their arms—the truth of the whole story has yet to be fully established—and are now expiating their crime as slaves to their ruthless seducers, could not have been corrupted by a few old wives' tales, nor deluded in any great numbers by the forged copies of the *Corriere della Sera* and the *Giornale d'Italia*, with their flamboyant stories of Italian women and children being slaughtered by licentious French and brutal British troops. To read of French cavalry riding down and sabring helpless crowds in the streets of Milan could, too, hardly have excited anything but derision even amongst the most ignorant soldiers in the Italian army. And what, it may be asked, were the Italian officers doing all the while this balderdash was being distributed broadcast under their noses? German mendacity, we know to our cost, has been too often ignored. The truth is that the Allied official estimate of its powers for evil is all wrong. We ourselves brush aside a naked lie as simply contemptible, instead of cabling a crushing *démenti*. The preposterous rubbish printed in *Islam's Glory* which came into the Prize Court—with the gorgeous crescent and flaming red star emblazoned on its cover—left us cold. We smiled unmoved at that wondrous compilation *The Neutrality of India and England*. But Germany knows full well the truth of the proverb :

Gutta cavat lapidem non vi sed saepe cadendo.

Of set purpose she floods the world with fables subtly calculated to fit her plans. At the present moment pamphlets we laugh at are being eagerly read all over India and the East. It is simply madness to treat such attacks with silent, and idle, contempt. We may be assured of Indian loyalty to-day, but can the myriads of that great Empire be regarded as immune to such continuous

seduction, however grotesque, fostered as it is by foes of our own household.

In Italy the stage was carefully set. The brilliant journalist who contributes to M. Clemenceau's *L'Homme Libre*, over the signature 'Lysis,' has unearthed the activities of an agency which claims to be of Swiss nationality, but is, and always has been, directed and financed by Germans. Known in Berlin as *Haasenstein und Vogler*; in Paris as *La Société Européenne de Publicité*; and in Milan as *Unione Pubblicità Italiana*; it has monopolised the advertising columns of not only a large section of the French Press, but of eighty-one Italian journals.

M. Jean Ajalbert has thus told the sorry story in the *Nouvelle Revue*:

Ici, comme ailleurs, l'Allemagne avait pris ses précautions. C'est tout naturellement qu'en trente ans d'amitié ses agents s'étaient introduits dans les rédactions et les imprimeries. Mais ils avaient des moyens plus sûrs. Ils avaient monopolisé la publicité avec l'agence prétendue suisse Haasenstein et Vogler, qui a impétueusement fonctionné au début de la guerre. Les grand journaux ont pu résister et tenir tête, mais un certain nombre ont dû disparaître ou s'incliner, c'est-à-dire accepter les dépêches tendancieuses et mener la campagne pour les empires du Centre. L'agence Haasenstein et Vogler dispensait ou coupait la publicité, c'est-à-dire les vivres aux journaux pauvres.

So, once more, the tares were sown. Is it any wonder that soldiers and people, taken off their guard, reaped a poisoned harvest? Germany, however, made assurance doubly sure. To the influence of the Press she added that of the priests. The *Morning Post* has performed a national service in advancing the charge that the Vatican is known to have been implicated in these intrigues and 'has furtively, but actively, espoused the Austrian cause.' Cardinal Bourne and Cardinal Gasparri have, it is true, flatly contradicted this 'atrocious calumny.' In a leading article on the 5th of December the journal says in reply:

And he [Cardinal Gasparri] challenges us to produce evidence in support of our statement. We have then, in our possession, what we believe to be accurate information that the parish priests in the country districts of Italy suggested to the people that a 'Pope-King' would be able to make much better terms with Austria than the King of Italy; and that when the wounded returned the priests asked them what they had been fighting for, and told them that the rich and well-to-do took care to escape military service.

Ultramontane 'pacifists' have, too, long been suspect. Read the crushing testimony of Ignatius [2]:

Unless the Allies are careful the public spirit of their peoples, with its moral and economic foundations, will be undermined while their armies are fighting Germany. 'Peace' will fall upon the world like an entang-

[2] *The New Europe*, October 25, 1917.

ling net, or like a fog rising, one knows not whence or how. This is the victory at which Germany now aims. She is preparing for it, as she alone knows how to prepare, with the help of the Roman Curia, on the one hand, and of high finance on the other, and followed by the bleating and imbecile flocks of Socialist pacifists and humanitarian pacifists. If her subtle campaign succeeds the peoples of Europe will hardly know why they have fought.

These weighty words are now doubly pregnant with meaning. Mr. Richard Bagot, again, whose consummate knowledge is beyond all question, in a letter to the *Morning Post* alludes, in proof of the direct or indirect culpability of the Vatican, to the fact that, for more than two years, the Italian clerical Press[3] has expounded pro-German and anti-British and French sentiments, to which must be added 'innumerable pamphlets and leaflets, reviews and *brochures* of all descriptions, which have been distributed wholesale, not only in the Italian cities, but even in the smallest and most remote country towns, through clerical agencies.' He goes on to explain that extracts from the Papal Peace Note, 'accompanied by insidious and unpatriotic comments, were clandestinely distributed among soldiers on leave and in the hospitals, and to men called up to the Colours who would sooner or later be going to the Front.' Need we further expound the plot? Has Ultramontane influence been at the bottom of the support and leading which a section of the Irish priesthood has given to the Sinn Fein movement? Is this the bridge between de Valera and the Kaiser?

If the case of the Italian Press usefully illustrates the enemy methods, Germany is practising exactly the same sort of subterfuge in France. It is no secret that Boloism is much more far-reaching than has been permitted to appear. The exact position is not at the moment susceptible of discussion; the impeachment of M. Malvy; the case of *Le Journal*, with its bewildering succession of owners; the Caillaux affair; and the like ramifications of the conspiracy are sufficiently before the public day by day. The French Government is perfectly wide awake and has shown itself commendably capable of meeting the emergency. 'Lysis' more than hints, however, that the same firm, suitably camouflaged, of course, are at work in England. We see no reason, on *a priori* grounds, to doubt the possibility of the suggestion. It does not, at first sight, appear to be quite clear how such a plan would work out. Any communiqués which such an agency, however disguised, ordered to be inserted, would have to be very cleverly wrapped up. For it is unthinkable that any British journal would deliberately allow itself to be used by the enemy. The suggestion may, nevertheless, explain many cryptic

[3] Since these words were written Signor Pirolini in the Italian Chamber instanced the Germanophil propaganda of certain Catholic journals.

paragraphs, often of neutral origin, or so called, which have appeared in the Press, astutely directed, whatever their seeming purpose, to stirring up strife among us. Are our own people, for all their courage, immune to so sinister a method of undermining their confidence? A working man reads in, it may be, his one and only journal, as it seems to him, *bona-fide* doubts as to the wisdom of the War and specious pleas in favour of an early peace. Round the corner, too, he finds the agitator, primed with arguments to drive the lesson home. He has so far been left without warning and without inspiration from any of our leading men.

The case of poor, unhappy Russia stands on all fours with that of Italy, save that the consequences are, as it seems, there so terribly irremediable. Here, again, the Allies had plenty of notice as to what was afoot. There is scarcely a feature in the whole hideous spectacle that was not forecasted in urgent messages from Petrograd. All were warned over and over again that the Russian masses were in a state of abysmal ignorance, more especially as to British traditions in particular and the Allied war aims in general. Sir George Buchanan has unquestionably discharged his official functions with undaunted courage during a period of stress and strain almost beyond human endurance. It was not in his unaided power to do more. But it cannot be contested that Germanism, heedless of disguise, had a perfectly free hand throughout the length and breadth of the Russian State. If you look at the foundations on which the Bolshevik conspiracy was built, you can see standing out an amazingly thorough organisation working above as well as underground all the while. The seduction of such large masses of the soldiers and sailors and people to a point which made them ripe for civil war, murder and a Reign of Terror was not done in a day. Lenin's plot would have collapsed long ago but for its German backing, and so long as the Allies permit these machinations to be pursued, without even the barest pretence of a counter-offensive, the troubles of which we have already reaped the first-fruits will prevent the restoration of ordered Liberty in the place of unbridled Licence in All-the-Russias. Germany has willed a Reign of Terror in Russia. Siberia, Esthonia, and even Kuban have declared themselves independent Republics, and they signalise this event by withdrawing all their troops from the Russian Front. It does not call for any very great acumen to detect the villain of the piece.

In China, again, the enemy is keeping alive the ferment of revolution. Foiled in her specious *coup d'état*, aimed at the restoration of the dynasty, she is now addressing herself to the congenial task of engineering recurring ministerial crises and driving home the wedge between the northern military leaders

and the southern provinces, hoping thus to avert the danger of a strong coalition and foment disintegration, decay and revolution. Only the other day a Government official consulted by the writer as to the trend of enemy action remarked 'Oh, we needn't worry about China.' It is the acme of *laissez-faire*. We need not, if you please, worry about this limitless reservoir of man-power, which the enemy has long marked down as his happy hunting-ground!

There is a curious sameness about German propaganda, but in 'the unchanging East' that is almost an advantage. We do not doubt that the *Deutsche Zeitung* is still being presented to all the men who matter in China, as it has been for years. Such a trifle as a declaration of war would not be permitted to affect German activities materially. During the last few days we have had from Tientsin reports that, clearly under German inspiration, the vernacular Press is setting about categorical statements that 'Japan is negotiating for a separate peace.' The next move will undoubtedly be the quotation from the Chinese Press of this pretty little story. Thus Germany hopes to discount Viscount Ishii's exposure of her intrigue to close the 'Open Door' in China which so narrowly failed of complete success. The Marquess of Lansdowne's letter—of which it is well known German propagandists have made the most all over the world, and not without a certain amount of success—is at the same time being used by Pekin journals as a proof of British decadence, which is not unnatural, and a presage of Britain's downfall, which involves a *non sequitur*.

But the octopus is omnivorous. The French had the good luck to capture, lately, *en bloc* the German Mission to Abyssinia, where, 'according to plan,' they had been fomenting the downfall of the dynasty. The menace of German influence, through a Pretender, to British, Italian, and French Somaliland is sufficiently obvious. In South America, again, for all its belligerency, Germany is busily at work, but now underground. In the Argentine they have managed to stave off the evil day, and, characteristically, in return fomented a railway strike. All the same the Buenos Aires correspondent of *The Times* predicts that the Argentine will become the 'Greece of South America.' Germany has, it is said, succeeded in making the maintenance of neutrality vital to President Irigoyen and the Radical Party. Here, too, clerical influence has, we are told, been cast in Germany's favour.

But the story is the same, take what country you will. A semi-official statement from Athens, for instance, declares that German propagandists are busily at work shaking the *moral* of Greece on exactly the Russian and Italian lines. Spain, Norway, Sweden are also in the clutches of the octopus, although they

vainly hope that the blessed word 'neutrality' may prove their salvation. They forget the octopus never lets go its grip.

An Inter-Allied Propaganda under the control of a Supreme Civil Council, directed with vision, is, we believe, the true answer to the enemy challenge. It has already been far too long deferred. Its methods can only be settled by conjoint authority, and, obviously, lie outside the sphere of public discussion. In the same way, no doubt, its policy and practice at home are imperatively matters of domestic concern for each of the Allies. It is not possible for one Ally to step between another and its armies or its people, and it is not, perhaps, unnatural that one and all should prefer to keep their own counsel, although this may be a source of weakness.

One consideration, however, arises which is, in its application, common to all. It is the traditional method of the older diplomacy to surround itself, like the Veiled Prophet of Khorassan, in a web of mystery. It would, perhaps, be unfair to suggest any parallel between its underlying motives and those which actuated Mokanna. The tradition of secrecy has, however, throughout the War been enforced without discrimination. So far as military necessities prevail it is, of course, inevitable, but it does not seem to possess the like cogency where we have to meet enemy civil action. All the Allies possess the most wonderful examples of enemy propaganda, and all, we believe, alike, with the single exception of the United States, with its virile vision, hide them away in their archives as sacrosanct and not for vulgar eyes. We ourselves possess collections, scattered through many departments, and never co-ordinated, which would throw a flood of light upon Germany's manœuvres. But the fiat has gone forth from the wiseacres who control these precious proofs of German guile, and publication is not to take place 'until long after the end of the War.' They will then, no doubt, provide amusing reading for posterity, but posterity instead of smiling at Germany's foolishness is more likely to form its own conclusions as to the unwisdom of our neglect to use them at the time so that their influence could have been sterilised and their mendacities held up to the ridicule and reprobation of the civilised world. It is argued that to give them publicity is to comply with the enemy's wish and enhance their effect. But is the Allied cause so poor of justification that it need fear exploded enemy teachings or preachings? We may not be able to compete on even terms in this orgy of infamy, but if it were pitilessly exposed in all its utter depravity we should at once inflict a crowning moral defeat upon the enemy.

A Cimmerian darkness is not the happiest atmosphere for a country at war. It can neither satisfy nor reassure. We have, Heaven knows, given our foes information enough and to spare.

We have indulged in a carnival of candour as to our national shortcomings. In a war of peoples it is, above all, vital, and at this, 'the fateful hour of mankind,' it is our sacred duty to preserve the national balance. At the Front our soldiers must be kept secure from being deluded by those songs of victory which the enemy sing twice a day. At home our watchword should be 'Trust the people.' This is not the moment for scolding and fault-finding. The masses have given proofs and to spare of a high courage. They have shown themselves strong to labour and to endure. The enemy will surely fail to shake their allegiance to the commonweal if we dispel the darkness by which it is being obscured. Darkness begets doubt, doubt despair. 'Let there be light.'

W. Morris Colles.

SHAKSPEARE AND ITALY

I

Now that a movement is on foot to set up, so soon as the War is at an end, a statue in the Italian metropolis in honour of the British Poet who has made Italy the scene of many of his greatest works, and the occasion of much of his most passionate eloquence, it may not be inappropriate to devote some pages to the subject of Shakspeare's Italian knowledge, whether of history, language, topography, or social customs, so far as we can gather it from what he himself has told us. It is a topic that has not yet been treated of, so far as I am aware, in any connected form—and that in spite of what a contemporary of his own wrote of his plays:

> there run
> Italian works whose thread the sisters spun;
> And there did sing, or seem to sing, the choice
> Birds of a foreign note and various voice.[1]

Such recent publications as *Shakespeare's England* and *A Book of Homage to Shakespeare* (1916) do not take the opportunity of letting the world know what an exhaustive study of this interesting subject might disclose. It is true that *Shakespeare's England* does contain some scattered fragments concerning Italy and our dramatist, Sir Edward Maunde Thompson's contribution dealing with the Italian form of writing that was displacing the English hand of the period being of exceptional interest; but nowhere in this work or elsewhere is to be found any detailed account of Shakspeare's actual acquaintance with Italian, or a conjecture as to how he came by what he did know on the subject. Still stranger is the fact that Shakspeare's Italian geography is, down to the present day, merely ridiculed, and described by his professed admirers as being either the outcome of a careless and fantastic form of imaginative poetry, or the result of an ignorance which would, in the case of any other writer, be ascribed to heedlessness of a more or less rabid, not to say inartistic, nature. I have before now endeavoured to correct the complete lack of penetration which has been associated with the criticism upon Shakspeare's Italian geography,[2] and the never-ending misrepresentation of

[1] *On Worthy Master Shakspere and his Poems*, by I. M. S.

[2] 'Shakspeare and the Waterways of North Italy,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1908.

his knowledge since the day when Ben Jonson, in a petulant or jealous mood, found fault with him for giving a seacoast to Bohemia, though his then critic might have remembered that Shakspeare *may* have been writing of a Bohemia of a much earlier date, when it had not only one seacoast, but actually two; and Jonson, of all others, assuredly should have been aware that *The Winter's Tale* was taken from Greene's well-known romance, the plot of which *may* have been adopted by Shakspeare, seacoast and all, without further inquiry. What Shakspearian commentators since then have *never* noticed is that Jonson cannot have seen anything wrong with his successful rival's *Italian* geography; for had he any fault to find with it, he would most certainly have said so in his brusque and characteristic way. It is comforting to think that the old stream of misrepresentation is beginning at last to dry up, and that the worn-out dogmatic insistence on Shakspeare's having made seaport towns of Milan, Verona, and other cities is breaking down. My endeavour in this article is to trace the growth of the Poet's study of Italian—such as it was; of his acquaintance with the history and social habits of the country; and to show that such critics as still believe in his ignorance of Italian topography have no rational ground to stand upon; his knowledge being, with one trivial exception, absolutely in accordance with reality, and confirmed in every way by Italian writers of his time of the most unquestionable reliability. The task is one of considerable fascination—spoiled only by the thought that there is at the moment a haunting apprehension lest the country which was the scene of *The Merchant of Venice* and *The Taming of the Shrew* may yet be desecrated by the brutal forces of the Germanic Empire and its allies.

All of us who see or read the plays of Shakspeare know that he had a distinct leaning to Italy as the setting or background of his dramatic pictures. He was not alone in doing so, for many other dramatists of his day showed a like partiality, though hardly to the same extent as he did. Out of his thirty-seven plays, there are no less than fourteen in which the scene is either wholly or partly Italy. Four of the fourteen, however, have to do with the Italy of the Ancient Romans, namely, *Julius Caesar*, *Antony and Cleopatra*, *Titus Andronicus* and *Coriolanus;* for which reason they are not of interest for my purpose; while one other, *The Winter's Tale*, cannot be classed with either of the groups mentioned. The remaining nine deal with Italy as it was in Shakspeare's own day—and it is in these that one naturally looks for traces of such knowledge as the Poet had of the language, the customs, the topography, or what we might call the Atmosphere of that country.

Before approaching the subject in any detail it will be helpful to say a few words by way of description of England's relations with Italy at the time. To put the situation very briefly, it may be mentioned that travel in Italy was extremely fashionable amongst Englishmen of position in those days; and to have spent some time in that country was looked on as the finishing touch to a gentleman's education. It was quite a common thing to send young Englishmen to study at the Universities of Padua and Bologna, and other learned places in Italy. It was at Padua that Harvey, the famous discoverer of the circulation of the blood, took his degree. That city was at the time also renowned as a leading European school of law; and it is in strict accordance with its reputation in this way that we find the learned Doctor Bellario a resident there when sent for to assist the Court in the trial scene in *The Merchant of Venice*.

Venice itself was, however, the main attraction for Englishmen who went to Italy for pleasure's sake rather than for study: and many well-known writers who lived in Shakspeare's day have described it in works published on their return; while it and other places in Italy formed the constant subject of conversations between Englishmen of the educated or literary classes when at home. In addition to such impressions of Italian travel at first-hand, and such as were commonly to be gathered, as it were, in the street, there were still other sources of information available for those who were interested in Italian fashions and modes of living, chief amongst which were the translations into English of the many Italian Romances of Boccaccio, Bandello, Ariosto, Cinthio, and others, so largely used by Shakspeare and contemporary English playwrights for the purposes of their dramatic plots. Again there were translations of some well-known 'courtesy books,' as they are called, such as Hoby's *Castiglione*, George Pettie's *Civil Conversation*, Della Casa's *Galateo* (translated by Robert Peterson), and other similar works, in which was put forth as complete a picture of Italian life and customs as any dramatist or romance-writer, who had never been to Italy, could possibly desire.[3]

As regards the Italian language itself, so sweeping was its incursion into England in and before the period when Shakspeare began to write, that many well-known authors were driven to utter strongly worded protests against it. The literary world of London was divided into hostile camps on the question—one side

[3] Those who would like to know almost all that can be known on this subject should consult Professor Mary Scott's recently published work *Elizabethan Translators from the Italian*, a most admirable contribution to the literature of that period. Three hundred and ninety-four translations are there described, in addition to seventy-two Italian and Latin publications brought out in England in or about the time.

maintaining that new words added strength to our language—the other as vigorously insisting that the innovations were productive of affectation only.

Drayton, in his *Heroical Epistles* (1599), uttered his thoughts in this way:

> Some travel hence to enrich their minds with skill,
> Leave here their good and bring home others' ill:
> . . . . . .
> In their attire, their gesture, and their gait,
> Fond in each one, in all Italianate;

while an often-heard piece of doggerel ran:

> An Englishman that is Italianate
> Doth quickly prove a devil incarnate.

Sir John Cheke was against borrowing, and wanted English 'clean and pure.' Mulcaster and the learned Ascham were of the same way of thinking; and Gascoigne, who was not himself in the least backward in borrowing from Italian sources, and whose knowledge of Italian was of a very high order indeed, still showed quite an aggressive pride in retaining old English words in preference to annexing 'such epithets and adjectives as smell of the inkhorn.' I have mentioned only a few out of many. The curious point about their efforts to exclude Italian was that in doing so they were merely repeating what Bembo himself had previously attempted in Italy for the purification of his native tongue from foreign, and particularly from English, influences. Amongst those who were for widening our language by the addition of Italianate forms and phrases were some of the very finest writers of prose in that day of great writers. Thomas Nashe was perhaps their most powerful champion; his prose at its best is Shakspearian in style and vigour. Gabriel Harvey had charged him with travelling to Italy 'to fetch him two pennyworth of Tuscanism,' and with forgetting his English intonation in favour of the Italian manner. Nashe defended himself in his own slashing style, and at considerable length. In his introduction to *The Unfortunate Traveller* he writes: 'Others object unto me the multitude of my boystrous compound words, and the often coining of Italianate verbs which end all in "ize" such as Mummianize, tympanize, tirrannize. . . .' A general defence follows, ending with: 'My ubraided Italianate verbes are the least crime of a thousand, since they are grown in general request with every good Poet' (1594).

Robert Greene—dramatist and brilliant stylist—mixed Italian largely with his sentences; and George Pettie, the translator of Guazzo's *La Civil Conversatione*, was strongly opposed to the introduction of foreign fashions, and, denouncing travellers, speaks of 'their apish imitation of every outlandish Asse in

their gestures, behaviour and apparel'—but was just as strongly in favour of introducing foreign words to enrich our language. Of works dealing with Social Italy, this volume of George Pettie is undoubtedly the book which Shakspeare chiefly used.[4] It is one of the two books which Florio in his *Second Fruits* (1591) specially mentions as being 'most commonly read by those who desired to know a little Italian,' the other being *Il Cortegiano* by Castiglione (translated by Sir Thomas Hoby).

I may say *en passant*—though some eminent Shakspearians do not share my views—that the latter work had little attraction for Shakspeare, dealing, as it does, too exclusively with the noble Italian orders of the time; whereas Pettie's version of Guazzo, which has mainly to do with the manners and thoughts of persons of a more ordinary rank in life, fell in completely with Shakspeare's notions. And I may say further that one has only to read half a dozen pages of any work published in or about Shakspeare's time to know at once whether it was one which, by reason of its style, wording, metaphors or literary illustrations, had caught his fancy, or suggested helpful possibilities to him of borrowing, imitating, or expanding into more embellished form. Chief amongst such authors as are easily recognised to have been well read by Shakspeare are, Nashe, Pettie, Sylvester, Riche, Gascoigne, Armin and Markham.

Reverting to the interesting literary quarrel of the time, there were many other protagonists who might be named, but the one deserving most notable mention was none other than Shakspeare himself—the greatest innovator of them all, at least so far as language is concerned. The boldness of *his* daring was absolutely without stay or limit. (Small wonder that Jonson said of him 'Sufflaminandus erat,' 'he could have done with a brake.') But in spite of his freedom in borrowing from other tongues he could never stand any pettiness and affectation of manner. Hence possibly his intolerant bearing to all characters tainted with such defects, many of whom were created by himself, merely for the purpose of furnishing an opportunity for the satirical humour with which he afterwards castigated them, to the endless merriment of those who witnessed his plays. With a single example one can illustrate the high level that may be reached by the introduction of foreign words by such a master of language as Shakspeare was. Macbeth, looking on his blood-stained hand, after Duncan's murder, exclaims:

> Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood
> Clean from my hand? No! This my hand will rather
> The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
> Making the green, one red.

[4] See 'A Forgotten Volume in Shakspeare's Library,' by the present writer, *Nineteenth Century and After*, February 1904.

English, Latin, and Italian, mixed with a magician's hand—but what a result! 'Incarnadine' he found in Sylvester.[5] It is an adjective, and verbs do not, according to lexicographers, emerge from adjectival forms. What cares Shakspeare? He picks it up; turns it into an English verb never dreamed of by any before him; and in our English tongue, set in the natural vigour of his astounding rhetoric, it stands (as Tennyson would say) a jewel

> That on the stretch'd forefinger of all time
> Sparkles for ever.—(*The Princess.*)

Then again, English romantic drama not only went to Italian literature for subjects and ideas, but it borrowed from the dramatists of Italy a considerable quantity of their machinery—the Chorus, for instance, the echo, the play within the play, the dumb show, the ghosts of great people as Prologue, and a good deal more.[6]

While in another line, too, in *Trade*, we find Italian influence asserting itself with a strength which more than three hundred years have not yet exhausted. Many commercial terms, of an origin entirely Italian, have become completely acclimatised in our language to-day. 'Cash' is only a corruption of Italian *cassa*. 'Journal' is *Giornale*. 'Bank' and 'Bankrupt' were originally *banco* and *bancorotto*. 'L.S.D.' still represents *lire*, *soldi*, *denari*. 'Company' is still abbreviated into *compa* on our Bank of England Notes, the full form being *Compagnia*. 'Ditto' is only *Detto* ('said'). And then, in addition to what has been already mentioned, we know that snatches of Italian were constantly to be heard in London in every sort of society, from the Court down to the veriest ordinary of the time.

It was the same with fashions in ladies' dress, caps, and coiffures—matters mentioned many times in the plays—though here, as in the literary world, protests were often heard against such foreign introductions, as for example when Ben Jonson puts into the mouth of Peregrine in *The Fox*,

> Yr lady
> Lies here in Venice, for intelligence
> Of tires and fashions, and behaviour
> Among the courtizans?

It was the same in the matter of men's attire, as witness

[5] *Du Bartas his First Week* (description of the Earthly Phoenix), 1591:
> A golden down about her dainty neck,
> Her breast deep purple, and a scarlet beck,
> Her wings and train [i.e. tail] of feathers (mixèd fine)
> Of orient Azure and incarnadine.

[6] Professor Mary Scott, *op. cit.* p. lxxx.

Gascoigne addressing his friend, Bartholomew Withipoll, when going to Geane (Genoa) in 1572:

> Believe me, Batte, our Countreymen of late
> Have caughte such Knackes abroade in forayne lande,
> That most men call them Devils incarnate,
> So singular in their conceites they stande:
> Nowe sir, if I shall see your maistershippe
> Come home disguysde and cladde in queynt araye,
> As with a piketoothe byting on your lippe,
> Your brave Mustachyos turnde the Turky waye,
> A Coptanckt hatte made on a Flemmish blocke,
> A nightgowne cloake downe trayling to your toes,
> A slender sloppe close couched to your docke,
> A curtold slipper, and a shorte silke hose,
> . . . . . .
> Then shall I coumpte your toyle and travayle spilte.

In matters of sport, strange though it seems to modern ears, Italy's lead was, before and during Shakspeare's day, chiefly followed. Italian instructors were employed to teach Englishmen the niceties of clever horsemanship, or, as old Florio puts it, 'Make him turne, stop, run, cariere, trot, gallop, and whatever else may be expected of an excellent ready horse.'[7] The same writer puts forward, as one of the reasons for composing his Italian-English Dictionary, the view, that without it our gentlemen of the time would be unable to understand Grifonio's work on riding. As regards falconry and hunting, we have George Turberville's own acknowledgment of his debt to Italy; while there were no less than three schools in England where the terms of art used in relation to such pursuits were all Italian. The fencing phrases were of the same mint, and Florio again describes the powers and skill of that recognised master of fence, Vincenzo Saviolo, in the *Second Fruits*. Touchstone shows his acquaintance with Saviolo's *Practise* when enumerating the many forms of giving an adversary the lie (*As You Like It*, V. iv.). The revival of the tourney in this country was largely based upon Italian models; and the language or terms of art associated with each of these branches of sport naturally became part and parcel of our tongue.[8] There was, besides, another source of Italianising influence of a curious kind—namely, the Italian Church in London, which had grown up under the direct encouragement of the State. Originating for the benefit of such Italians as embraced the reformed religion, it was also considered profitable for the use of such English gentlemen as had travelled in Italy—that by their resorting thither they might both serve God and keep their knowledge of the Italian language.[9]

[7] *Montaigne*, i. ch. 48.
[8] Einstein, *The Italian Renaissance in England*, New York 1902.
[9] Strype, *Annals of the Reformation*.

Surrounded then by such conditions, it would be strange indeed if a brain like Shakspeare's did not absorb a considerable amount of knowledge concerning both Italy and the Italian language. He shows substantial evidence of having done so in both cases; but when you come to weigh the evidence you find that his use of the Italian language is such, that it is by no means easy to make out how much exactly he knew of it—while in such a matter as the topography of the country we can at once say, after a slight examination of contemporary authorities, whether he was accurate or not in such allusions as he makes to either the towns or rivers in Italian territory.

A very curious feature connected with Shakspeare's use of Italian in his plays is this: he introduces this foreign language into dialogues where one least expects to find it—sometimes even in his most thoroughly English plays—obviously an echo of what he heard in street or eating-house. Critics may suggest that this was but advertisement or an imitation of some other playwrights. I do not share their views. Rightly considered, the practice may rather be regarded as the outcome of his own admirably expressed ideas in *Hamlet* on the 'purpose of playing,' and with the object of showing 'the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.' In other words, the scraps of Italian introduced in scenes where their inappropriateness might offend the modern ear are made use of merely to complete the picture of London daily life of the period, without which that picture would fail to show what was, at the end of the sixteenth and the opening of the seventeenth century, one of the most strongly marked features of social intercourse as it then really was.

Good illustrations of what I suggest are furnished in *Love's Labour's Lost* and *Henry the Fourth*, Part 2. The scene in *Love's Labour's Lost* is laid in Navarre—not Italy—but there we find Holofernes, the schoolmaster, saying:

> I may speak of thee as the traveller doth of Venice:
> 'Venetia, Venetia,
> Chi non te vede, non te pretia.'

The Italian, however, is *not* Shakspeare's in this instance, but merely a proverbial scrap found in Florio and elsewhere. Later in the same play Holofernes says 'I will undertake your *ben venuto*'—and uses such words as *damosella*, *canzonet* and *Via*; while Don Armado, though a Spaniard, contributes 'We will put it, as they say, to *fortuna della guerra*.'

In *Henry the Fourth*, which is in no way connected with Italy, it is Pistol, the typically English braggart, who uses the longest bit of Italian made use of:

> Si fortuna me tormenta,
> Sperato me contenta.

Some editors have gone so far as to alter the words into a more correct Italian form—but it is more than likely that Shakspeare deliberately perverted the phrase in order to get closer to what ancient Pistol would really have said. He makes use of the phrase a second time when Falstaff and he are taken, under arrest, to the Fleet—but he substitutes the word 'Spero' for 'Sperato'—both being bad Italian, but still pointing to the fact that Shakspeare at this period knew enough of the language to make a deliberate mistake. A few other words of Italian formation occur elsewhere in the same play, such as *carbonado*, *bona-roba*, *cavalero* and *strappado*, but the majority of these were practically English words at the time, as shown by their occurrence in the works of contemporary writers.

If we take the plays in chronological order—more especially those of them that deal directly with Italy, or have some remoter bearing upon that country—we find the following are those which are now generally regarded as filling the first period of Shakspeare's dramatisation—that is, from 1591 to 1593: (1) *Love's Labour's Lost*, (2) *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, and (3) *Romeo and Juliet*. I have already mentioned the few snatches of Italian that occur in the first. In the second, though the scene be Verona, we find but little suggesting knowledge of Italian. The *Dramatis Personae* do not help us much, though on other occasions names furnish very valuable evidence. Valentine (once called 'Valentinus' in the text), Proteus and Eglamour can hardly be called correct Italian names; though Antonio, Silvia and Lucetta are so, and Thurio and Panthino sufficiently so to pass muster. The rest of the characters are either unnamed, as the Duke of Milan, or else bear names of a decidedly English kind, such as *Speed* and *Launce*, the two clownish servants, and Julia. The persons who are only incidentally mentioned are the two Friars, Patrick and Laurence; the outlaws Moses and Valerius; and Ursula, Sebastian, Don Alphonso and Mercatio. It will be noticed, too, that there are no Italian words or phrases in the whole play—even the word *Signior*, which is used with some frequency in some of the other Italian plays, being made use of only once—while the questionable 'Don' is used in the cases of Don Alphonso, Don Antonio. In short, the author's knowledge of Italian is distinctly wanting in this play; and though his knowledge of the geography of the district lying between Verona and Milan is thoroughly accurate so far as it relates to the intercommunication by water between the towns mentioned, he seems to make one blunder by introducing a range of hills to the east of Milan:

> *Duke.* And meet with me
> Upon the rising of the mountain-foot
> That leads towards Mantua.

As against this, however, the author shows indications of having dipped into the history of the State of Milan in his own century by his references to the visit of the Emperor to that city, which took place in 1533. (Act I. Sc. iii.)

Romeo and Juliet, the third on the list, and the first tragedy composed by Shakspeare, cannot be said to throw very much more light on the question of his command of the Italian tongue. Of genuine Italian there is practically none, while the names of the *Dramatis Personae* are in fact much more English than Italian. The only really Italian names amongst them are Romeo, Mercutio, Benvolio, and Balthasar—the first two being taken from Brooke's Ballad. The others, Escalus (the Prince of Verona), Paris, Montague, Capulet, Tybalt, and Juliet herself (or, as once or twice called, Jule, her pet name as a child), are rather more English than Italian; while the characters of a humbler rank in life are distinctly English, namely, Friar Lawrence and Friar John, Sampson, Gregory, Peter and Abraham. But, outside the *Dramatis Personae*, there are many other persons mentioned in the text, as for instance those invited to the dance at Capulet's house. These include such names as Martino, Vitruvio, Placentio, Livia, Valentio, and Lucio; while there are again some more whose names are given here and there, Lucentio, Tiberio, young Petruchio, and Angelica. In the selection of these quite Italian names Shakspeare was obviously freed from the limitations put upon him by the original story, and apparently using his own knowledge. But, as against these, we have to reckon some other additions in the introduction of characters of a purely English type such as the musicians, Simon Catling, Hugh Rebeck and James Soundpost, and with them the servants, Potpan, Nell, Susan Grindstone and Antony. Whether invented or not, the name Benvolio, Romeo's friend, is certainly well selected. Its opposite, Malvolio, was undoubtedly devised by Shakspeare himself; but *Twelfth Night* was one of the latest plays he wrote, and at a time when he had probably learned more Italian. Touching the dialogue of the play, if we except the word 'Signior,' there is no Italian used but such as would come under the head of fencing terms, 'a la stoccata,' 'passado,' 'hai' and such like. These had almost passed into English at the time. Mercutio adds one other word—'fantasticoes,' probably an Anglo-Italianism, and as such not out of place in the mouth of the man who uses it. Of Italian customs there is one prominent one introduced, in the burial of Juliet without a coffin 'and in her best array,' but this is what the original ballad had fully described. Here then, in short, is what *Romeo and Juliet* teaches us of Shakspeare's knowledge of Italian at the time. A young dramatist has, in the first period of his attempts at play-

writing, selected a well-known story of Italy, derived no doubt from Bandello, but more ready to his hand, as it had recently been told in English, in a popular and striking Ballad by Arthur Brooke. He has been making some efforts to gain a familiarity with the history, the manners and the tongue of Italy, but is too great an artist to introduce such scraps of the language as he may have picked up into a tragedy to be put on an English stage. So far as the then existing story goes he takes the characters of Brooke as they stood, and in the form in which they had become familiar to English readers of the romance. But where other characters are required for his dramatic purposes he makes use, to a considerable extent, of new names; and small though his acquaintance with Italian is, it is sufficient to enable him, with the aid of books or information otherwise acquired, to present these added characters, when of high social standing, in a correct Italian guise. The newly introduced characters of lower rank have to be content, as in many other plays, to carry such English names as would commend them to the groundlings. For the inconsistency involved he had no more care than he had for such matters as chronological errors. He had at the time already written one Italian play, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, which, though showing signs of some study of the history, topography and manners of the country, gives no indication of linguistic knowledge. *Romeo and Juliet* may therefore be looked on as furnishing the evidence of a first step made by Shakspeare towards learning something of the Italian language.

This brings us to *The Merchant of Venice*, the date of which must have been about 1594. It distinctly discloses an advance in the writer's knowledge of Italian, and shows a greater familiarity with the ways and habits of the people of Italy. This familiarity in the case of Venice would have been a matter of no great difficulty in the London of Shakspeare's time. I think, however, that there is evidence of book study also. I shall refer to it later on in connexion with what he knew of Italian topography. It is certainly the one play in which some commentators have told us that there is an Italian atmosphere. It is a romance in which we have town and country, business and pleasure, high life and low life, put in turn before us; and all so deftly interwoven in a double story that it is only just before the curtain falls in the last act the spectator feels reasonably assured that the whole may not end in something very near to tragedy. Everything concurs to give a skilful playwright an opportunity of displaying his knowledge—however acquired—of the national turns of character, the customs, and the social behaviour of the persons who carry on the drama; and of inserting some touches of a linguistic or topographical kind capable of displaying his acquaintance with the country in which his scene is

laid, or his intimacy with the language spoken by its inhabitants. But what do we find?

There is certainly an improvement in the Italian forms of the names of the characters—compared with those in the two plays already referred to. Topical allusions become more prominent. The *Rialto* is often mentioned. A *gondola* is once named. The high state of usury allowed in Venice is alluded to—a fact mentioned in Thomas's *History of Italy* (1561). There is a special reference to

> the traject,[10] the common ferry
> Which trades to Venice.

The word *Signior* is made use of a good many times. *Via* for 'come on' is once used. *Magnificoes*—which had already become an English word—comes in a few times, and, of Italian places, Genoa and Padua are mentioned in addition to Venice itself. Padua is accurately described as the residence of Doctor Bellario, being, as it was then, a well-known law school. Out of these trivial materials the alchemy of a commentator's imagination has distilled the 'Italian atmosphere' of *The Merchant of Venice*!

But there are some other features in it which somewhat cloud the Italian nature of the imported atmosphere. For instance, Launcelot Gobbo, in spite of his Italian surname (meaning 'Hunchback'), is the characteristic English clown that Shakspeare dearly loves, and we learn from the dialogue that his mother's name was Margery. Besides, as usual in Shakspeare's plays, there are infinitely more references to strictly English customs, proverbs and traditions than to those that can be identified in any way with Italian practice or thought. In other words the 'Italian atmosphere' is a myth—as would be at once apparent if the names of the characters were made English, if Belmont were replaced by, say, Warwick Castle, and the Rialto by the Exchange.

The Italian names of the characters in the play are in this case, however, of exceptional interest from the point of view under discussion—namely Shakspeare's knowledge of the language—for there was evidently here a good deal of care exercised in their selection or formation. Take Antonio, the merchant who gives the name to the play. It was a common Italian name, no doubt, but it is a noticeable coincidence that there is a place not far from Padua called S. Antonio. If this instance of taking a name from the locality of the scene stood alone, it would perhaps be of no value; but there is yet another example in the name of

[10] 'Il traggetto' was the word used generally by Italians at the time. It is used of the crossing between Dover and Calais in Erizzo's *Sei Giornate* (Venetia, 1567), e.g. 'il traggetto di Cales'; and 'à Dover, che è il traggetto di Francia.'

Bassanio, Portia's lover—for in the same region is a small but well-known town called Bassano, situated on the Brenta. As Bassanio was not a common name at the time, it looks as if the Poet himself, with a slight knowledge of the language, deliberately adopted the name of the town, with the alteration of an added 'i,' for the purpose of identifying the bearer of it more completely with the neighbourhood of the locality of the play.[11] Shakspeare's knowledge of the map of Lombardy was certainly good, as I shall show later on.

Another character in this play, Stephano, throws a more or less valuable light on Shakspeare's knowledge of Italian. The middle syllable is pronounced long—Stephāno; while in a much later play, *The Tempest*, it is correctly pronounced Stephăno, as in the line:

> Is not this Stephano my drunken butler?

and there is outside evidence as to the cause of the change. Ben Jonson's *Every Man in his Humour*, in its original form (1598), had a character named Stephāno, and Shakspeare played a part in it. He would then have learnt how to pronounce the name as Italians did; but this was *after The Merchant* had been written.

A small point worth noticing in this Venetian play is that Shakspeare invariably calls the head of the State the Duke. He never makes use of the word 'Doge.' His very silence is quite important as indicating his growing knowledge of Italy, and more especially of the administrative side of the history of Venice—for Italian authorities, such as Alberti,[12] in the last half of the sixteenth century, use 'Duca' and never 'Doge.' This last-named writer gives an account of the government of Venice from its inception, describing its rulers as at first Consuls (*Consoli*), then Tribunes (*Tribuni*), and finally Dukes (*Duce*),[13] this last form of government continuing down to Shakspeare's time, and, as we know from other sources, for a considerable time after.

The source from which the dramatist derived some of his information on Italy was in all probability Thomas's *History*

[11] Dr. Furnivall suggests that it was adopted from the Bassano family who resided in London at the time. (*New Shakspere Society Transactions*, 1881.)

[12] *Descrittione di Tutta Italia* di F. Leandro Alberti Bolognese, Venetia, 1568.

[13] The word 'doge' is, as regards its use in English, extremely puzzling. The earliest quotation given of it in the N.E.D. is 1561:—Thomas's *Hist. of Italie*: 'They have a Duke, called after their maner, Doge.' Other quotations are given down to Browning (1885). Latham's ed. of Johnson's Dictionary gives 'Title of the chief Magistrate of Venice and Genoa: Duke, of which it is a local form.' Hoare (1915) says: 'Dòge (Venetian *dose* or *duse* from Lat. *ducem*).' The Della Crusca *Vocabolario* (1806) quotes 'doge di Vinegia' from Boccaccio (fourteenth century). The word seems really to be more English than Italian, as used in Shakspeare's time.

(1561). One instance has already been mentioned, but the following is even more noticeable in support of this probability:

> *Antonio.* The Duke cannot deny the course of law:
> For the commodity that strangers have
> With us in Venice, if it be denied,
> Will much impeach the justice of his State.—
> *Merchant*, III. iii.

The Clarendon Press editors aptly quote here a passage from Thomas on 'the libertee of stranngers in Venice':

> Al men, specially strangers, have so much libertee there, that though they speake very ill by the Venetians, so they attempt nothinge in effect against theyr astate, no man shal control theim for it . . . whyche undoubtedly is one principall cause, that draweth so many stranngers thither. (Fol. 85.)

The most striking point of all, however, connected with *The Merchant of Venice* is the fact that the Italian Romance in the *Pecorone* of Ser Giovanni Fiorentino from which the main incident of the plot is taken (that of the Jew and the pound of flesh, the disguised lady lawyer, and the trouble over the ring that was given away) had not been turned into English when the play was written. It is therefore all but certain that Shakspeare himself must have been able to read Italian at the time, or that he got someone to read and translate the story for him. So far as I am aware, no suggestions have yet been thrown out as to the friends to whom he might have gone for instruction or assistance when trying to learn Italian, or what may have been their qualification as teachers. He may, of course, have devoted some time to an unaided study of the language, for the little he picked up in a casual way could hardly enable him to read the untranslated *Pecorone*.

To get over the difficulty presented, it does not seem unreasonable to make a guess at the names of his most likely helpers, relying upon the knowledge we possess of those that formed the possible circle of his associates. I am strongly inclined to say there were two persons who came to his aid—Robert Armin and John Florio, but Armin in perhaps a more friendly and companionable way than the other. Armin stands 8th in the King's players patent 19th May 1603, and is also named in the list of actors in the First Folio. Besides being an actor, he was a shareholder in the Globe and Blackfriars theatres. He is known to have played Dogberry in *Much Ado*, in succession to that great comedian, Kempe. But, more than that, and in addition to his being a playwright himself, he was the author of a poem in nine cantos, *The Italian Taylor and his Boy* (1609), which he trans-

lated from the original Italian; and in his dedicatory address to that work he shows that he had a high appreciation of Italian poetry. His intimacy with Shakspeare must have been of a genuine kind, for he was a legatee in the Poet's will of 'twenty shillings in gould.' In all the circumstances it would have been only natural that Shakspeare should have consulted him occasionally, if not with frequency, upon matters connected with the Italian tongue. And one may fairly assume, if a man like Armin, hard-worked and poor, as he is known to have been, could have mastered Italian as he did, that there were no insuperable obstacles in Shakspeare's way when treading the same road.

Of John Florio, author as he was of a most noteworthy Italian-English Dictionary, *Queen Anne's New World of Words*, and the same 'newly much augmented' (1611), and also other smaller works intended to assist beginners in Italian grammar and conversation, there is no need to speak at any length. He was one that must have met Shakspeare very frequently. The dedication of his *First Frute*, a volume of English and Italian dialogues, was made to Leicester in 1578; and on Leicester's death Southampton and Pembroke became his patrons. When James the First came to the throne, Florio was appointed Reader in Italian to Queen Anne, and shortly after occupied an official post in the Privie Chamber of the Queen. In these circumstances he can hardly fail to have met Shakspeare on many occasions. It has indeed been argued that the sonnet which is to be found at the beginning of Florio's *Second Fruits* (1591) came from Shakspeare's pen; and I think much may be said in favour of that view from internal evidence, although Sir Sidney Lee describes it (*Life*, 1915, p. 154) as 'somewhat clumsy.' It is headed 'Phaeton to his friend Florio.' Two lines in it, describing winter, have certainly a Shakspearian ring about them—

> For when each branch hath left his flourishing,
> And green-lock'd Summer's shady pleasures cease—

and remembering that a contemporary writer speaks of Shakspeare's 'sugred sonnets among his private friends,' it does not seem very improbable that one of them should have found a resting-place in the introductory pages of a work of John Florio.

The theory that Shakspeare's Holofernes, in *Love's Labour's Lost*, was a character drawn for the purpose of ridiculing Florio, is one that for many good reasons has for some time now been regarded as altogether untenable. If Holofernes should by any possibility be shown to be a satirical representation of John Florio, the suggestion of a relationship between him and Shakspeare as teacher and pupil would of course no longer hold. I may therefore add a few words to explain the baseless nature of Dr. Warburton's

argument. In the main it is founded on the language used by Florio in the address 'To the Reader' that appears in Florio's Dictionary, first published in 1598. This address undoubtedly contains some very vigorous expressions of denunciation of certain unnamed critics of his own works, and Shakspeare is assumed, on the strength of some far-fetched reasoning, to have been the chief object of the castigation—*ergo* the Dramatist was driven to retaliate at the first opportunity that arose, that is to say, when writing *Love's Labour's Lost*. Dr. Warburton, as a matter of fact, produced no proof whatever that the play was written *after* the Dictionary; and as the date of the play is now, and with good reason, agreed to be earlier than 1598, Dr. Warburton's contention is reduced at once to nothing. Holofernes, moreover, is described in the play as a Schoolmaster—not 'a pedant and Schoolmaster' as the Doctor calls him. The Pedant of the play is another character altogether, Sir Nathaniel. It is true that Holofernes as a schoolmaster gives us now and then some snatches of Latin, a few French words, and a commonplace proverb in Italian—but introduced with apt dexterity. He also uses three or four Italian words—one of them certainly a coinage of Shakspeare's own, 'damosella,' that only *looks* Italian. He reduplicates the meaning of his words no doubt, 'as it were, in via, in way, of explication'; but even here he is true to his character. In fact the learned Doctor and critic seems to have misread the character of Holofernes in a hopeless kind of way. A delightful quickness of humorous expression, coupled with an epigrammatic terseness of phrase such as Holofernes possessed, is no sign of the pedant or the precisian of a boring type—one has only to recall a few snatches from his 'part' to find where the truth really lies. It would not, for example, be easy to better his short criticism of a faulty 'canzonet' (another Italianism of Shakspeare's): 'Here are only numbers ratified; but for the elegancy, facility and golden cadency of poesie, *caret*.' Take again the account he rattles off of Don Armado: 'His humour is lofty . . . his gait majestical, and his general behaviour vain, ridiculous, and thrasonical. He is too picked, too spruce, too affected, too odd, as it were too peregrinate, as I may call it.' Where is the pedant schoolmaster here? Or in 'He draweth out the thread of his verbosity finer than the staple of his argument'; or in his comment on Sir Nathaniel's shady Latin: 'Priscian a little scratched; 'twill serve'? With what whole-hearted contentation would his presence be hailed in the conversation-room of a London Club to-day.

Shakspeare's advance in the matter of Italian, and his complete mastery of a knowledge of North Italian geography will be discussed in the next instalment of my article.

EDWARD SULLIVAN.

LITERATURE AND POLITICS.

Of Lord Morley it might be said with some truth what de Vigny said of himself in quite another connexion—'*J'avais porté dans une vie toute active une nature toute contemplative.*' Lord Morley, we may be sure, would not accept so sharp a dichotomy, for long before he entered politics he laid emphasis on the advantages of a life of action as a stimulus, if not a corrective, to a life of contemplation.[1] He has corrected the querulousness of Lecky on Democracy[2] with a reminder that the garland of political truth is not to be won except in the heat and dust of the arena, and like Mill[3] he has found in contact with permanent officials and Parliamentary draughtsmen an intellectual athleticism that teaches a thinker both his own limitations and those of the people with whom he has to deal. But it none the less remains true that by temperament he is more of a thinker than a man of action. He has made some great contributions to the sum of political achievement—of which more in a moment—during the last thirty years, and if, with Burke, we consider it no small part of a statesman's tasks 'to know what to *avoid*,' then his strenuous opposition to the coercion of popular sentiment in Ireland and South Africa must also be taken into account. Still it is as a thinker and a writer he is to be judged in the first instance, for what distinguishes him from all his political contemporaries is that he was a man of letters by vocation.

Judged in this light Lord Morley's latest book[4] is in some respects unique. Many English politicians have affected a graceful interest in letters, but to few has it been given to achieve real eminence in both literature and politics. Most of those who have achieved the one or the other have, like Mill and Macaulay, had to make election between the two. It would be difficult, and, I think, impossible to find a parallel in this country to careers like that of Guizot, Thiers, Tocqueville, and Hanotaux, men in whose case

[1] *Voltaire*, p. 17: 'Voltaire's books would not have been the powers they were but for this constant desire of his to come into the closest contact with the practical affairs of the world.'

[2] *Miscellanies*, iv. 175.

[3] *Autobiography*, p. 85.

[4] *Recollections*, by John Viscount Morley, O.M. (Macmillan and Co. 1917.)

the study of History and Political Science seems to go hand in hand with the pursuit of Politics. The man of letters who enters the House of Commons has to live down a certain suspicion as a doctrinaire and it is rarely that he succeeds. Burke, of course, stands in a class apart, but his greatest speeches smack a little of the closet and there is authority for believing that his audience too frequently thought of the dining-room in the midst of his splendid rhetoric. Lord Morley, on the other hand, seems from the first to have found himself at home in the House of Commons and for many years he stood in the front rank as a debater. The secret of his success in that most exacting of all assemblies is no doubt to be sought in his training, his temperament, and what, for want of a better term, we may call his instinct for political casuistry, using that term in no invidious sense. His training was that of a journalist and he edited the *Fortnightly Review* and the *Pall Mall Gazette* at a time when, as he himself has remarked,[5] the tradition of a kind of hieratic anonymity was passing away from journalism, and with its decline the influence of the journalist and his sense of responsibility increased rather than diminished. Perhaps the 'ticklish' task of having to defend coercion editorially in the October of 1881 after opposing it in January was no bad training for the author of the *Essay on Compromise* in those arts of accommodation which make politics what Lord Morley has himself called 'one long second-best.' But his temperament was also that of a man who finds a forensic stimulus in the clash of mind with mind. Of all men he would be the last who could say with Hobbes 'If I had read as many books as most men I should be as ignorant as they,' but his deep and catholic study of literature was never exercised at the expense of social intercourse. The first volume of this book might, indeed, not inaptly be called a treatise *De Amicitia;* it abounds in the most charming full-length portraits of friends in politics and literature—Meredith, Huxley, Mill, Acton, Herbert Spencer, Arnold, and Carlyle. More than that, however, both volumes are full of extraordinarily penetrating estimates of political colleagues and opponents, their virtues and their defects, the secrets of their success and of their failure—Chamberlain, Harcourt, Parnell, Gladstone, Campbell-Bannerman, Spencer, Lord Rosebery, Lord Haldane, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Balfour. They have all the shrewdness of Shelburne's portraits of his contemporaries without their malice. A man who could judge with such acumen the causes of political success or the want of it, was bound to achieve it. Whether ideas or men count for most is one of the vexed—and we think one of the most idle and vexatious—questions of history; history may or may not be what Carlyle called it—'the essence of innumerable biographies,' but in politics as

[5] *Studies in Literature*, pp. 332-5.

an art the knowledge of men is half the battle. As for what I have ventured to call Lord Morley's instinct for political casuistry, it has often been exhibited in his writings and, although he takes exception to his friend Lord Acton's view of him as seeing nothing in politics but 'the higher expediencies,' there are many passages in his writings[6] on the art of politics—we will not be so profane as to take seriously his comparison of Politics with Logic as being neither a science nor an art but 'a dodge'—which would give Acton respectable grounds for his belief. Lord Morley's own choice to stay in the Cabinet in the cause of Home Rule rather than leave it with Mr. Gladstone in the cause of naval 'retrenchment' is a case in point. In this we intend no reproach; it was one of those cases of 'hard alternatives,' grave or divided responsibilities, critical balancings in sharp emergencies and clouded situations that, as he has elsewhere remarked, 'press those who meddle with the government of men.'[7] Politics are full of such economies; we meet with them in the long sinewy wrestle of Lord Morley with Lord Minto over the limits within which it was wise or justifiable to revive an old Regulation to deport Indian agitators or put the curb on a seditious Press. But we are left wondering furtively at times, whether the author of the Essay which exhorted men as to the imperative duty of not only making up their minds but of speaking them did not smile to himself at the efforts of the Whips to preach silence to the 'Indian group' of Radicals in the House restive under the exercise of these arbitrary prerogatives.

No doubt another clue to Lord Morley's success in the House of Commons was his robust, not to say resolute, belief in representative institutions. That belief has been the burden of many of his political essays—on Machiavelli, on Maine, and on Lecky, for example. As Lord Randolph Churchill said of him, he '*believed* in the solution of political questions' and he believed in their solution by the forensic arts of Parliamentary Debate, and even the black magic of the Whips. It is not always easy, however, to resist the conviction that he is concerned in this book to persuade himself quite as much as his reader.

> Much of Parliamentary debate is dispute between men who in truth and at bottom agree but invent arguments to disguise agreement and contrive a difference. It is artificial, but serves a purpose in justifying the lobbies and a Party division. You have patiently to learn the wholesome lesson that wisdom may be wisdom even when she chooses rhetorical apparel. You cannot expect to escape a continual exhibition of the common error of politics, and of much besides, the attribution to one

[6] Cf. *Compromise*, p. 229. And cf. p. 26: 'Moral principles are only registered generalisations from experience.' There is also a deprecation of Chamberlain's talk of 'natural rights' on p. 158 of the *Recollections*.

[7] *Miscellanies*, iv. 187.

cause of what is the effect of many; nor the vexation of listening to the wrong arguments for the right object. Above all, one often felt the pregnant truth that most mistakes in politics arise from flat and invincible disregard of the maxim that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be. But then here, too, Parliament is only representative.'

As against this sedative we may recall a certain passage in the *Essay on Compromise*:

The extension of the ways of thinking which are proper in politics to other than political matter means at the same time the depravation of the political sense itself, and the art of politics is growing to be as meanly conceived as all the rest. At elections the national candidate has not often a chance against the local candidate, nor the man of principle against the man of a class. In Parliament we are admonished on high authority that 'the policy of a party is not the carrying out of the opinion of any section of it but the general consensus of the whole,' which seems to be a hierophantic manner of saying that the policy of a Party is one thing and the principle which makes it a Party is another thing, and that men who care very strongly about anything are to surrender that and the hope of it, for the sake of succeeding in something about which they care very little or not at all. This is our modern way of giving politicians heart for their voyage.'

This is certainly no less true now than when it was written some forty years ago. The arts of political management of opinion—stipendiary titles of honour, caucuses, 'lobbying' and all the rest of it—have accentuated this subordination of the intellectual exercise of one's own volition to the supreme exigencies of party. Lord Morley says somewhere in his new book that it is the great virtue of party that it disciplines caprice, but a party may have its caprices no less than an individual. Although no doubt, as Lord Morley is inclined to believe, the average of political intelligence stands higher in the House of Commons than ever it did, we are not at all sure that there is any corresponding degree of political independence. A Cobden or a Bright would probably find it impossible to maintain his Parliamentary existence in these days. As a legislative instrument Parliament works harder, but we doubt if it works better than it did in that era from 1832 to 1867 which Bagehot regarded as the golden age of political intelligence. In those days Parliament made and unmade Cabinets, in these Cabinets make and unmake Parliaments, and there was truth in the last words of Sir William Anson that legislative sovereignty may be said to have passed from the Commons to the Cabinet. Lord Morley says nothing of Parliament's control over foreign policy and, what amounts to much the same thing, its intelligent interest in it, although he could, we imagine, say much. He would, we are sure, be the first to admit that the age is long past when one could say with Disraeli 'Show me your House of Commons and I will show you your foreign

' *On Compromise*, p. 107.

policy,' and we feel hardly less sure that he would be the first to regret it. He has but one faint reference to Chamberlain's part in introducing into our political life that parasite on democracy, the caucus, whose malign activities M. Ostrogorski has exhibited to us at work in all modern countries causing a slow corruption in the body politic. He has still the same ardent faith in democracy as he exhibited in the pages of his *Rousseau* and in his polemical essays on Maine and Lecky, but we are not sure that he distinguishes sufficiently between Democracy as a form of society and Democracy as a form of government. We may read in vain through these pages as through the pages of his Essay on *Democracy and Reaction*[9] for an answer to some of the riddles of Democracy and in particular for the solution of that antinomy between Democracy and Liberty which so perplexed Acton and De Tocqueville. It is indeed, as I have previously remarked in the pages of this Review,[10] Lord Morley's way to propound more questions than he answers and the part of Socratic midwife is one which with his immense reading and sinewy, dialectical mind he is well qualified to play. The same negative, or perhaps secretive, attitude characterises his utterances about Progress, a word of which Maine plaintively remarked that he had never yet been able to discover any definition. He remarks truly that the Victorian period was a great age of Progress in the amelioration of social conditions, and he has elaborated elsewhere in striking language the novelty of this conception[11] and the great conquests it has made in the sphere of thought and action. His early career was contemporaneous with the period when 'the philosophical parenthesis' of a sterile transcendentalism came to an end and 'an active faith in the improvableness of institutions' began to flourish; when, as he says of Diderot, 'political ideas were grasped as instruments.'[12] Of that great movement he could legitimately say *quorum pars magna fui*, and not the least interesting of these pages are those in which he describes, as elsewhere,[13] the progressive 'school of thought' associated with the *Fortnightly Review* under his Editorship. But this is perhaps hardly the time to ask any oracle for a definition of Progress, and in the frightful retrogression of this War, when the issue between the powers of light and the powers of darkness is still undecided, Machiavelli with his belief that History moves in a weary cycle has the laugh of all of us.

This, however, is something of a digression. If Lord Morley has little to say about politics as a science, and its problems, he has

[9] See the fourth volume of the *Miscellanies*.
[10] 'Lord Morley's Reflections,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, March 1914.
[11] *History and Politics*, pp. 82-93, *Miscellanies*, iv. 47-48.
[12] *Diderot*, pp. 8 and 185.
[13] *Studies in Literature*, 'Valedictory,' p. 323.

much to say about it as an art. Here, as always, he is a staunch believer in his fellows. Like Guicciardini he refuses to subscribe to Machiavelli's cynical saying that men are naturally bad, he insists that they are naturally good, though by nature weak. He is never embittered like De Tocqueville who, less fortunate than he in politics, saw in Democracy at best the advent of the mediocre, or like Taine whose microscopic studies of the pathology of the French Revolution left him sceptical and despondent. Lord Morley has escaped what he has called elsewhere the Sceptic's Progress—the sad declension of the disillusioned idealist into the cynic, and he has escaped it because he has cherished this belief in the natural goodness of men and has never succumbed to the insidious temptation of the politician to tell men merely what he thinks they would like to hear. In this respect it may be said of him what he said himself of Cobden,[14] that he has escaped the great danger of the platform orator's career. Effect has never been with him the decisive consideration instead of truth, and there are few more bracing passages in this book than his story of how he faced—and subdued—a hostile Jingo audience in Manchester whom he sought to convince that our South African policy towards the Boer republics was morally wrong.

Much the best part of this book from a literary point of view is, however, the part which is devoted not to politics but to literature. And this for a very simple reason. The volume which deals exclusively with politics is largely made up of political diaries and correspondence dealing with the daily and weekly progress of the writer's public activities, and this inevitably involves, as in the letters to Lord Minto, constant repetition. It is inevitable[15] but it is unfortunate. The second volume is, in fact, rather the *disjecta membra* of a treatise on Indian Government—of which more in a moment—than a coherent piece of literature. It shows the writer as an *esprit positif* catechising and exhorting the Governor-General, but it has the drawback of leaving us without the replies of the objects of these admonitions and even of leaving us a little in the dark at times as to what they were about. With the exception of a chapter on Lucretius, in every way worthy of its subject, the second volume is not to be compared in literary attractiveness with the first. The first volume is not only memorable for its graceful portraits of Victorian men of letters but also for its frequent excursions into literary criticism—sometimes self-criticism. Lord Morley is, indeed, no indulgent critic of his own writings. He is dissatisfied with the phonetic quality, as prose,

[14] *Life of Cobden*, chapter viii.

[15] *Ibid.*: 'A political or religious agitator must not be afraid of constant repetition. Repetition is his most effective instrument. The fastidiousness which is proper to literature and which makes a man dread to say the same thing twice is in the field of propagandism mere impotency.'

of that memorable sentence of his about Machiavelli, so apt in its characterisation, so perfect in its rhythm :

> He uses few or none of our loud easy words of praise and blame, he is not often sorry or glad, he does not smile and he does not scold, he is seldom indignant and never surprised.

Lord Morley is hard to please if he can find fault with this. In an illuminating excursion on style he pleads almost apologetically that he never ran after words, that he was content with 'Correctness.' In truth his style is just what he says, as others have said before him, a good style should be, a 'faithful reflection' of the writer's mind. His mind has that *justesse* which he admired so much in Mill,[16] and one may say of him in the words of Pascal 'Quand on voit le style naturel, on est tout étonné et ravi, car on s'attendait de voir un auteur et on trouve un homme.'[17] Take any passage at random—the passage on the beauty of holiness in the *Miscellanies*, the analysis of Burke's fame at the beginning of the monograph, the description of the Terror in the Essay on Robespierre, and the truth of this as a characterisation of Lord Morley's style will be evident.

This first volume also has its interest for all lovers of literature, and in particular of Lord Morley's contributions to it, in that it permits us to see the worker's choice of his subject and the motives which inspired it. Lord Morley is his own literary biographer as he is to some extent his own literary critic. He explains to us how his *Essay on Compromise* was inspired by a desire to counteract that demoralising habit of accommodation which was so marked a characteristic of Anglican churchmen in high places who subscribed to the Articles when they had long lost all belief in them. The hypocrisy which underlay the University tests long survived their abolition; it had become too much of a habit. But Lord Morley's *Essay* had a wider scope than this and we are not sure that he does not underrate it in treating it as little more than the enforcement of a platitude necessary at the time. It is true, to some extent, as the great American jurist O. W. Holmes once said to me of his epoch-making book *The Common Law*, when I urged him to publish a new edition, that if a book does its work effectively it ought to die a natural death, because if men have absorbed it they will no longer need it. But the main thesis of the *Essay on Compromise* needs constant enforcement because men are always apt to take beliefs on trust and, as Maine remarked, never so much as under Democracy whose chief characteristic is its readiness to adopt vicarious opinions in preference to an intellectual exercise of its own volition.[18] The lasting justifi-

[16] *Miscellanies*, iv. 162.

[17] *Pensées*, p. 427.

[18] 'The civilised man like the savage is a man of party with a newspaper for a totem—and like the savage he is apt to make of it his god.'—*Popular Government.*

cation of the *Essay on Compromise* is to be found in the words of Pascal—'On se persuade mieux, pour l'ordinaire, par les raisons qu'on a soi-même trouvées, que par celles qui sont venues dans l'esprit des autres.'

One of the qualities which strike a diligent reader of Lord Morley's literary work before he entered Parliament is its singular coherence. This was characteristic of the Victorian thinkers. There is a unity, a direct 'political' purpose which integrates all Mill's writings—the *Logic*, the *Political Economy* and the Essays on *Liberty* and *Representative Government*, just as, in a very different connexion and with a very different purpose, there is a unity about the work of Maine. But it was peculiarly characteristic of the school to which Lord Morley belonged, than which there probably never has been any school more zealously determined to regard, with Alexander Hamilton, the government of man as the greatest of all human studies. What Newman made their reproach[19] was their pride—the subjecting to human judgment of 'first principles of whatever kind.' They were determined to find reasons for the faith that was in them. Lord Morley was, if anything, distinguished from among them, and certainly from their immediate predecessors such as Bentham, by an attachment to the study of history no less than to philosophic speculation. His own contributions to History alternate, to adopt his classification of historians,[20] between the 'statesman historian,' as in his books on Gladstone, Cobden, Walpole, Cromwell, and Burke, and the 'philosopher historian,' as in his studies of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot. For a man not directly apprenticed to the now highly specialised art or science (we deliberately beg a question here) of the historian in these days when the garment of the Muse of History is divided between the palaeographer, the numismatist, the philologist, the economist, the ethnologist, the legal historian, he has shown an extraordinary feeling for the Historic Method. But after all, this feeling comes by faith, not by works, and long training in the technique of the scriptorium has more often than not destroyed a historian instead of making him; he 'cannot see the wood for the trees.' The chapter on 'History' in Lord Morley's *Voltaire* is an admirable example of his 'historic sense.' So is the admirable chapter on the history of political speculation in his *Rousseau*,[21] a work which he now criticises, quite undeservedly, as 'not historic enough in spirit.' It is just this feeling for History that distinguishes him from the Agnostics of his generation in his attitude to the Catholic Church and indeed to all great religious movements. We are not surprised to be told by him in these *Recollections* that

[19] The *Apologia*, Note A. on Liberalism, p. 318.
[20] *Voltaire*, p. 299.
[21] *Rousseau*, vol. ii. chap. iii. 'The Social Contract.'

many of them reproached him with 'idealising' the Catholic Church. He himself makes it a reproach against Voltaire that he never grasped the historic greatness and, relatively to certain periods of human growth, the historic goodness of that mighty hierarchy.[22] No one, indeed, whatever his religious beliefs, who has any sense of the development of the human mind could think otherwise. Much of the effectiveness of Lord Morley's polemics on Agnosticism lay in the fact that Newman's gibe against the Protestants—'to be deep in history is to cease to be a Protestant'—would have had no point against him as an Agnostic, for of all Agnostics he was one of the best equipped. But the explanation probably lies deeper than this. He has in his own way as profound a sense, though he does not discover it so easily, of a moral order in History as Acton, and he is more catholic in his search for it. Some of his most glowing pages are devoted to Calvin as the founder of a moral order, 'the positive education of the individual soul.'[23] Only he sees that all those are systems which 'have their day and cease to be.' What is left? A deep humanity, a strong religious sense of Duty as wearing the Godhead's most benignant grace, a wide charity, and above all that feeling of Pity the want of which he deplores in Meredith, and which for him finds its completest expression in that great saying of Bacon's, so often greeting us in Lord Morley's work, 'The nobler a soul is, the more objects of compassion it hath.' There are, indeed, many glimpses in this book of a large and generous nature, none more touching than when, as only too often, he has had to perform the last offices of friendship at the deathbed or over the grave of a cherished friend. His friendships have been as catholic in their range as they were staunch in their quality. They embraced an extraordinary variety of men between many of whom there was little or nothing in common except their community of friendship with him. That they reveal a generous nature is obvious; what is, perhaps, not so obvious is that they are the trophies of a discerning spirit. 'A mesure qu'on a plus d'esprit, on trouve qu'il y a plus d'hommes originaux; les gens du commun ne trouvent pas de différence entre les hommes.'

One meets this discernment at every turn—whether in essays in the 'experimental psychology' of Cabinet-making or in that conduct of a monthly Review which Lord Morley once described as demanding only less tact and patience than the management of an opera-house. But one wonders sometimes whether it is charity or a sense of decorum that induces Lord Morley to reveal so little of the 'back-chat' of politics, its intrigues, heart-burnings, feuds and jealousies. He glides lightly

[22] *Voltaire*, pp. 2, 40, 322. [23] *Miscellanies*, iv. 122.

over the feuds of the days of the Liberal League, perhaps because he thinks they are now composed and the hatchet buried—only permitting himself a rare reference to the events of 1915 in an ironical reflection on the failure of the apostles of 'efficiency' to conduct the War without seeking the collaboration of their opponents. But if we are to judge by his recent *Life* there was, according to Dilke, only one member of Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet who was not jealous. True, one somewhat distrusts the authority when one learns from the same source that the exception was Dilke himself. But the political memoirs of the nineteenth century, although they do not exhibit the violent recriminations of the eighteenth, are full of evidences that, as Lord Morley himself says in his Essay on Guicciardini, 'The cases are rare where politics do not rather contract than expand the range of human interest and feeling.' The mind is subdued to what it works in. We seem to see in this book a good deal of evidence that Lord Morley was very frequently in demand as an 'honest broker' to compose the feuds and jealousies of his colleagues. It is refreshing to find that these experiences have not induced in him that mood of cynicism which is so characteristic of the Florentine publicists in their reflections on the art of dealing with men.

Moreover, with the displacement of the House by the platform —and no one did more to shift the venue than Gladstone—the intrigues of the lobbies have been supplemented by the histrionics of the public meeting. The Idols of the Tribe and the Market place have dominated the mind of the politician. He has been tempted to put his opinions up to the highest bidder—not always, we admit, successfully, as Lord Morley remarks of one pushful member of the species. There seems no place in the House of Commons to-day for an independent educator of public opinion like Mill. This is one of the defects of Democracy. Whether it be true or not, as De Tocqueville contends, that democracies will only tolerate an intellectual mediocrity, it is certainly true that a man who is a supple, acoustic echo of current opinion flourishes in them as in no other form of polity. It has been said of a certain very successful politician of to-day that he lives by his intuitions and that an audience goes to his head like wine. Certainly there never was a time when the people were more in need of political education and less inclined to receive it. As Acton said with his usual profundity, democracies are of all societies least tolerant of opinion just because they are most dependent on it. But as regards Lord Morley's own career he is entitled to contend that this has not been his own experience. He practised very few economies of truth in the expression of his own opinions, whatever capitulations he may have made in the

matter of their enforcement. His persistent refusal to change or conceal his opinions on the Eight Hours question is a case in point. But it cost him his seat at Newcastle none the less. The days are gone when a Member of Parliament could claim like Burke that he represented not merely his constituency but the nation. But then, if we recollect rightly, Burke's contention met with little countenance from the electors of Bristol.

Apart from its literary excursions and the fragment (we can call it nothing else) on Indian reforms the main interest of the book lies in its studies of character. The most finished portrait is undoubtedly that of Meredith: it gives us the clue alike to his attraction and his repulsion—an eager, buoyant spirit, as lyrical in his conversation as in his poetry and yet at times as forced and as affected as in his prose. The reader of Meredith's published letters must have been struck by the contrast between the direct simplicity of the letters addressed to an intimate friend like Lord Morley and the preciousness—it might almost be called the coxcombry—of the letters addressed to the young ladies of title who courted his friendship. We find the explanation in Lord Morley's picture of Meredith as a conversationalist; with a friend he was simple, manly, direct; the moment he had an audience he was histrionic. But as a whole the picture of him is one of a radiant personality. None the less we cannot but feel that there is something harsh and pagan in his resolute optimism, something almost hedonistic. There is more of humanity, just because there is more of pity, in the great and tender genius whose profound sense of the tragic irony of life Meredith brushes so lightly aside in Lord Morley's book—Thomas Hardy, who will be read long after Meredith is forgotten. There is a glimpse of Herbert Spencer which is at once ludicrous and pathetic. As the shadows of death closed upon him at Brighton his Agnosticism was shaken by the persistency and immanence of Space, and he wrote to Lord Morley seeking comfort in his perplexity. The recipient of the letter made a special journey to Brighton to console him with the reflection that Space was a subjective impression, and was reproached with presenting him with a Kantian postulate as his *viaticum*!

When we come to the character-studies of politicians we are at once conscious of a contraction of the field of vision. Parnell and Chamberlain attracted Lord Morley—perhaps for the same reason as Strafford and Cromwell attracted him: they were resolute men of action who knew their own minds.[24] Moreover, the sombre fate of one of them, namely Parnell, presented a dramatic illustration of the play of that element of 'accident,' or

[24] Cf. *Voltaire*, p. 18: 'Voltaire rated literature, as it ought to be rated, below action.'

'Fortuna' or τύχη which invests history with so much of its romance and all its fatality. One remembers Burke's striking figure of speech, in the *Letters on a Regicide Peace*, of the way in which a face at an inn has changed the course of history. But although Lord Morley's admiration for Parnell is obvious, he fails to make us share it. The impression remains of a figure, as Lord Bryce has somewhere described it, at once cold and callous. We cannot avoid a suspicion that in any other party than the Irish Parnell would have failed; his mind was uncultivated, his sympathies narrow, his temperament dark and suspicious. The portrait of Chamberlain is infinitely more attractive though we are somewhat surprised to be told that he had both taste and knowledge in literature. His speeches certainly reflect none of those qualities and, if we recollect rightly, he never rose higher than the *Pickwick Papers* in his literary allusions.

Space does not permit us to analyse all the portraits in Lord Morley's picture-gallery. Some are mere rough studies—such as the sketch of Lord Kitchener; others like those of Lord Rosebery, Lord Spencer, Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Asquith and Mr. Balfour, are finished portraits distinguished by a warm affection in the artist for his subject. We will close with a word on Lord Morley's views on a vital subject which is likely to occupy more and more of public attention in the future—the Government of India.

Lord Morley's tenure of office as Secretary of State for India will always be memorable for the reforms which resulted in the admission of a Native Member to the Viceroy's Executive Council, the appointment of two Native Members to the Council of the Secretary of State for India, and the reconstitution of the provincial councils on a predominantly representative basis. These were great reforms and courageous, and none more courageous than the admission of a Native Member to the Viceroy's Executive Council; in carrying it Lord Minto had to encounter the opposition of his own Council, and Lord Morley the disapproval of such experienced colleagues as Ripon, Elgin, and Fowler. Lord Morley is more than justified in quoting Lord Hardinge's testimony, that 'the vast political development' and improvement in the temper of India in the years that have elapsed 'is an outcome of the reformation of the councils undertaken by Lord Morley and Lord Minto.' All this must be admitted. But the wisdom of Lord Morley's attitude on other, and in a sense, larger problems of Indian policy is more open to question, especially in the light of the present war. Readers of the Mesopotamia Report will remember its deliberate conclusion that the disasters in Mesopotamia were, among other things, due to the passion for economy, amounting to parsimony, in the Indian Government

which led it to 'struggle hard to carry on war upon a peace budget.' For this Lord Morley was not, of course, directly responsible, as he resigned the seals in 1908, and it was not till much later that the Home Government, in spite of the alarming developments in the European situation in 1911, deliberately limited the improvement of the Indian Army by the imposition of an arbitrary maximum of expenditure. But one traces the same attitude of mind in Lord Morley's letter to the Viceroy of January 8, 1908, in which he says:

> In a poor country like India, economy is as much an element of defence as guns and forts, and to concentrate your vigour and vigilance upon guns and forts, and upon a host of outlying matters in Tibet, Persia, the Gulf, &c., which only secondarily and indirectly concern you even as garrisons, seems to me a highly injurious dispersion from the other and more important work of an Indian Government. Then again, notwithstanding all you say about the Man on the Spot, I humbly reply that this is just what the G[overnment] of I[ndia] is not. China, Persia, Turkey, Russia, France, Germany—I have never been able to understand and never shall understand, what advantages the G. of I. has for comprehending the play of all these factors in the great game of Empire. On the contrary, the G. of I. is by no means the Man on the Spot.[25]

Let us consider this a little closely. Lord Morley's conception of the relations of the Secretary of State to the Viceroy and his Council was, it is clear from various passages[26] in this book, that of the generation of Mill and Argyll, who held that the Viceroy was merely the servant of the Secretary of State. They exalted the authority, as Lord Morley exalts it (see pp. 178, 232, 264), of the Viceroy not in order that the Viceroy might be stronger but that his Council might be weaker. They seem to have suspected, with reason, that the Viceroy would grow with the growth and strengthen with the strength of his Council. The more that Council approached to the position of a Cabinet, with the Viceroy as Prime Minister, the more independent of the Secretary of State would the Viceroy become. He would be able to treat as something of an equal, with the collective authority of a council of colleagues behind him. Now it is undeniable that the constitutional development of India during the last twenty years, with some interludes, has been steadily in the direction of the autonomy of the Viceroy's Council. Even before that period, Strachey, an acute student of Indian institutions, remarked on the change in the status of the councillors from that of mere advisers to heads of important departments of State. It is true that the Viceroy's Council is not—and never can be until the

[25] Lord Morley to Lord Minto: *Recollections*, ii. 242.

[26] E.g. vol. ii. p. 178, p. 264, and cf. the approving reference to the Duke of Argyll's views on p. 244. Argyll's view (see the quotation from him in Irengyar's *Indian Constitution*, p. 147) was that the Government of India is 'merely the executive officer of the Home Government.'

change is effected by statute—responsible to the Legislative Council, much less to the people of India; it is responsible to the English Cabinet through the Secretary of State, and ultimately to the English people, as represented in Parliament. But that responsibility has, with the development of the Viceroy's Council into a quasi-Cabinet, tended to relax. In 1894 the Viceroy (Lord Elgin) and his Council were compelled by the Secretary of State to withdraw their vote on the Indian Cotton Duties Bill and to support a countervailing excise; in 1916 the exact converse took place—the Viceroy and his Council originated the very policy which they had been compelled to abandon in 1894, and the Secretary of State (Mr. Austen Chamberlain) withdrew the traditional opposition of his office and pleaded the plenary inspiration of the Viceroy's Council as his mandate. The only way a Secretary of State can counteract this constitutional tendency is to persuade the Viceroy not to consult his Council at all, because the exercise of the Viceroy's veto upon the decisions of his Council has long been falling into disuse. This appears to have been the drift of Lord Morley's persuasions. For example, he writes (in reply to the Viceroy's contention that the Government of India should be consulted about the Anglo-Russian agreement):

> If you mean the Government of India in a technical sense—as the G.G. in C.—I must with all respect demur. For one thing, the G.G. is his own Foreign Minister, and the Foreign Department is under his own immediate superintendence. Second, with sincere regard for the capacity of your Council, I fail to see what particular contribution they could make to questions of frontier policy.[27]

Now let us turn to the Mesopotamia Commission's report:

> The substitution of private for official telegrams [between the Secretary of State and Viceroy] tends to dispossess the Council of its functions which by Statute they are entitled to exercise. . . . *We have been informed by two members of the Governor-General's Council that according to their recollection the Council were never consulted as to, nor were they privy to, the campaign in Mesopotamia.* . . . If the old practice of having recourse to an official despatch had been adopted, and a despatch had been written at the outset with the full authority of the Secretary of State *in Council* conveying to the Governor-General the rumours and the nature of the doubts which had arisen as to the condition of the wounded, and such despatch had been received by the Governor-General *in Council*, the circulation of such despatch *amongst both Councils* would have accelerated an investigation and prevented a great deal of the distress and suffering which occurred during that period. . . . As the Council of the Governor-General was not consulted, it is clear they cannot be held responsible for what occurred in the Mesopotamia campaign. On the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief must rest the sole responsibility.[28]

We see here the results of the policy of turning the Council out of doors in matters of foreign policy, and the auricular use of

[27] *Recollections*, ii. 178.

[28] *Report of the Mesopotamia Commission*, pp. 102-3.

private telegrams and letters to whisper in the ear of the Viceroy (and Lord Morley obviously availed himself very largely of these informal communications) is one of the instruments of that policy. The parochial view of her Imperial responsibilities which India took during the Mesopotamian campaign is, to my mind, very largely the result of the denial to her, and in particular to the Viceroy's Council, of any voice in foreign policy. In this respect we cannot but think Lord Morley's policy was reactionary. To narrow your institutions at the top while liberalising them at the bottom savours a little too much of Prussian 'reforms.' The Indian Government was, to borrow a phrase from Lord Justice Farwell's words[29] about our African protectorates, lowered to the level of 'a Parliamentary despotism.' How far this policy of inducing the Viceroy to ignore the Viceregal Council was accompanied by a policy on the part of the Secretary of State of ignoring his own Council we do not know. What we do know is that Lord Morley's successor at the India Office deliberately made an attempt, by the abortive Council of India Bill, to abolish the Council of the Secretary of State as a consultative body altogether; had Lord Crewe succeeded, the strange dictum[30] of a certain judge that there was 'no such person' as the 'Secretary of State for India *in Council*' would have become an accomplished fact. Had these tendencies—reactionary tendencies we think them—continued, the Secretary of State and the Viceroy would have divided the government of India between them, impersonating the parts of Messrs. Spenlow and Jorkins, and there can be no doubt who would have been the sleeping partner. It would have been the unfortunate Viceroy.

There is a good deal to be said for Lord Morley's policy in one respect, and it is this—the Viceroy's Council would, almost certainly, have opposed the introduction of the Native Member. But once appointed, his appointment was an argument for strengthening the functions of the Viceroy's Council instead of weakening them. And time and policy, we think, are against Lord Morley's conception of these functions. The recent resolution of the Viceroy's Council in favour of direct representation at the Imperial Conference, and the welcome extended to the representatives by the Dominion Premiers when they duly appeared there, show unmistakably the natural drift of events. The grievances of India as to the Asiatic problems in the Dominions are much more likely to receive a favourable solution if the status of the Indian Government is thus raised to some degree of correspondence with that of the Dominions. There are limits, of course; limits set by the fact that India is not—and probably for a very long time cannot be—conceded the full status of a self-governing

[29] In *Rex* v. *Crewe*. [30] In *Frith* v. *the Queen*.

Dominion. But that is no reason why we should march in the opposite direction. We cannot think that Lord Morley's 'wicked thought,' as he terms it, that 'Strafford was an ideal type, both for governor of Ireland in the seventeenth century, and governor of India in the twentieth century' was a happy inspiration. Lord Morley tells us, not altogether with disapproval, earlier in the book that he was once compared to St. Just. The comparison is interesting. It reminds us of the aphorism of a famous French writer that 'no one is so like a clerical as an anti-clerical.'

But these are delicate matters and controversial. Lord Morley has every right to his own opinions and to be 'positive' in the expression of them. They do but enhance the interest of a profoundly interesting book. Lord Morley is his own Boswell, and a very candid Boswell he is. The book closes with 'a word of epilogue' which is certainly one of the most beautiful, as it is one of the most inspiring passages in modern literature. In the evening of his days the writer walks the Surrey uplands with his little dog pausing inquiringly at his feet 'eager to resume her endless hunt after she knows not what, like the chartered metaphysician.' He muses on the eternal mystery of existence and on the flight of the human soul through time—brief, transient, bewildered like the passage of the fugitive swallow of the Anglo-Saxon fable through the lighted hall of the King's Thegns, coming one knows not whence, going one knows not whither:

> No Angelus across the waves reached my Surrey upland, but the church bells ringing out with pleasant cheerfulness for evening service from the valley down below, recalled the bells of Lytham, where in the quiet churchyard in the wood by the Lancashire sea-shore are the remains of those who began my days. A vaguely remembered passage of Chateaubriand floated into my mind about church bells: how they tell the world that we have come into it, and when we leave it; into what enchanted dreams they plunge us—religion, family, native land, the cradle, the tomb, the past, the future.

The wistfulness of these words recalls the reverie of another, the great thinker who in the evening of his days upon the earth heard deep in his own heart the plaintive whisper of his childhood's orisons calling to him like the muffled peal of the submerged belfries on the stormy Breton coast. The rest is silence.

J. H. MORGAN.

PARNELL AND HIS LIBERAL ALLIES

SIR FRANK LOCKWOOD made the observation, some years after Parnell's death: 'Parnell was cruelly wronged all round. There is a great reaction in England in his favour. I am not altogether without remorse myself.' His conclusion will carry new force in the eyes of Irish readers of Lord Morley's fascinating volumes of *Recollections*.[1] It is not too much to say that if the Irish Party could have read the story, now for the first time revealed, of Gladstone's frame of mind up to the day before Parnell's re-election, they would never have deposed their leader. They acted in the belief that, both as a moralist and as a politician, the Liberal Leader had immutably made up his mind that either he or Parnell must go. We are now informed it was nothing of the kind. He declined point-blank to commit himself to any pontifical pronouncement of his own as a Party leader on the issue of morals. We learn for the first time that, even on the question of his own continuance in the Liberal leadership, he was so far from having formed any irrevocable resolution, that he deliberately omitted from the final draft of his letter the famous passage that Parnell's re-election 'would render my retention of the leadership of the Liberal Party almost a nullity.' That was the passage which alone could have justified the Irish Party in facing the appalling risks of parting with the leader who was the personification of the unity of their race. The rest of the Gladstone letter would have been taken as, *quantum valeat*, the advice of an anxious friend, who was careful even to qualify it by confining his objection to Parnell's continuance 'at the present moment.' With a calmness that takes one's breath away, Lord Morley quotes from his Diary the proofs that Gladstone on second thoughts struck out the passage from the original draft, and that it was Mr. John Morley himself—*et tu, Brute!*—who insisted—with a mournful success—upon its restoration to the letter as published. Nobody could honestly harbour any suspicion of bad faith on the part of men of the Gladstone or Morley build. What was suspected and is now proved is that the Liberal leaders failed to come to any clear decision of their

[1] *Recollections*, by John Viscount Morley, O.M., Hon. Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford. London: Macmillan and Co., 1917.

own in the crisis, and failed to make their Irish allies aware even of the halting conclusion they had come to. The Irish Party was encouraged to destroy a leader whom Gladstone declared to be 'a political genius of most uncommon order' and who in Lord Morley's own words 'fought the Parliament with implacable energy, unerring skill, and bewildering success,' and to commit their country to a ten years' civil war, in tragic ignorance of what they were doing or even of what the Liberal leaders were really thinking.

Parnell's own contributions to the catastrophe are not to be ignored. Almost any other man in his position would have from the start taken his own Party and his English allies freely into consultation as to where lay the line of public safety—whether in showing an immovable front, or in appeasing the storm by a voluntary withdrawal 'at the present moment.' In either event, he would have secured the unbreakable allegiance of his own people and, it cannot be doubted, of those of his Liberal allies, who were something more than 'half-baked Home Rulers,' and to whom, indeed, the preservation of his influence was, at the time, scarcely less essential than to Ireland. But both Parnell's value and his defects lay in his not being like other men. It must not be forgotten that up to the moment when he was debarred from giving evidence himself, he was convinced either that the Divorce proceedings would not be persisted in, or that he would leave the witness-box with public opinion anything but implacably estranged from him. For another thing, of the only two members of his Party whom he had of late years intimately confided in, one was in broken health in London and the other was in America. And, for another, he thought he knew the Liberal chiefs well enough to forecast (with some accuracy, as it now appears) their calculations in the emergency, and he probably (with less accuracy) concluded that they would rather thank him for saving them the trouble of making up their minds until Ireland's attitude was quite clear.

He might well have been confirmed in this latter assumption by the interview, of enthralling human interest, which Lord Morley now for the first time reports to the public, between the Irish Leader and himself in his hotel at Brighton on the 10th of November—'on the very eve of this dire wreck'—a bare week before the decree in the Divorce Court. Who would not have expected at such an hour a conversation above all things dwelling upon those anxieties of the Liberal leaders which, before two weeks were over, they were to shatter a five years' alliance by publishing to the world in a panic? Not a rumble of the tempest spoiled that pleasant evening. The awful possibilities of the succeeding week are not even alluded to, until the last paragraph

of the interview, as in the postscript of the legendary lady's letter. We have some entertaining small talk about Parnell's 'fine and easy carriage and unaffected dignity,' about the number of cigars he smoked, and his way of liking to sit close to the fire; about his exquisitely Parnellite query: 'Who is the Under Secretary? I forget'; about his talking little of himself, and 'with much benignity as to his colleagues save as to ——, the very mention of whom made him angry,' and this characteristic touch: 'About 11.30 R. appeared. Parnell very courteous and pleasant and neither frigid nor stiff with her.' All of which would be delightful enough, except as the prologue to a tragedy. The eminent English statesman who two weeks afterwards was to deliver an ultimatum of dishonour to his guest betrayed not the remotest sense that the sky was cracking overhead.

It was not an interview to make provision for an impending crash, but a cordial and deferential consultation with the Irish Leader as to who was to be Viceroy and who Chief Secretary of the country of which he was presently to be the ruler. 'I opened the conversation by saying that we were anxious to know what line he meant to take on Land Purchase.' The response, by the way, was one that would have saved England from 60,000,000*l.* to 70,000,000*l.* on subsequent Land Purchase loans, while rescuing the great mass of the small farmers once for all from landlordism, and preserving the richest of the grazing lands for more beneficent national uses. But that is another story, although here we have Parnell as the cool, practical statesman, even while the *fractus orbis* was falling.

> I sounded him as to Spencer for Viceroy. He saw no objection to S., but slightly in his favour as a man knowing the ropes. Then for Chief Secretary. 'I assume that it is quite out of the question,' I asked guilelessly, 'that you should take it yourself?' 'Oh yes, quite—or that any of my Party should join a Government.' 'Then what do you say to —— or ——?' 'But surely there is no doubt you would take it yourself?' 'Of course, I should be entirely in Mr. G.'s hands in the matter.' 'Your record, you see, is so clear.'

The co-respondent in the Divorce Court is invited to dispense like a king great offices of State which he quietly pushes aside for himself. 'In every word one felt the voice of the man looking at government, putting his finger on the difficulties of managing men, using occasions, drawing decisive lines, sending his glance forward and around.' High homage, and true: just the man to be asked frankly to send his glance forward for a week and draw decisive lines as to the consequences it might bring for the Irish nation and the Liberal Party.

At long last, and as it were casually, we come to what ought to have been the beginning and end of the interview,

At the end of dinner I said to him, 'There's one point on which I have no right to speak to you—and if you don't like it, you can say so. But it is important we should know whether certain legal proceedings soon to come on are likely to end in your disappearance from the lead for a time?' He smiled all over his face, playing with his fork.

'My disappearance! Oh no! No chance of it. Nothing in the least leading to disappearance, so far as I am concerned, will come out of the legal proceedings. The other side don't know what a broken-kneed horse they are riding.' 'I'm delighted to hear that,' said I, 'for I, for my part, of course, regard you as vital to the whole business.' 'Well,' he said, 'the Irish people are very slow to give a man their confidence, and they are still more slow to withdraw it.' I inferred from his talk of the broken-kneed horse that he meant there would be no adverse decree.

One is tempted respectfully to protest that Mr. Morley had as good a 'right' and even duty 'to speak to' the Irish Leader upon the topic, however delicate, then 'on the very eve of this dire wreck,' as he had a fortnight afterwards in language of menace and when menace came too late. 'I inferred from his talk of the broken-kneed horse that he meant there would be no adverse decree.' O saintly simplicity! For nine months previously the Divorce proceedings had been public property and had engaged the anxiety of all friends of the great Irishman and of the Irish Cause. So long before as January 14, 1890, in reply to an uneasy inquiry from the present writer, Parnell wrote almost exactly the same thing that he said to Mr. Morley in November in his Brighton hotel:

If this case is ever fully gone into, a matter which is exceedingly doubtful, you may rest assured that it will be shown that the dishonour and discredit have not been upon my side.

I was at least as uninformed as Mr. Morley as to the grievous antecedents of the case, but my own passionate eagerness to grasp at any charitable construction did not certainly lead me to the comfortable conclusion that 'he meant there would be no adverse decree.' The inference seemed only too manifest that 'if the case was ever fully gone into,' although his own technical legal responsibility might not be successfully evaded, it would not be against 'my side' the storm of public indignation and disgust would be directed. Parnell made no concealment of his belief that the Divorce proceedings were simply a new form of vengeance by the enemies whose conspiracy to destroy him by the Forged Letters had come to grief before the Three Judges. It ought not to have required much imagination to comprehend that 'the broken-kneed horse which the other side were riding' was the broken-kneed witness who, alone of witnesses claiming to be men of honour, swore that the murderous letters were in the handwriting of Parnell, which were a few weeks afterwards proved to be clumsy forgeries of the suicide Pigott. The case was 'never *fully* gone into' because Parnell was not allowed to go

into the witness-box for a reason which perhaps Sir Frank Lockwood felt professionally bound not to disclose to his colleague, but which is now notorious enough, and consequently those who laid their money on 'the broken-kneed horse' were not disappointed. But it is known that, even while the case was at hearing, Parnell persisted in his struggle to have his evidence heard.

'Parnell departed just upon midnight,' and that appears to have been the only allusion in the course of an interview of three hours and a half to the danger which, a week later, was to exclude the Liberal Party from effective power for sixteen years, and to adjourn Home Rule over a generation of men. It is a matter for lasting regret that Mr. Morley did not at least press upon his guest the vital necessity for close communication between his Liberal allies and himself in the next few critical days, and did not even insist upon knowing where any urgent message would reach him, although they happened to be both living at the same moment in the same not very far-spreading township. It is gravely to be feared that Parnell left the Hôtel Métropole with the fixed belief that the only thing that really mattered was the discomfiture of 'the broken-kneed horse,' of which he was absolutely confident 'if the case should be *fully* gone into,' and that, even if the worst should happen, the Liberal leaders would be rather thankful to him than otherwise for not saddling them with too close a responsibility for whatever might be his own decision.

Parnell did not appear in the witness-box and the Divorce decree was pronounced. Three days afterwards the National Liberal Federation met at Sheffield, Harcourt and Mr. Morley being Gladstone's delegates. It is obvious from his communications with his lieutenants that Gladstone, though naturally alarmed at the fierceness of the periodical fit of British virtue which used to make Macaulay merry, had not yet come to a clear decision upon the issue which he ought to have been for months past revolving. As to the moral issue, indeed, his mind was quite made up. 'I think it plain that we have nothing to say and nothing to do in the matter. The Party is as distinct from us as that of Smith or Hartington.' His own Irish Lord Chancellor and his own Irish Attorney-General had, indeed, taken a foremost part in the Leinster Hall meeting proclaiming the necessity, come what might, of retaining Parnell as, in Mr. Healy's phrase of that night, 'no longer an individual but a National institution.' 'I own to some surprise,' the Liberal leader somewhat slily added, 'at the apparent facility with which the R.C. bishops and clergy appear to take the continued leadership, but they may have tried the ground and found it would not *bear*. It is the Irish

Parliamentary Party and that alone to which we have to look' for that decision against their incomparable leader which a man of Gladstone's own spotless morality and transcendent genius as a statesman had not enabled him to arrive at for himself. The Scotch sentence, 'playful but pithy and to the point,' about Parnell's continued leadership, 'It'll na dee,' which was his *consigne* to his lieutenants in Sheffield, was not of the loftiest, nor even of the clearest, especially as it was qualified by the hint that he only 'said it to himself in the interior and silent forum.'

Harcourt and Mr. Morley evidently so understood him, for at the meeting of the great Liberal organisation they did nothing more than pull the excellent Dr. Spence Watson by the coat-tails when he threatened to break out into 'a red-hot protest against Parnell.' The practical problem was how far Mr. Stead's divine indignation in the *Pall Mall Gazette* would stampede the Party; and at Sheffield, however passionate and genuine the wrath of the Nonconformists was, nothing irrevocable came of it. Mr. Morley's own comment on the Party's *état d'âme* is not without its touch of comedy in so grave a man.

> November 21.—Heard of the angry currents running against Parnell's continued leadership. It was not only the devout world, the secular caucus man was quite as strong. The breach of moral law, one must remember, was not all. It was accompanied by small incidents that lent themselves to ridicule and a sense of squalor. How could candidate or voter fight under a banner so peculiarly tainted?

In plainer terms, electioneering prospects were harmed by some vulgar bits of evidence which, if Parnell had been heard in the witness-box, might have taken a very different colour.

Lord Morley's pages may be searched in vain for any conclusive proofs that the Nonconformist tornado, soul-shaking though for the moment its ravages indubitably were, would have raged on until the General Election without the fresh fuel it very quickly received. The only weighty evidence offered is that of Schnadhorst, the high-priest of the Caucus, who was already in the decline of his powers, and we read this remarkable entry in Mr. Morley's Diary:

> November 23.—Schnadhorst, the head of our Party organisation, called: thinks the election fatally lost by this desperate business; one candidate bolted already, and new ones would be all the less likely to come forward. 'But then,' I said, 'this means the end of Mr. G.'s career.' 'Would it be a bad end?' he asked. 'What a pity,' said I, 'that such a fine set of fellows as we saw at Sheffield should be broken up.' 'They won't break up,' he answered; 'they will rally to you, and by that I mean you personally.' 'If Mr. G. goes, I fancy that I go too.' 'I expected,' he said, 'that this would pass through your mind, but it must not lodge there.'

The plain English of which, again, seems to be that Schnadhorst and his brother Tapers and Tadpoles thought it a good oppor-

tunity of getting rid of Gladstone and the Parnell alliance, and made a clumsy attempt to entice into the plot a man of whose honesty of soul only party wire-pullers of the Schnadhorst brand could have ever entertained a suspicion.

Not only did Sheffield sensibly hold its tongue. 'Unionists did not abuse the advantage of having one of the Ten Commandments on their side.' Their chief oracle, the *Daily Telegraph*, wrote:

> It is no satisfaction to us to feel the political adversary, whose abilities and prowess it was impossible not to respect, has been overthrown by irrelevant accident, wholly unconnected with the struggle in which we are engaged.

Chamberlain himself, with whom (it is one of the surprises of the book) Mr. Morley dined in the week of the explosion,

> was extremely pleasant; no crowing or jubilation, but rather disgusted as he said that a controversy in which all the best brains in Parliament and out of it had been at work for five years should be at last decided, not on the merits but by an accident.

And he added the sage advice: 'What we ought to do, my dear Morley, is to keep quiet,' with, however, as in Schnadhorst's case, the suggestion of a deal for 'revising the conditions:' that is, for repudiating Home Rule.

Sheffield was on the 24th of November. Parliament was to meet in a few days, and the Irish Party for their annual election of a Chairman. The fluid mind of the Liberal leaders had at last to be solidified. The scene was the library in Gladstone's house in Carlton Gardens. In a position of perplexity, such as even he had never faced before, Gladstone seems to have retained what the French call the 'measure' of a statesman for whom, whatever the whisper of the moralist 'in the interior and silent forum,' punishment for the sin of one man had to be weighed against the happiness of innocent millions in Ireland. Harcourt, who frankly played the politician throughout,

> had come around to the view that Parnell should be told to go, without any *égards* and without waiting for spontaneous action on his part. I remonstrated, and Mr. G. strongly took the same line. 'I must think of the after-reckoning,' he said with emphasis.

An after-reckoning truly which, even in the less brutal form in which the blow was struck, still burns in the blood of Ireland a generation later! Harcourt rode the moral high horse with the solemnity of a Mr. Pecksniff, although a Mr. Pecksniff with a certain comic twinkle of the eye.

> Harcourt was very strong that in the communication to Parnell Mr. G. should express his own opinion that the immorality itself had made him unfit and impossible, and not merely found himself on the opinion of the party upon the immorality. 'The party would expect it,' he said,

'would not be satisfied otherwise; Mr. G.'s moral reputation required it.' Mr. G. stoutly fought any such position. 'What,' cried Mr. G., 'because a man is what is called leader of a party, does that constitute him a judge and accuser of faith and morals? I will not accept it. It would make life intolerable.'

A fine burst of the higher morality turning a scornful back upon the morals of the electioneering caucus! Under hard pressure from Harcourt, Gladstone had inserted in the original draft of the letter to be communicated to Parnell the vital passage about his leadership of the Liberal Party being reduced almost to a nullity. At the consultation in Carlton Gardens he had come to an altered view when he sat down to write the letter in its final form. The passage making it a choice for Ireland between dismissing Parnell and dismissing Gladstone was deleted. What followed is so startling that, in justice to Lord Morley, his own account of it must be quoted:

At 8 to dinner in Stratton Street. I sat next to Granville, and next to him was Mr. G. We were all gay enough, and as unlike as possible to a marooned crew. Towards the end of the feast Mr. G. handed to me, at the back of Granville's chair, the draft of the famous letter in an unsealed envelope. While he read the Queen's Speech to the rest, I perused and reperused the letter; Granville also read it. I said to Mr. G. across Granville, 'But you have not put in the very thing that would be most likely of all things to move him.' Harcourt again regretted that it was addressed to me and not to P., and agreed with me that it ought to be strengthened as I had indicated, if it was meant really to affect P.'s mind. Mr. G. rose, went to the writing table, and with me standing by, wrote, on a sheet of Arnold M.'s grey paper, the important insertion. I marked then and there under his eyes the point at which the insertion was to be made, and put the whole into my pocket. Nobody else besides H. was consulted about it, or saw it. After the letter came to be printed Mr. G. remarked to me that he thought the insertion was to be a postscript. He did not complain nor care, but was it not so? 'No,' I said, 'it really was not; I marked the place in pencil at the moment.' Just imagine. 'P.S.—By the way, I forgot to mention that if he does not go, my leadership of the Liberal Party is reduced to a nullity.' What a postscript, to be sure!

History will perhaps rather remark 'What a kettle of fish, to be sure!' Gladstone's own considered judgment was overborne, and by the man from whom of all mankind the Irish people would have least expected it. Earl Spencer, Lord Morley tells us,

was the one man who doubted whether we were right in putting any screw at all upon Parnell, and pressed earnestly that P. was the only man who could drive the Irish team. Most true—if only there were no English electors to be thought of.

Lord Spencer, whose conversion to Home Rule had moved the English electors even more than Gladstone's, might have had his reply to that somewhat crude opportunist comment. Whether

Spencer's sage advice had told upon the Liberal leader—whether, on second thoughts, he had come to the conclusion that his leadership might not be altogether a nullity, after all, in spite of Mr. Stead's hot-gospelling, or that his threat, addressed to a proud man and a proud nation, might defeat its purpose—as it horribly did—we shall not now, perhaps, ever know. But what is not doubtful is that the change of front operated while Mr. Morley was standing behind his chair was the signal for all the mischief that followed. Gladstone's own compunctious visitings, as soon as the letter was made public, and his wistful question to Mr. Morley a few months later: 'You have no regrets at the course we took?'—set one mournfully speculating what might have been had there been a little more adroitness and less haste.

The decision taken, for good or ill, what mattered next, and above all, was that it should be communicated to the Irish Leader and to his Party in good time and by the most authoritative and acceptable ambassador. But here blunder followed blunder. Mr. Morley was designated as the right ambassador, by the fact that it was to him the momentous missive was addressed, as well as by his cordial relations with Parnell only a week before. The ambassador and the man to whom his embassy was addressed unhappily failed to come together before all the fat was in the fire. The fault lay, of course, largely—if not mainly—with Parnell's calculated avoidance of his allies and his Party in those critical hours, although, as we have seen, he may well have come away from the Brighton interview with a suspicion that the Liberal leaders would not be too grossly offended if their virtue was surprised by the *fait accompli* of his re-election. But was it impossible for the Liberal leaders even yet to undeceive him as to this suspicion of their infirmity of purpose—if, indeed, their purpose was no longer infirm? There were still twenty-four precious hours in which at least to make their decision reach him before a shot was fired. Mr. Morley relied upon Parnell's secretary and upon Justin McCarthy—most lovable but most easy-going of men and, in semi-revolutionary politics, most ineffectual—for this delicate office, and when they reported a difficulty in finding Parnell, did nothing but wring his hands while the golden sands were running out. Parnell's address must have been known to most officials and probably to thousands of residents in Brighton. An early morning train would have enabled him either to force an interview, or at least to liberate his own soul of any whisper of remorse. He was quite obviously the man to impress the Irish Leader with the change of the situation since the evening at the Hôtel Métropole, a bare fortnight before, when he was doing worship to him as the Irish King-maker of

the future. The issues were too tremendous to shy at small points of dignity. Even short of a visit to Brighton, he had the machinery of the Opposition Whips at his service to apprise Parnell the moment he reached the House of Commons of the desperate urgency of an interview before he entered the Party meeting at two o'clock. The still more effective expedient of going down to the House of Commons himself did occur to him, but at an hour when he might well have guessed it would be too late. When he reached the House 'a little after three,' the Party meeting had been over for an hour, and he found Parnell, the re-elected Irish Leader, in the thick of a congratulatory group of friends in the Lobby. Poor McCarthy had, indeed, gently delivered his missive to his Leader in the bustle of the Party meeting, without one chance in a thousand of its alarming Parnell —if, indeed, it did not confirm his suspicion that it was another sly move of the Old Parliamentary Hand to save his personal responsibility—while the unfortunate Party were left wholly unaware of the sword hanging over their heads. Parnell 'came forward with much cordiality' to greet the belated Chief Secretary and 'as we went along the corridor to Gladstone's room, he informed me in a casual way that the Party had again elected him chairman.'

One resource remained—to keep out of the newspapers, until both sides clearly understood one another. Here came in the second and worst fault of the Liberal leaders—the first in which Gladstone himself was the chief offender. In his wrath at the Irish Leader's obduracy he would have his letter (the letter, be it remembered, out of which he would fain have struck the one operative sentence) 'published at once, that very afternoon'—in a special edition of Stead's *Pall Mall* if it could be done. The Chief Secretary induced him to delay a few hours; but the effect was to throw the Lobby into a wilder fever by the circulation of all sorts of panic-stricken rumours as to the contents of the letter.

Lord Morley for the first time gives us his impressions of that tragic evening of uncertainties.

> Then Harcourt, Arnold, and I went to dinner. News of the letter swiftly got out. Two or three Irish members came in much excitement to my table to know if the story of the letter was true, and, above all, if Mr. Gladstone had really said, and really meant it, that he would withdraw from the leadership. I said very little, and begged them to get the letter itself from the reporters. Tremendous sensation and panic among the Irishmen all night. Parnell sat sullenly in the smoke-room, and would no more consent to go to the meeting which they proposed to hold than Barnardine would consent to go with Abhorson to be hanged.

The comparison is one which, if it came from any less fastidious pen, would seem to be in indifferent taste. It was

in the circumstances a heartless thing to say both of the great man with whom he had been glad to hold friendly colloquy twice upon that day, and of the distracted Party whom he coldly referred to the reporters for information of what had happened, and who, if they were like Abhorson executioners, were executioners at his call and without even being answered when they came to know 'if Mr. Gladstone had really said, and *really meant it*, that he would withdraw from the leadership.' It was a case for a plain tale, and the Englishman whom Ireland trusted most after Gladstone wrapped himself in an Olympian haze as impenetrable as Parnell's own. Nay, when he spoke at all, it was to leave Parnell and his adherents under the impression that in his own view it was better for Ireland to be united in the wrong than divided in the right. It was indeed from the doctrine thus enunciated that Mr. Redmond in after years appropriated his own unlucky apophthegm; 'Better be united in following a foolish and short-sighted policy than divided in following a far-seeing and wise one,' which led him and his followers to a so-called Home Rule Act, the repeal of which is now the only point on which all parties in Ireland are united.

One stroke of madness begat another. There followed discharge after discharge—with little more reflection than moves the barrels of a machine-gun—Parnell's retort in his reckless Manifesto, the savageries in Committee Room 15, the splitting asunder of Ireland to its foundations, and to borrow from a still more hapless Chief Secretary—a ten years' 'hell.' For one host of honest Irishmen it became a fight between Bellerophon and the bloody-mouthed Chimaera; for another, and still more passionate host, the conspiracy of a pusillanimous or debauched Party 'to throw to the English wolves' their irreplaceable Leader.

Lord Morley makes sympathetic reference to the difficulties of the six members absent in America, the attitude of two of whom, 'the most important of all after Mr. Parnell himself, was felt to be a decisive element.' 'Few men,' he justly says, 'have ever been placed in sharper difficulty.' If even Irish members in the House of Commons were left groping for themselves as to what had happened behind the scenes, their colleagues in America had no information beyond the shock-captions of the New York sensation sheets. One of them expressed his own judgment of what the emergency required in Cincinnati the night Gladstone's letter was published:

> All we have got to do in this crisis is to keep our heads cool and go on steadfastly with our work with the firm confidence that Mr. Parnell and the representatives of Ireland, in frank and friendly consultation with Mr. Gladstone and the rest of our hitherto faithful allies, will determine

upon the course—whatever it may be—that is wisest in the interest of Ireland.

They had been dragged against their will into the precipitate action of the Leinster Hall meeting in the belief that, the Liberal ex-Lord Chancellor and the Liberal ex-Attorney-General being two of its chief promoters, it represented the result of the 'frank and friendly consultation' between Gladstone and Parnell thus desiderated. It was Parnell's Manifesto, definitely breaking off the Liberal alliance on grounds of perfidy to the Home Rule Cause which, so far as concerned Gladstone and Mr. Morley, were to their own knowledge shockingly unjust, that determined them and alone could have determined them to separate themselves from their Leader in his hour of stress. It is certain they would never have despatched their Manifesto if they could have read the narrative Lord Morley now gives to the public; for they would have known that Gladstone's own instinct warned him against obeying the clamour to proclaim as pariahs Parnell and all who stood with him; that there was no real weight of evidence that, even from the electioneering standpoint, the clamour would be more than, in Parnell's own words to Mr. Morley, 'a storm in a teacup'; that Lord Spencer, weightiest of councillors on Irish affairs, was opposed to putting any coercive pressure at all upon Parnell or upon Ireland; that Chamberlain himself was of the opinion that the thing to do was 'to keep quiet'; and that, in fact, only for the still inexplicable interposition of Mr. Morley, of all men, the scenes of Committee Room 15 would never have been enacted. Where blunders were pretty equally divided, they would assuredly have still insisted it was a case for 'frank and friendly consultation' and not for major excommunications, unforgivable recriminations and red ruin for both sides.

Their first impulse, of course, would have been to return home to consult with their colleagues and their countrymen. But they had no power of freely meeting either one or the other without first undergoing their sentences of six months' imprisonment. They did, indeed, make a last desperate effort for a composition of misunderstandings which, it is now clear, were temperamental rather than organic. Although they could get no nearer to the heart of affairs than France, and had to battle against a tide of boiling passion in which all heed of the future seemed to be lost amidst the screams of the Furies: 'No compromise! Give no quarter to the man! Strike home, strike hard, and strike often!' it is now pretty well recognised history that a peace treaty might have been had, and was only thwarted at the fifty-ninth minute of the final hour by a lamentable personal *contretemps* which the present writer has narrated elsewhere.[2]

[2] *An Olive Branch in Ireland and its History*, p. 44. Macmillan, 1910.

The irreconcileables had their ten years of torments in which to repent at leisure, and the peacemakers had to resign themselves to the usual reward of being impartially misunderstood and reviled in both camps as 'Whigs' for believing, what ten years afterwards everybody believed, that both Parnell and Gladstone ought to be, might have been, preserved; even as one of the two was misunderstood and reviled as 'a Tory' during fifteen subsequent years for urging that reconciliation with Ulster, which his adversaries, Irish and English, are now grasping at as a last chance of salvation.

Sinn Fein will be able to draw from these two volumes a mournful argument of racial incompatibilities. Here is easily the first of living English Men of Letters for whom, as he says, 'Ireland was his polestar,' and here is a people believing almost to excess in his devotion to their cause; and it now turns out the Irish people knew their Mr. Morley as superficially as he makes it distressingly evident he himself knew Parnell or Parnell's countrymen after a four years' reign in the Chief Secretary's Lodge. The Irish people will learn with a gasp that, so late as 1882, seven years after Parnell's work began, three years after the foundation of the Land League, Mr. Morley returned from his first visit to Ireland to write: 'My visit has not made me any headlong convert to Repeal or even Autonomy'; that of Chamberlain, Ireland's most venomous enemy once she declined to be his pawn in the game, he tells us 'for thirteen years we lived the life of brothers'; that Mr. Balfour is the only living man to whom he chants a hymn of unbroken praise not to say adulation, and with whom it is his pride to have been an intimate even while Gladstone was making the heavens ring with his cry of 'Remember Mitchelstown'; and that his friendship with Gladstone himself only began shortly before the formation of the Ministry of 1885, when the old man was already far advanced in the seventies. The keenest shock of all will be for the leaders of the Irish Majority Party when they learn that Mr. Morley was a principal personage in the movement to replace Gladstone by Lord Rosebery, and remember how easily they might have baulked the design if they had only guessed that Gladstone fought to the last for a Dissolution, or, at the least, for the premiership of Earl Spencer. It was possibly their stupidity which led them to very opposite inferences as to Mr. Morley's real attitude towards the movement for the removal of 'Mr. G.,' but their mistake was also to some extent due to half-confidences of the same Delphic dubiety as those which led both Parnell and his Party to draw mistaken inferences with respect to his view of the Divorce Court proceedings. For Irishmen, the Gladstone tragedy makes scarcely less poignant reading than the Parnell tragedy of five years earlier.

Mr. Morley was equally at sixes and sevens in his impressions about Ireland. Edmund Burke appears to be the only Irishman he ever really loved. About Parnell he makes so shallow a remark as this :

> **Apart from the business of the moment he contributed little to ordinary conversation, because among other reasons, he had no knowledge, not even the regular knowledge of common education, and the man of the world.**

And all because Parnell resolutely stuck to ' the business of the moment ' and because his own hobbies happened to be matter-of-fact sciences like Geology, Astronomy, Trigonometry and Chemistry, rather than the slightly sub-acid table-talk of politicians, philosophers, and literary gents at the Athenaeum Club where some great minds seem to find their heaven. Lord Morley scarcely cares to disguise from us that he has a poor opinion of ' diabolic ' Irish politics, whether Unionist or Nationalist; of Irish writings; even of Irish scenery, which he finds ' unquiet ' in comparison with the sleepy green folds of Wordsworth's Lake country. It may well be cited as one of the most piquant of ' life's little ironies ' that the strongest personal charm for him of Home Rule for Ireland (which, after all, *fait les frais* of his entire political career, including the Indian Home Rule, which was only an Asiatic corollary) seems to have been that Englishmen need see or hear of all these things no more.

WILLIAM O'BRIEN.

THE FIGHT AGAINST VENEREAL INFECTION:

A REJOINDER

THE following comments on Sir Francis Champneys' reply in the November number of this Review to an article by me which appeared in September seem to me necessary for the clearing-up of some of the issues between us and for the possible removal of some misunderstandings. In making these comments I appreciate very highly the friendly tone of Sir Francis's expressions of personal regard.

I.—In his final paragraph Sir Francis writes: 'I do not believe that there is much difference of opinion between Sir Bryan Donkin and, say, the National Council for Combating Venereal Diseases; at least I have searched for great differences in his article—and have not found them.' But in enumerating, for the most part correctly, several attitudes towards the subject in hand that are shown in common by both parties to the discussion he writes: 'Sir Bryan Donkin is urgent upon the necessity of early treatment (which he prefers to call Prophylaxis)—so is the National Council.' And his last words are, with reference to himself and other members of that Council, 'Our only crime has been that we have not adopted "that blessed word Mesopotamia"—I beg pardon, I mean Prophylaxis. Surely we can all work together for our common object!' He further emphasises this point by the spelling of 'prophylaxis,' both here and in other places, with a capital P, a spelling which does not occur in the article he is criticising.

I wish that this conclusion to Sir Francis's otherwise serious defence of the cause of the Council had been as correct in fact as it is pacific in intention. In effect it wholly misrepresents the only point actually at issue between the advocates of the medical prophylaxis of Venereal *Infection* as explicitly set forth in my article, and the National Council (or rather the major part of the Council, for it is not unanimous) which has quite lately reiterated its opposition in this matter. This misrepresentation, the outcome, doubtless, of misconception, is further

evidenced (on page 1048) in his article where Sir Francis states that 'the question at issue is largely a matter of the names "Prophylaxis" and "early treatment" . . . We had better agree about what we mean by "Prophylaxis."' It is to be noted here that while he thinks it necessary to have a definition of the meaning of 'Prophylaxis' he does not suggest that the definition of 'Early Treatment' (the capitals are mine in this instance) is equally necessary, as of course it is, for the purpose of intelligible discussion. The words 'early treatment,' however, as used so often in discussion of this subject, are not explicitly defined by anyone.

It seems to be undeniable that the question at issue is between 'early treatment,' however it may be defined, of persons known or supposed to be diseased, and the immediate treatment (i.e. treatment within a few hours of exposure) of persons who have exposed themselves to the possibility of infection by the germs of disease. The last named course necessitates, for its success, that those who have exposed themselves to such risk must be possessed of means of disinfection which can be used within a very short time whether before or after, or both before and after, such exposure. Merely 'early treatment' of persons already infected, or possibly infected, including even many who seek for treatment within twenty-four hours of exposure, is doomed to prevalent failure to prevent the development of disease. Doubtless the earlier the best modern treatment is established the greater the likelihood of possible prevention of *infection* and the greater the probability of reduction, or abolition, of the actual infectivity of persons who have already contracted the *disease*, even in cases when the disease itself may not be cured. But it is well known that the most infective period is the stage when, as a rule, the best early treatment of the disease will not come into operation.

There seems to be much confusion, even among doctors, in the use of the words *infection* and *disease*; and this confusion tends to obscure discussion. What the advocates of medical prophylaxis want to do is to stop the infective agent from invading the body and thus setting up disease.

It is surely beside the mark to discuss, as Sir Francis does, the etymological question of what the word 'prophylaxis' *ought* to mean. I do not think that Sir Francis is in serious doubt about what I and others who use this word mean by it. All clear discussion requires that the critic should accept the meaning of a term which the criticised person explicitly attaches to it, and that the question whether the term itself is the best possible, or even correct, should be quite disregarded. Otherwise all discussion must inevitably degenerate into mere logomachy. I need

hardly repeat, therefore, that there is a very essential difference between the meaning of the terms 'prophylaxis' and 'early treatment' as used by the advocates of the first as well as (as far as I can see) by those of the second procedure.

With reference to some of the queries put by Sir Francis about the time for the provision, or for the use, of prophylactic means, I must, it seems, repeat that these means should of course be used before the disease shows itself, or is likely to have become established in the body. It is therefore clear that the provision of disinfectants must precede the exposure to infection, and that the disinfectants should be employed either very shortly before or after exposure, and in the latter case, for the sake of perfect protection, not longer than twelve hours afterwards. And here I would say, once for all, that as 'medical prophylaxis' implies that the means of protection must be possessed before exposure to infection, it cannot conceivably matter to anyone, whatever their views may be as to the propriety of employing these means at all, whether they are used soon before, or soon after, or both before and after, the act of exposure to infection.

II.—On page 1045 Sir Francis says he 'does not quite understand who is referred to' in my Article (on page 585 of the September number of this Review) where I say that

> venereal diseases are not to be attacked merely by warnings against their evil physical results, by checks on drunkenness, by moral admonitions regarding irregular sexual intercourse generally, or by efforts to secure the best treatment of the infected after the disease has been contracted.

I had thought it was plain that I referred to all those who held that the above-mentioned methods of attack were sufficient, and that proposals for medical prophylaxis were to be hindered or discouraged or left severely alone. It seemed equally plain that I referred especially both to the Report of the Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases and to the National Council. But Sir Francis immediately follows his statement that he 'did not understand who was referred to by me,' with the sentence 'The N.C.C.V.D. is certainly not open to the reproach of deprecating all protection except merely "good advice."' Nothing that I have said leads to this suggestion. I explicitly referred in my article to the work of the above-mentioned bodies in bringing the whole subject of venereal disease before the public, and securing the means for the best and most modern treatment. Nor does my contention that both of these influential bodies have, either by their silence or otherwise, discouraged or opposed the spread of knowledge regarding medical means for preventing infection at its source, in any way imply that I charged anyone who disagreed with me on this point with deprecating all pro-

tection except 'good advice.' The words 'good advice,' indeed, do not occur in my article. I take this opportunity, moreover, to say that the several medical men, personally known to me, who recommend prophylactic treatment among large bodies of men, are no opponents of 'good advice,' but habitually give such advice themselves, before instructing the men concerning the means of preventing infection. And I believe the same may be said of the advocates of medical prophylaxis generally.

If I required any further justification for my statement that the methods of prevention encouraged by the National Council were insufficient to lessen materially the present evils resulting from venereal diseases, I might find some in Sir Francis's own summary of the advice given by himself and other members of the Council who address troops on this subject. The only medical item he mentions is—'In case of a lapse immediate recourse to the doctor.' Now, in view of the varying circumstances in which 'a lapse,' which, I take it, means irregular intercourse, occurs, would 'the doctor,' or indeed any doctor, be usually near enough for the 'immediate recourse' to him that is advised?

III.—Again Sir Francis says on page 1045 that he does not quite understand what I mean by saying that 'there is no possibility of extinguishing or paralysing a primitive and instinctive function,' and he then asks the question, which seems to me inconsequent, whether I mean that 'a clean life is impossible,' adding 'I cannot think that he does.' But he proceeds to argue at some length as if I did. That abstinence from irregular, or indeed from all, sexual intercourse is observed by many persons from many different reasons which need not be enumerated, certainly needs no argument; nor does my statement, quoted by Sir Francis, in any way imply that the sexual instinct cannot be controlled. Some control of it is of course a necessity of civilisation or of social existence. But the inference apparently made by Sir Francis that there is a prospect, however remote, of the establishment of complete continence outside the bonds of marriage, by such influences as he suggests is surely Utopian, and quite unpractical in relation to the present discussion. Nothing short of either universally enforced monasticism or a complete remodelling of the marriage laws could compass this object. Past and present experience shows that the efficacy attributable to moral and religious warning has been and is quite incommensurate with the object against which such warnings are directed. Wherefore I contend that to trust only to such measures, including 'early treatment,' as are considered by the National Council to be sufficient, or at least the only practicable, measures towards the prevention of venereal diseases, would be

to allow wilfully the scientific knowledge we possess of successfully blockading the venereal poisons at their source to remain fruitless.

IV.—On page 1048 Sir Francis mentions several statements of mine with which he entirely agrees; and with reference to one of them he says that he supposes 'that everyone agrees that fear of disease is no sufficient deterrent, so that the removal of such fear need not be considered likely to add seriously to the number of the incontinent.' I do not know whether Sir Francis is here expressing the view of the majority of the National Council as well as his own; but in any case this opinion is of great value in this discussion. For the opposite opinion has been often given in private, and I imagine in public as well, although I have never heard of it being publicly and explicitly urged or formulated. In this context I would refer again to the Army Order of March 1916, from which I quoted in my previous article. This order directs that soldiers who have exposed themselves to the risk of venereal disease should be required to attend for treatment within twenty-four hours of *infection*, but does not state whether this means *exposure to infection*, or the time when the first appearance of disease has been noticed by the soldier. This order, however, is prefaced by the following words: '*Suggestions with regard to prevention which would imply the adoption of any system of prophylaxis which might be said to afford opportunities for unrestrained vice could not be accepted by the Army Council.*' These words, as they stand, do prevent many medical men in the Army, who are keenly aware of the necessity of medical prophylaxis to produce any material effect on the reduction of venereal disease, from carrying out what they feel to be their medical duty. I know this from many personal talks I have had with both medical and combatant Army officers who greatly deplore the general effect of this order. These words have seemingly been introduced into the order to meet a supposed objection on the part of the public, or some section of it, that the treatment thus forbidden would be likely to increase the number of the incontinent. But, after many and diverse inquiries, I have no doubt that Sir Francis is perfectly correct in saying that there is a general agreement as to the invalidity of this objection, and I regard this statement of his, with which it is to be hoped the National Council is in accord, as tending to remove at least one point of contention in this matter. I feel sure that if experienced Army medical officers were permitted to express their opinion on the whole question of 'prophylaxis,' they would find but little, if any, dissent on the part of the public generally.

V.—In the latter part of his article, from page 1050 onwards,

Sir Francis seems to depart from his former critical attitude by introducing a theological objection which virtually decries all attempts to attack the evils of venereal disease at their source according to the methods of scientific medicine. He bases this objection on the doctrine which distinguishes between 'mortal' and 'venial' sin and includes fornication and adultery among the former; and he infers, on this ground, that the complete abolition of venereal disease without corresponding abolition of unchastity would be wrong. 'It is better,' he says further, 'that venereal diseases should be imperfectly combated than that, in an attempt to prevent them, men should be enticed into mortal sin which they would otherwise avoid.' This is tantamount to saying that sanitary science should be held in abeyance in order to promote morality by neglecting to prevent infection. In this context, however, he seems to assume that it is proposed to force upon everybody the medical means of prevention, whether they wish for it or not. There is, however, no such proposal. It is proposed to spread widely the knowledge of such means; and it is clear that such a procedure would greatly facilitate the imposition of a legal penalty on any man or woman who, with knowledge of the means of prevention, conveyed disease to another person; and in the case of soldiers, the infliction of disciplinary punishment on anyone who was found, on return to duty from leave, to have contracted the disease himself.

I do not of course propose either to discuss the theological position taken up by Sir Francis, or to reply to the several deductions he makes concerning the possible evils of forcing on everyone the means of prevention of venereal disease. I would only say, in reference to the first point, that the doctrine he quotes in his argument is, I believe, neither universally accepted by theologians or members of the Church of England, nor accepted at all by those of the Church of Scotland, or of any of the large and numerous denominations of Christians in this country known as Nonconformists. As appealed to by Sir Francis in this argument, this doctrine, with the consequences he draws from it, negatives the possibility of discussing the subject in hand from any scientific or practical point of view.

Sir Francis, however, after saying, on page 1051, that

> To give a man a prophylactic packet unasked, with the result that he falls when he might have stood upright, is to have made oneself an accessory to a mortal sin before the act,

continues by conceding that

> the suggested development of public lavatories with appliances for preventive treatment might come under the same head, although such an arrangement, accessible to those who sought it in need, might be free from this objection.

The last phrase of this sentence, if he could see his way to substitute 'is' for 'might be,' would make another point in our discussion on which Sir Francis and I entirely agree.

To have answered in more detail the whole of Sir Francis's article would have involved the repetition of much that I wrote in this Review for September. But I trust that my two articles, taken together, have set forth fairly and clearly the case for medical prophylaxis of Venereal Infection. Sir Francis's article, being undertaken to support the policy of the National Council, may properly be understood as generally representative of the views of the majority of that body. May it be hoped that this discussion may tend (to use some of Sir Francis Champneys' own words) to disperse some mists of understanding, and to elucidate the issues between the supporters and the opponents of medical prophylaxis against infection as an essential part of the successful prevention of Venereal Diseases.

H. Bryan Donkin.

JERUSALEM DELIVERED

'A city and a solitude.'—SHELLEY: *Prometheus Unbound.*

THE standard of St. George at length floats over the battlements of the Bible. There is a thrill in Jerusalem Delivered unequalled since the first Crusade and its immortalisation centuries later by Tasso. Jerusalem, Athens, Rome—these strike the trichord of history: Rome the capital of Rule, Athens of Art, Jerusalem of the Spirit. All of them have been what Gibbon so finely terms Jerusalem, 'the theatre of nations.' Each—and each is a hill-sanctuary—has repeatedly been mutilated and destroyed. But none so often or so long as the city, small in extent and situation, that has yet loomed so large on the world's horizon for over three thousand years. It is the citadel and shrine of inspiration, of tragedy and triumph, of faith and failure, of destiny and desolation, of heroism and betrayal, of song, dirge, and prophecy—the scene of Divinity incarnate and of the central event not only of time but eternity—an eternal city indeed. No stronghold has been so repeatedly sacked and rebuilt: it stands for ruin and renewal, for death and re-birth. It has survived the Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians and Arabians, Pharaohs, Caesars, and Caliphs, the Seleucidae, the Abassids, the Seljouks—yet it has remained a monument of loneliness and a pivot of imperial intrigue. It is concerning this last characteristic that a word of warning must be raised ere this brief article closes, for Palestine divides Syria from Egypt and abuts on the Mediterranean: by land and littoral it is a point of vantage, and Judaea was ever more Mediterranean than Oriental—a piece of the South in the East. Its very holiness has been the prize and pretext of ambitions.

Jerusalem is primeval. Long before Israel invaded Canaan, the stone-records discovered at El Amarna reveal that even then its name was Jebus Salim, the high Place of Peace with a high-priest for its worship who corresponded with the Court of Cairo. Egypt was ever present. Centuries afterwards, saved from Sennacherib, it was taken by Pharaoh Necho, and from him almost immediately wrenched by his overweening rival Nebuchadnezzar. Within half a century, and after the favouring

Cyrus, it fell to the Persian Smerdis. Spared by the great Alexander it passed to the Antiochus from whom the militant Maccabees rescued it, establishing the proud dynasty of those Asmoneans who welcomed Cleopatra as their guest. With the rise of Rome came Pompey and Crassus to spoil, Antipater the upstart to restore it, and Herod to besiege what his father had saved. But these pro-Roman Idumeans lent it a false security, and it was once more razed to the ground by Vespasian. Hadrian protected, Constantine and Helena and Eudosia hallowed, Julian the renegade re-templed it—till again, in the seventh century, it passed to Persia in the person of Chosroes. A hundred years onwards and the Saracens seized it, while in 1076 the Turks first fastened on its fastness, only to be succeeded by the Egyptian Caliphate. Then the imagination of Christendom was kindled, and there arose as its deliverer the Belgian Godfrey of Bouillon with a wife from Lorraine—Godfrey the paladin-pilgrim, who, though King, refused the crown, since one of thorns had been his Master's, and yet Godfrey who in that Master's name massacred Israel as ferociously as Ishmael. The Latin Kings of Jerusalem followed—commerce had urged the Crusaders as much as Christianity—till in the next century the Crown was lost by the degenerate Lusignan. Then Saladin entered, the Bayard of the East, in duel with Richard Lion-heart, the nearest approach to a modern Major-General. Next came the interlude in 'shining armour' of Barbarossa's grandson, Frederick the Second, of whom doubtless the Kaiser thought in 1898 when he broke down the ancient wall to make the Joppa Gate for his dramatic parade. Then after yet a fresh Turkish inroad, the Carismians captured and pillaged the sacred city. And finally, in 1517, Selim the chivalrous, and magnificent, re-won it for the Ottomans. Let it be said at once that the Turks have never lacked chivalry in watching over the holy places.

All along, in the vast kaleidoscope of changes and catastrophes, there were many who, 'passing through this vale of misery, used it for a well.' Jealously guarded by the Moslem, Jerusalem remained the symbol of Christendom and the promise of a 'new earth' as it descends in the Apocalypse. So often conquered, Jerusalem abides invincible. So constantly profaned, the mystery and majesty are unaltered. Wasted and weeping, this Mater dolorosa stands, no brooding ghost but a living spirit. What haunted ground not only of saints, apostles and Redeemer, but of earthly romances and vicissitudes! The smile of Herodias' daughter still wavers inscrutable around the once-palaced cliff. The crimson sunset still reflects the carnage of Athaliah, Judaea's Lady Macbeth. Jezebel and her priests still image the clash between papist and puritan, for all along Judaea was 'this pro-

testant Egypt.' Is that the sighing breeze, or is it Mariamne wailing, disconsolate as Rachel? And those clouds of midnight towering over the brook Kedron, are they the solemn shapes of mighty warriors from Joshua downwards, guarding the Valley of Assize? The driven dust eddies—it veils Don Jehuda ben Halevy, the Spanish sage and troubadour who, wan and wayworn, has pilgrimaged hither only to be pierced to his faithful heart by a Moorish spear. That plaintive breeze, saddening the silence, is it the world-old lamentation round the Wall of Weeping? What reveries, what rare merchandise, what traffics and discoveries, cohorts and caravans haunt its approaches; what wraiths and echoes issue from the caves, what long-past lightnings flash over the mountain-peaks! What loves and hatreds wander among those vanished gardens and still vibrate in that 'city of stone in a valley of iron under a sky of brass'! From David to Disraeli, who has not renowned it—the seat of song, the mount of vision?

But the British entry raises more mundane problems than the literalisation of prophecy so dear to the parish-heart, and amid just and general rejoicing it may be well to indicate two of them. Great Britain rules over a vast Mussulman population, and in that sense she is a great Moslem Power. How will the Moslems, long jealous of the shrines, accept the change? General Allenby acted like a statesman in appointing Mahommedans to guard those sacred places which by prescription they protect, and he also showed wise insight when he entered on foot the city that he had won. It is said that a soothsayer so predicted, but in any case, if the East loves splendour, nothing more constrains it than modest strength. But it will not always be General Allenby. Downing Street is notoriously imperceptive, and constantly its outlook is coloured by the politics of the hour. It will never do to see Palestine through the spectacles of extreme democracy or of any one Church or Conventicle. If the Turks have been our enemies, it is not all of them that desire to be so, still fewer that relish their present league with Germany, and millions of Moslems look up to us that are not Turks but Indians or Arabs. The way in which Jerusalem is to be the centre of government will require considered and considerate handling. It must not be forgotten that our triumph coincides with prevailing tentatives towards Indian home-rule (misliked by many a loyalist) and forecasts of some eventual Arab administration in Mesopotamia. Mahommedan susceptibilities will thus become doubly sensitive and in divergent directions. The one group will dread sedition, the other interference. What is this but to afford a playing-ground for any foe of the future whose motto is to divide and conquer? Unmitigated, absolute, 'democracy' is

no ruler of Empire. A sensitive touch, a firm grasp, an intuitive world-mind are requisite. Ask any really impartial and well-versed Anglo-Indian, any of our tried Eastern pro-consuls, and he will confirm this outlook. Let us beware of a House-of-Commons Downing Street in Jerusalem, nor forget that the due apportionment by treaty of the wardship of its shrines afforded the pretext—the apple of discord—for the Crimean War. Let not Jerusalem, the peace-altar, endanger, through 'pacifist' doctrinaires, the peace of mankind. The British Empire, if it will only emerge strong, resolute, united, is the safeguard of the world.

Again, how will the 'Zionist' hope take shape? Can it prove compatible with conditions immune from political intrigue, quite apart from any and many other considerations? Such, as we have seen, is not the lesson of the past. Will Jerusalem cease to be 'the theatre of nations,' will, too, the tribes of the Lebanon cease to profit by ferment? To many it will seem that a Jewish State—even were that inherently a likelihood—would be impracticable if it is to be formed out of a polyglot crowd, the exiles of persecution—as impracticable as it was in the days of the 'Dispersion' when the citizens of the world thronged Jerusalem only once a year. It would prove a Babel of tongues and discords, an assemblage of Russian and Polish and American internationalists that, in perhaps forwarding the creed of Lenin and the politics of Geneva, might afford a new centre for those Teutonic machinations which even now are busied in setting the Crescent against the Cross. In such a medley, presided over by mediocrity, the dregs of German Jewry, always industrious, often vital, might prevail. And in this regard it may be pointed out that the originator of the *mot*, 'Moi, je reste Ambassadeur à Paris,' was not Rothschild, as the tattlers have it, but the shrewd old Crémieux more than sixty years ago. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that, under much finer conditions, the Jewish genius was not political, however great their statesmen have been when assimilated to empires. This has been well shadowed forth by Disraeli in the conflict between Jabaster and the young Alroy, another of the lights that failed. The Jews, in yearning after a Theocracy, never founded a State. They religionised politics, whereas Europe has always politicised religion. That is why the Roman Catholic religion which, assuming the mantle of Caesarism, 'sent forth its dogmas like legions into the provinces,' has always been thwarted in its more theocratic aspirations. Take Dante. He dreamed, it is true, of a real Theocracy, but he was a strong champion of a Monarchical State. He staked his hopes on that great Emperor—that 'patriot-King'—whose premature death dashed his vision to the ground. And

after Dante, Savonarola craved a real Theocracy, but, again, it assumed that Republican shape which, two centuries later, was to play a greater, though as futile, a part in England. The Church, one way or another, throughout Europe perpetually tended towards becoming a 'State within the State,' a 'King of Kings,' and the present Oratorians still obey the antique Florentine Constitution which St. Philip of Neri embalmed and prescribed as the rule of his order. Indeed, a great part of the Middle Ages was spent in perpetual conflict between the Pope and the Emperor. To come nearer home, take Milton who tempered the Puritanic fire with the Renaissance light. He deemed himself a theocrat, he was only a Republican; his religion subserved his politics. A reformed commonwealth and no visible Church are Milton's ideals. 'The Parliament of England,' he protests, among many other such pronouncements, had turned 'regal bondage into a free commonwealth.' 'How then,' he proceeds, 'can any Christian derive his Kingship from Christ? I doubt not but all ingenious and knowing men will easily agree with me that a free commonwealth without a single person or House of Lords is by far the best Government. . . .' And then he propounds grand councils of a perpetual senate without, forsooth, 'any Dogeship of Venice,' as the means of salvation. He cannot divorce religion from politics. True, before puritanism the English Reformation, which was a protest against internationalism, created in the English Church the nearest reconciliation between nationalism and Theocracy. But the pact did not last, and politics triumphed. The English bishops dictated to America. Nationality does not imply unity of race. On the contrary, a nation is a fusion of races under a common ideal, and the Jews are a race, **not** a nation. To become a nation they must be deracinated. Is this possible? Is it desirable? Are the idealogues to be trusted, and how often are they right? 'Whoso is wise will ponder these things.'

It will be urged, I know, in some quarters, that these doubts are superfluous in face of the contemplated League of Nations which is to usher in the Millennium. It is a consummation devoutly to be desired. But quite apart from the fact that it postulates universal agreement, that it only means an organised alliance from which any signatory (like Russia) could break away, and that it really but re-establishes the Hague Palace which facilitated the War by lulling the anti-Germans, I would venture to submit two practical criticisms. It is proposed to 'refer' any national quarrel to the Common Council. Is it not obvious that while it is being 'referred' the strong man armed will cross the border? Again, no such pooling of forces to 'police' the world could prove effective without the sanction of those very armaments

to which 'Labour' is always and vehemently objecting. If you have a permanent force highly trained and organised why not keep it for your own defence? It is by mutual self-respect and a mutual understanding, backed by the strength of union, that nations, like families, will soonest live in peace. Mr. Asquith is pleased to call this 'the chapter of accidents,' but surely his own 'Wait and see' is their encyclopaedia. And in any case prevention is better than cure.

Meanwhile Mr. Thomas Atkins cannot be insensible to the genius of the spot, though these considerations will hardly appeal to him, and the austere grandeur of Jerusalem may touch him less than the memories of hymns. But the Psalms, the hymns of history, must rise to his recollection as he 'lifts his eyes unto the hills,' and the sight of Calvary will recall not only the Supreme Sacrifice but the world-crucifixion of to-day. He will know nothing of Tasso and *Jerusalem Delivered*, but listening to the prince-poet Isaiah he will remember that 'the desert shall blossom as the rose,' and, looking this Christmas on a freed Bethlehem, he will feel that the Child, whom no Herod could slay, has conquered, and that 'the government shall be upon His shoulder.'

WALTER SICHEL.

CAPITAL AND THE COST OF WAR

AMONGST the various expressions of what is called 'industrial unrest'—especially such 'unrest' as relates to the conditions of war-time, one of the most frequent has been the complaint that there has been a conscription of labour, but that there has not been, as there ought to be, a corresponding 'conscription of capital.' Without pausing to insist on the fact that the 'conscription of labour' is a totally meaningless phrase as applied to existing conditions, let us here confine ourselves to considering what is meant by the 'conscription of capital.'

Until it is analysed with reference to detailed facts, 'the conscription of capital' is a very effective cry by reason of its seeming simplicity; but such simplicity is the measure of the ignorance of those who adopt it; for the actual facts to which this cry relates are not simple, but in the highest degree complex. That such is the case has been realised, or strongly suspected, by certain trade-union leaders, one of whom submitted, not many weeks ago, the following judicious Memorandum to an official closely connected with the industrial politics of the moment. '*Very loose statements are constantly being made concerning wealth and its possible appropriation, particularly for the payment of debts incurred in connexion with the War. It would be particularly desirable to have some definite information as to the approximate amounts sunk in fixed capital, differentiating between machinery and land; the amounts invested in other countries, and the amounts that are fluid in the sense that they can be appropriated or transferred without involving the dislocation of industry or commerce, or the impoverishment of land.*'

The official to whom this Memorandum was communicated forwarded a copy of it to myself, suggesting that I might be able, in general terms at all events, to do something to elucidate the main issues raised. It so happens that, in a work called *The Limits of Pure Democracy*, now on the point of being published, I have devoted certain chapters to a discussion of these precise issues. They are, however, there treated with reference to questions wider than those here immediately involved; and in the following few pages I shall confine myself to the facts and

considerations which the interesting Memorandum just quoted indicates as those which are most directly pertinent to the exceptional problems of to-day.

I

The Quantitative Measure of Capital as compared with corresponding Income

The first thing to be realised in all discussions which relate to capital quantitatively considered, is that the conception of capital, as considered thus, is much more complex and ambiguous than the conception of annual income. Thus in the *Introductory Report on the Census of Production*—a volume issued only two years before the War, but referring to the year 1907—the authors show that whilst various and independent estimates of the income of the United Kingdom differed from one another by no more than 5 per cent., the various estimates of the capital corresponding to this income differed from one another by 33 per cent., and in some details by as much as 50 per cent. A partial explanation of these discrepancies may, the authors suggest, be found in certain ambiguities attaching to portions of the official statistics; but they are mainly due to the fact that with the same figures before them statisticians have computed capital values with a view to different objects, and on different suppositions with regard to social conditions generally.

Thus, if a man has an income, let us say, of 1000*l.* a year from shares in a manufacturing company, what his income means to him is a matter plain enough, for his daily experience shows him what he can get for it; but, if he wished to sell his shares and turn them into so much capital with a view to starting some business or other on his own behalf, what he could count on getting for these shares would not be equally evident. There might, for instance, be a likelihood that the company in the near future would suffer from the competition of better-equipped rivals; for which reason shares, which were still yielding 1000*l.*, might, a few years hence, yield but 700*l.*, 500*l.*, or even less. Their capital value, then, for any possible purchaser would depend on mere conjecture, and might prove to be indefinitely less than what for many years it had been. It would bear no fixed relation to the income at present derived from it. Again, for purposes of a mathematical calculus, certain incomes may be expressed in terms of a capitalised value which have no relation to realisable value at all; and to many possessions a capital value may be attributed, which they actually have under some conditions, but which under others they have not.

Sir Robert Giffen, for example, in computing the capital of the United Kingdom, included furniture and works of art, and the goodwills of individual businesses and professions. Furniture and works of art were capitalised by him at their computed selling value. The capital value of industrial and professional goodwills was taken by him as the sum of so many annual earnings at so many years' purchase. About twenty per cent. of his total was made up of these items. Now under normal conditions this procedure has a certain practical meaning, but under other conditions it has none. Let us begin with works of art, such for instance as great pictures. The number of great pictures in the galleries and private houses of England is large, and the value attributed to each is large also, as may be seen by the vast sums for which pictures, when lent to exhibitions, are insured. To each individual picture a certain capital value is attributed on the assumption that this value, realised by a money price, could be ultimately converted into, and exchanged for, some implement of production. But in war-time, when the vital question is how, for purposes of war, to raise the productive equipment of the entire nation to a maximum, no addition is possible by any transaction such as this. The nation would gain no new capital if at a war-bazaar in London a beautiful duchess induced a susceptible millionaire to give her 20,000*l.* for a portrait of her great-great-grandmother. The picture would be merely a means, so far as war is concerned, of inducing the millionaire to subscribe for national purposes what he might just as well have subscribed had the picture never been in existence. A similar observation applies to the goodwills of trades or professions. Sir Robert Giffen capitalised these at about 500,000,000*l.*; and this might be the total of the sums which these goodwills would have yielded if all of them were sold separately; but such sales, in war-time at all events, could only take place between residents in the same country. Certain London doctors, for example, might sell their practices to others for so much industrial capital; but the capital which the vendors gained the purchasing parties would lose. The capital stock would remain what it was before. It would not be possible for London doctors to increase it by selling their several practices to doctors in Berlin. Thus a great many things the value of which, when sold, is new capital for the particular persons who sell them, are not new capital for a nation. Indeed, for most practical purposes they are not capital at all. They are nothing more than a mathematical phantom.

And here we are led on to a consideration much more widely important, which the above examples will be of much service in illustrating. Even if the capital values attributed to works of

art and goodwills can be treated as actual capital for any purpose whatever, they can be so treated on one supposition only—the supposition that at any given time the number of persons who desire to sell them is limited. If, for the purpose of increasing the national stock, all persons possessing them were equally anxious to sell them at the same time, they could not be sold at all, and even the semblance of any capital value would disappear; for nobody would exchange a ship for the possession of a great picture if he knew that an hour later his one desire would be to re-exchange the picture for the ship, in order to put the latter at the service of the State or nation. If the State conscribed or borrowed all the great pictures in England, the only use it could make of them for any national purpose would be to exhibit them; but, so far as war is concerned, this use would be useless. Food would not be brought into the country, nor would battles be won in Flanders, by a loan exhibition of Old Masters in London. One doctor, about to retire, might sell his practice to another for the price of a motor-boat, which might be borrowed or conscribed by the Government. But if the Government conscribed or borrowed the computed values of the practices of all doctors simultaneously, what would there be to borrow or conscribe? The only result, so far as the State was concerned, would not be the acquisition of more usable capital, but merely the suppression of all medical practice, the doctors themselves being ordered not to cure the sick and wounded, but to drive goods trains, or load and unload coal-trucks; or else the State would be compelled to make them go on practising, and the collective forces of the nation would be just what they were previously.

Here is one way in which, for practical purposes, circumstances may alter the amount of a nation's capital if, like income, it is measured in terms of money; so that, though income may be constant, the proportion of capital to income, so far as a nation's needs are concerned, is indefinitely less in war-time than it practically is in times of peace. The fact remains, however, that despite all these considerations, a rich modern country such as the United Kingdom possesses a capital which, as measured like income, in terms of material utility, is at any given time expressible, as income is, in terms of money, so that the amount of the one may be compared with that of the other, all fluctuating or contingent elements being set aside. What, then, if thus regarded, is the total value of the capital of the United Kingdom to-day as expressed in terms similar to those which are used to express the amount and distribution, taxes included, of its current annual income? The most recent comprehensive information bearing on this question may be taken as relating to the decade

just preceding the present War; but for the purposes of our immediate discussion it will be sufficiently indicative of facts as they are now.

II

The Ratio of the Material Capital to the Income of the United Kingdom

The information just referred to is contained in the enormous volume called *The Final Report on the First Census of Production*, which represents the results of an inquiry of a kind never undertaken in this country before. It gives firstly in a series of minute analyses the net selling value of all the goods produced by the manufacturing, farming and other industries of the country in a certain given year, the values being those of the goods at the various places of origin. It deals, secondly, with the value added to these goods by the processes of commercial distribution, or the transference of these goods to the final buyers or users. Thirdly, it deals with the value of personal services—such as those of domestics, railway porters, the staff of the Post Office, teachers, doctors and so on, such values representing the material goods which those rendering the services actually get in exchange for them. The sum of all such values (which represent the material prices paid for material things, plus the prices of the material things which are given in exchange for services) is finally presented as the total income of the nation as it was in the year 1907.

This total income amounted to about 2,100,000,000*l.*, three fourths of which consisted of purely material commodities. About a quarter consisted of personal services, for which goods were given in exchange. Goods and services are things not wholly of the same order. It may, however, be assumed that the goods-price paid for a man's services tends to correspond with the goods which his efforts could have produced if, instead (say) of acting as a waiter, he had given his time to the raising of the chicken, pigs, or potatoes, which he brings to the consumers in the form of cooked dishes. Thus for both these elements of income we have substantially one common denominator.

To go farther into detail, out of a total income of rather more than 2,000,000,000*l.*, material goods represented about 1,600,000,000*l.*, of which 200,000,000*l.* or more represented the finished products of businesses owned by British residents, but situated in other countries, whilst the remainder—about 1,400,000,000*l.*—represented all the commodities produced by home manufacture or agriculture, as ready for home consumption, whether directly by the producers themselves, or by persons giving services in exchange for them. Finally to these elements

of material income must be added the use of dwelling-houses, as expressed in terms of rental, minus the cost of upkeep, though it would appear that in the *Census of Production* the use of houses by occupancy is classed as a service rendered. The net rent of dwellings and sites was about 100,000,000*l.*

Thus, if we deduct income from abroad, we may sum up the matter with rough but substantial accuracy, by saying that, of a home-produced income of 1,900,000,000*l.*, 1,400,000,000*l.* represented material commodities manufactured and agricultural, as finally offered for their enjoyment to the population of this country; that 100,000,000*l.* represented the use of houses; and that 400,000,000*l.* represented personal services, some of these being monopolised by the rich, but the larger part of them (such as education, medical attendance, travel by rail and tram, the carrying of letters, and so forth) being rendered to the people generally, and paid for, as already stated, out of the total of material goods.

III

The Material Substance of the Capital of the United Kingdom

What, then, apart from mere fanciful or other values, which may exist under certain circumstances but which disappear under others, are the material substance and amount of the capital corresponding to this income of 2,100,000,000*l.*, if both capital and income are measured in the same way, so as to render any comparison between the two amounts possible? The *Introductory Report on the Census of Production* deals not with ideas. It deals with material facts. Except in the case of unimproved land, of which the rental value is negligible, all capital is the product of human effort, just as are the consumable commodities, or in other words the income, in the production of which capital assists; and, with certain reservations, the Report computes capital in terms of the cost of construction. This means, for example, that, if a hundred men working as tailors add so much value in a day to the value of so much cloth, the value of the factory at which the cloth was woven would be proportionate to the number of days which the same men, if working as mechanics and builders, would have to spend in constructing the factory plant and buildings. The Census Report emphasises the nature of this method of computation by the fact that one of the means employed in reaching a general conclusion is an inquiry into the number of men whose efforts are necessary for the keeping of existing capital in repair.

The material capital of the country, then, being computed

in this way, its total amount, according to the Census, was about 4,000,000,000*l.*, or, we may say, roughly twice the national income. But this does not mean that the capital of the United Kingdom yields a consumable income of something like fifty per cent. Some three fourths of that income can, with very fair precision, be shown to consist of the earnings of direct effort—such as wages, salaries, the fees of professional men, and the profits of very small employers, in which interest on their little capitals is a hardly distinguishable element. If we deduct the interest identifiable as going to workers mainly manual, and also the interest on capital owned by British subjects abroad, the income going to the recipients in mere virtue of their possession of capital was approximately 300,000,000*l.*, which means a dividend of about seven per cent. In some cases, as the Census shows, the rate is much higher than this, in some cases much less; but the ratio of the capitalist income, if taken generally, to capital, is as 7 to 100. Of what, then, does this capital consist? Its main elements are agricultural land and its adjuncts, houses, mines and their mechanical equipment, factory plant, and factory buildings, railways, shipping, shops, and a certain stock of consumable goods in excess of immediate needs.

Now in what sense could material things like these, if conscribed or borrowed from their present possessors by the Government, be used in payment of war-costs as a supplement or an alternative to the taxation of current income?

Let us take, for example, houses. Except in the cases of those which the Government has annexed as offices, what use could it make of houses if it borrowed or conscribed them, other than the use which is made of them by the existing occupants? If it took them over as a loan, it would have to pay the owners an interest equivalent to the present rental. There would be a change in the form of the arrangement, but no change in its essence. If the Government, instead of borrowing the houses, 'conscribed' them, it might effect one proximate change at all events. It might remit all rents due from occupiers to present owners, and the occupiers would so far be the richer by the amount of the rents remitted. Each of them would to that extent have a certain extra income. But whether the State by this conscription of house-capital acquired any extra assets available for defraying the costs of war, or whether it gained none, would depend on what the occupiers did with this extra income when they got it. If they spent it in causing the production of more luxuries for their own consumption—let us say beer and fireworks—whereas the expropriated landlords had previously spent the same total sum on orchids, there would be a change for individuals in the distribution of luxuries, but the State, by its act

of conscription, would have raked in nothing which it would not have got before if the landlords, free of taxation, had been left to spend all their rental on whatever luxuries they pleased. The only way in which, by conscribing the capital represented by houses, the State could gain anything for the purposes here in question would be that of compelling the occupiers, as soon as their rents were remitted, not to spend them on their own gratifications, but return them unconditionally to the State—a process which, so long as it lasts, would be only a clumsy variant of the process of raising the same sum by taxation.

Let us take the case of ships. Let all the ships of this country be typified by a single vessel. The cost of constructing it—i.e. its capital value—might be fifteen times as great as the value of the services which it rendered by its voyages in a single year; but by conscribing its capital value the State could not enable it to perform the voyages of fifteen years in one. For purposes of war, all that the State could do would be to see that its cargoes consisted solely of necessaries, and that the importation of superfluous goods was prohibited. In this way goods-values might be secured for war-use which would ultimately be equivalent to the ship's capital value; but this capital value could be realised in annual instalments only—that is to say, by a virtual tax on income, spread over a period of something like fifteen years. And to all forms of productive capital such as factories of every description, the same rule applies.

To this rule, however, there is one conceivable exception. There is one way in which, by conscribing productive capital, the State might for the moment gain more than the normal income derived from it, and secure for the purposes of war the efforts, manual and mental, of a larger number of men. The way in question is that of applying to the purposes of war the efforts of those who are normally employed in keeping the capital in repair. Such a procedure would be precisely analogous to that which is often adopted by house-owners. Thus a man, let us say, receives for certain houses a gross rental of 700*l.* a year. The average annual cost of keeping these houses in repair would be 100*l.*, and, if he kept them in repair, his net income would be 600*l.* But in order to augment this net income, and keep (we will suppose) a chauffeur, he lets the repairs go, and for the moment increases his income to the extent of 100*l.* The results of this procedure may not be at first apparent; but if it is continued the houses become gradually uninhabitable. Their rental value falls, or one by one the tenants give up their tenancies, and finally the owner has no capital and no income at all. The same would be the case with ships, and the larger part of productive capital generally. The deterioration would go on with

increasing velocity; very soon there would be little of the original capital left; and the cost of replacing the productive capital which was lost would, owing to this very loss, be indefinitely greater than the first cost of constructing it.

The only species of material things which are capable of being used as capital, and the total capital value of which is capable of being used immediately, consists of consumable goods, such as food and necessary clothing, which, saved from the products of one year, remain ready for use during the next; and the value of these as capital (or in other words as aids to production) depends altogether on the manner in which they are applied. Let us suppose that these immediately consumable necessaries took the form of so many million packets of biscuits, preserved meat, milk, butter and beer, each packet representing one man's livelihood for a week. Now if each of the men amongst whom these packets were distributed did nothing in return for them, but remained (as he might do) idle, the mass of consumable necessaries would not be capital at all. It would not aid, on the contrary it would suspend, production. The only way in which it could be made productive, or, in other words, be invested with the qualities of capital, would be to place this mass of food in the custody of some body, whether consisting of private capitalists or the State, who, since the recipients for the time need no longer produce food, would deal it out to them on the condition that they produced certain other commodities and who also specified what these commodities should be. The proper name for hoards of consumable goods when dispensed in this way is wage-capital; and the productive function of wage-capital is this: it is that it enables the dispensers to ensure, not only that productive work of some sort shall be performed by the recipients in return for it, but also and mainly that this work shall be of certain kinds, and performed in the most efficient way.

Of this kind of saved wage-capital which, unlike machine-capital, is converted into income for the wage-earners in the very act of being used, the State might, by conscribing it, use the whole of its capital value immediately, thus expending as income in one year what it had taken many years to accumulate, and would take many years to replace. But the State might accomplish virtually the same results if, treating the reserve funds of the employers as so much current income, it appropriated these by the method of direct taxation. Relatively, however, to capital of other kinds, the amount of wage-capital existing at any given moment is small. Capital is, for the purposes of the present discussion, mainly such permanent and non-consumable things as railways, ships, machines, and factory-plant generally; and, as has just been shown, the conscription of such capital

would be nothing more than an appropriation, by means of taxes, of that portion of the annual goods-income of the country which was due to the aid of capital as distinct from the manual effort of the labourers, and the directive brain-work of the employers.

And yet, despite this fact, the conscription of capital would, if it could be carried out, have some special effect on the nation generally of some sort. What would the kind and extent of that effect be?

IV

The Net Results of a General Conscription of Capital

Let us suppose that, instead of conscribing the capital of the United Kingdom, the State borrowed an equal amount from America, and that such a loan took the material form of all the ships of that country, these being placed for the time in the hands of the British Government. If this country borrowed the ships, it would have to guarantee to America some interest, or compensation for that use of them which the American people would forgo, and they would at least expect that ultimately their ships should be sent back to them. If this country, having borrowed them from an ally or a friendly neutral, should refuse to send them back—if, in other words, it should 'conscribe' them—such a 'confidence-trick' would be an act of war unexampled in history. This country, if it conquered one enemy, would at once be at war with another. Such a procedure is practically unthinkable. But let us suppose that the British Government dealt in the same way with the capital of the United Kingdom. How would matters stand then? For it is the conscription of home capital which here mainly concerns us.

The State in conscribing home capital would, as has been shown already, not be conscribing in any practical sense the material substance of such things as machinery, but simply be conscribing the goods-income which such capital aids in producing, and also prescribing in war-time what the nature of the goods shall be—aeroplanes, for example, instead of chocolate-creams. When normal times returned, and things such as shells and aeroplanes were no longer necessary, all that the State could do would be to see that the goods-income resumed its normal forms, and hand it back to the nation for personal enjoyment as before. The sole new power which, by conscribing capital, it would acquire, would be that of determining the manner in which the 'conscribed' goods-income should be distributed.

The case may be put thus: If all the available capital were *lent* to the State, the sum total would constitute what is called a national debt; and if we regard the nation as one individual, this debt would be a debt which one man owed to himself, for the

interest paid to him by the State would necessarily come from taxes which he had himself paid, and he would only be getting back to-day what he had given to the State yesterday. As a matter of fact, however, home capital lent to the State is not contributed by one man. It is contributed only by some, and these contribute it in very unequal proportions. Some lend their thousands of pounds, others their hundreds or their fifties, others nothing at all; and thus the nation as a whole is not paying interest to itself as an undivided whole, but certain portions of the nation are paying interest to others. But if the State treated the capital, not as a loan, but as so much public property, it would still have to pay this interest (or whatever it might be called) to the nation, but would pay it without any regard to the amounts subscribed by, or rather taken from, individuals. The individuals who had wasted their substance, or who had produced so little that they had nothing which the State could appropriate, would be treated as on a par with those whose care and talents had created and saved the whole. The corporate resources of the nation, so far as income from capital is concerned, would be just what they would be otherwise. The only difference would be that the burden of the debt (as it would be from the State's point of view), or the income from capital (as it would be from the point of view of the citizens), would be largely shifted from one class to another.

These observations relate to income from capital only. They have, other things being equal, no relation to income from personal effort. What, then, in terms of income, would be the maximum effect on the individual citizens which a State conscription of all home capital could produce? It would, were it feasible, take something from the more capable few for the benefit of the less capable many. So much is obvious. It is the precise result which those who talk about the conscription of capital desire. The question is to what extent would the less capable many, in terms of income, be benefited? The very essence of income from capital, or the goods-income which capital produces, as distinguished from income produced by current effort, is that its source, such as the plant of a factory, is transferable from one man to another without the income itself being thereby lessened. Now according to the data provided by the *Census of Production*, the income from home capital of this country in the year 1907 was about 300,000,000*l.*, representing a dividend of some seven per cent., as against a total income of 2,100,000,000*l.*, the larger part of this total being the product of the manual and mental workers by whom the capital was used. That is to say, income from transferable property was about one seventh of the whole. The utmost, then, that the State, from the point of view

of the many, could do by treating all capital as its own (or, in other words, as the property of the nation generally), would be to credit every citizen with an absolutely equal share of it, which would mean a capitalist income of about 8*l.* per inhabitant. Now the average income per inhabitant minus this 8*l.* from capital would have been about 42*l.*; so if this were the whole of the story, for everyone whose income was otherwise below the average there would be a substantial gain in the proportion of 10 to 12. But, essentially connected with capital, there is another fact to be noted.

According to the *Census of Production*, there is an annual saving, or a conversion of income-goods into new capital, which goods are equal in respect of their value to the total income accruing from the use of existing capital itself. This is at present equivalent to a voluntary tax, not merely or mainly on income from capital (for were that the case all income from capital would be absorbed by it), but on the total income from capital and earnings together. At present some three fourths of these savings comes from the richer classes, the majority contributing only about 2*l.* per head; but if all capital were conscribed or distributed equally, the masses, who save at present to the extent of some 2*l.* per head, would have to save at an average rate of 8*l.* Thus their average gain, so far as current expenditure is concerned, would be not 8*l.*, but 8*l.* minus 6*l.*, so that the net gain of all whose incomes are at present below the average would, relatively to their present incomes, be only in the proportion of 10*l.* to 10*l.* 9*s.*

But those persons who advocate the conscription of capital would probably denounce the process of saving as unnecessary. Indeed, the constant advice of Socialists to the wage-earning classes is to scout the idea of thrift, to spend every penny of their earnings, and then clamour for more. To such denunciations of saving there are two answers, which are these: Firstly, as is pointed out in the *Census of Production*, much of the material capital of a country—such, for example, as scientific machinery—requires not only to be maintained 'in good physical order,' but much of it also requires to be entirely reconstructed, if any advance in production per head is to be achieved, new mechanisms being substituted for others which are not worn out, but obsolete. A considerable amount of savings is necessary for such reconstruction. The most important answer to denunciations of saving is, however, as follows: Every year in the United Kingdom some 380,000 persons, or 180,000 workers, are added to the population, and new capital, or material aids to production, must be placed at the disposition of these; for they will otherwise be no more able to work than a soldier will be able to shoot if he is not

provided with a rifle. It is shown by elaborate figures given in the *Census of Production*, that the mechanical equipment necessary for each new workman represents on an average a material capital to the value of some 250*l.*; and, if to this mechanical equipment be added houses for himself, his wife and children, the capital value or cost of his entire material equipment will, we may say roughly, be something in excess of 500*l.*, and the total capital which must be saved for equipment of these new workers collectively will be something like 100,000,000*l.* Further, we must include goods saved out of home income, and exported for the purpose of equipping British-owned industries abroad, of replacing machinery, which, though not worn out, is obsolete, and of adding to the home reserves of consumable goods generally. These are the principal elements of savings which amount in all to some 300,000,000*l.*

In a country, then, such as the United Kingdom, the population of which increases, and which aims at increasing the average wealth per inhabitant, savings are not optional, but obligatory. If individuals did not make them voluntarily for their own prospective advantage, the State in the interest of the nation would have to take them by force. Taking them by force would be the virtual equivalent of conscribing them. The more efficient citizens, who at present produce the larger part of them, would be robbed of nearly the whole of the future advantages which the present savings now promise to themselves; and the less efficient, who alone would gain anything, would, in respect of goods-income available for direct consumption, be richer than they are at present by an addition to their present incomes of not more than a fortieth. Such is the mouse that would issue from the labouring mountain.

The practical question which remains for consideration is this: whether the more efficient citizens, out of whose products in any case most of the savings must come, would continue to produce them if nine tenths of their property in these were forcibly taken away from them. This is a question which requires to be dealt with separately.

All that it has been possible to attempt in these few pages is to illustrate, outline, and call attention to, certain broad and salient facts which would render the conscription of capital a process, alike in its nature and immediate results, widely different from what it is imagined to be by the loosely thinking persons who demand it.

W. H. Mallock.

THE 'FREEDOM OF THE SEAS'

The paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and co-operation.—PRESIDENT WILSON'S Speech before the United States Senate, January 22, 1917.

Only an economic peace, with the freedom of the seas assured, will enable nations to live together in relations of lasting friendship.—Resolution of the Reichstag, carried by a majority of 98, July 19, 1917.

For Germany there is only one 'Freedom of the Seas,' which is the liberation of the sea from the tyranny of England. England's outrageous power must be broken for ever.—COMMANDER BIERBRAUER ZU BRENNSTEIN: *Ueberall* (semi-official naval monthly), December 1917.

It is our honest conviction that to-day we are fighting with the neutrals for their future rights on the sea. And therein lies the great significance of the U-boat warfare in the present struggle, that it will destroy the obsolete, harmful theory of the 'invincibility of sea power' which has hung like a sword of Damocles over the heads of the weaker sea Powers; and that it will tear the whip of hunger from the hand of English naval despotism for all eternity.—REAR-ADMIRAL CARL HOLLWEG: *Unser Recht auf den U-Bootskrieg*, Berlin, 1917.

IN the remarkable letter by which Lord Lansdowne aroused the bewildered attention of the world, he hazarded the surmise that an immense stimulus would probably be given to the peace party in Germany if it were understood, *inter alia*, 'that we are prepared, when the War is over, to examine, in concert with other Powers, the group of international problems, some of them of recent origin, which are connected with the question of "the freedom of the seas." ' English people will do well to take note of this declaration. The erstwhile Foreign Secretary was apparently in agreement on this matter with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr Michaelis, recent German Imperial Chancellors, with the Reichstag in its resolution of July 19, with Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, with Count Bernstorff, and with Herr Dernburg and a host of lesser German luminaries—in agreement also with President Wilson and with many exponents of opinion in the United States before their entrance into this War. Lord Lansdowne admitted that the formula implied by 'the freedom of the seas' was ambiguous, and capable of many inconsistent interpretations. He did not attempt to interpret it, but doubted whether it could be seriously contended that there was no room for profitable discussion of the subject. If nothing more were implied than an

economic pact, whereby no such restrictions of trade should be set up as were implied by the policy of the Spanish Government in its American possessions, and by the contentions advanced in the Behring Sea dispute and the claims of the Russians regarding the Sea of Okhotsk, many people might be willing to agree. But the German authorities who advocate this 'freedom' have no such ideas. Far from it. Their manifest object is to deprive the British Navy—which is itself the very symbol of 'the freedom of the seas'—of its chief means of exerting its power against its enemies.

In all the suggestions and declarations of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, and of the Reichstag parties which responded to his inspiration, this demand for 'freedom of the seas' recurred. 'The freedom of the seas must be assured,' said the resolution passed by the Reichstag majority. The same formula, perhaps with some difference of meaning, appealed most strongly to President Wilson, and was put forward by him just before the United States was brought into the War. The Dutch, too, being the countrymen of Grotius, lean to the same view, and have objected most forcibly to the restriction of their navigation by the extension of mine-fields or otherwise.

It is necessary that we in this country should watch these tendencies and purposes very attentively, because developments are in progress and a propaganda is at work. Peace we shall welcome, but above all things it must not be a peace which will shorten the arm of the Navy. When Germany is defeated, and the time comes for the discussion of terms of peace, the German representatives or plenipotentiaries will most certainly endeavour to arrive at a ground of understanding with the Americans and with any neutral influences which have suffered from the inevitable restrictions of the War. They will endeavour to secure support for their attack upon belligerent rights at sea.

It is important therefore that the subject should be well understood, because in the catchword of 'freedom of the seas' is expressed the enduring protest of all who have at any time suffered from the pressure of British Sea Power. Interference with neutrals in sea warfare has in the past caused much anxiety to British statesmen, who have had no choice but to authorise and support the exercise of such pressure. Our molestation of American shipping was the chief cause of the war of 1812. Our seizure of the German mail steamer *Bundesrat* during the South African War so inflamed public opinion in Germany that every objection of the Reichstag to naval expansion disappeared, and the High Sea Fleet came into being. Our blockade methods in the present War intensely irritated the Americans, until a greater irritation brought them to our side. By one of the greatest ironies of history,

the submarine activities of the Germans, who had been claiming the 'freedom of the seas' ever since our blockade began, were the reason for the coming of the United States into the War.

The trappers of the North, the farmers of Missouri, and the planters of the South may not know what they have to do with the British Navy or the German, or with the command or the freedom of the seas, but President Wilson proclaimed the 'freedom of the seas' to be of sovereign importance to his country. The conflict upon which he enters is directed, he said, to the suppression of a 'warfare against commerce,' which is, in effect, a 'warfare against mankind' and 'a war against all nations'—a war divested of all regard for the scruples of humanity, and of all 'respect for the understandings supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world.' He described German submarines as 'in effect, outlaws,' and as deserving to be dealt with as such. They had struck at the basis of 'International Law,' as he had declared we had struck at it in an earlier stage of the War, and they had done so with a license—the words are not his, but those of Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*—'of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed.'

> The principle of International Law [said the President] had its origin in an attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had the right of dominion, where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meagre enough results, indeed, after all has been accomplished, always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This minimum the German Government swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity, and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these.

England used her sea weapons with greater moderation. We had made mistakes perhaps; there had been no strenuous grip in the screw of our blockade, and we had traversed no great principle of International Law, as the German submarines had done. Now, indeed, the neutral rights of the United States were at stake. The moral consciousness of thoughtful American people was also deeply shocked by the new violence.

Little more than a week before the German submarine note was presented, the President had proclaimed to the Senate that the only peace worth guaranteeing 'by the organised major force of mankind' was a peace without victory, and that the 'freedom of the seas was a *sine qua non* of peace, equality and co-operation.' Now he is, it is true, seeking victory, but the root of his contention remains. 'The paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free,' he has declared. It was a rude awakening to be told that an American steamer—and this merely by favour of the German Government—could be permitted to proceed to

Falmouth, and to Falmouth only, provided that she arrived on a Sunday and departed on a Wednesday, and was bedizened with white and red stripes, that she flew a white and red chequered flag, besides being brilliantly illuminated at night, and that she pursued a course indicated by the German naval authority. Could there have been a sharper conflict between the conditions of the ideal and the real? President Wilson, like Dr. Primrose, had been all for liberty, 'that attribute of the gods.' He regretfully realised what is the fate of liberty and of the 'freedom of the seas' in time of war, especially when German officers sink ships and their cargoes, be they enemy or neutral, and often cast to the mercy of the elements those who journey in them.

The President had moved, in the earlier times of the War, through the serene domain of lofty theories, but touched bottom, so to speak, when he found that the freedom of the seas which Germany sought was quite unlike his own, and, in the words of Count Reventlow, uttered in Berlin on the 1st of February, was 'not an international but a German freedom,' a freedom, as the Count crudely explained, based upon the possession of Belgium and upon a powerful German fleet, 'able to withstand every hostile coalition.' New factors had obviously entered into the War, and the original factors had shifted to a different angle. The highly industrialised state of Germany, well equipped for every purpose of war, had demolished precedent and shifted the bearing of every known relation. Yet the basic facts remain unaltered. In a state of war, we may be quite sure that no belligerent will spare the other, either on land or sea, whatever neutrals may say. The Germans do not permit any doubt upon this point. Their Government, says President Wilson, denies the right of neutrals, not only to navigate within the area of the sea which it has proscribed, but to use arms therein, even in defence of rights which no publicist ever questioned before.

The question raised is of high importance, and most worthy of examination, more especially because of President Wilson's views upon the subject. In an article published in the *Philadelphia Ledger* on the 15th of March to which considerable importance was attached, because it was supposed to represent the view of the President and his circle on the subject of a future Peace Conference, it was stated that, 'where the question involved the limitation of armaments, or the freedom of the seas, then we should expect to have a voice in the settlement itself.'[1] It may seem the more necessary to investigate it because, on an occasion

[1] In the *North American Review*, May 1915, Mr. Norman Angell wrote: 'There is in England not the faintest realisation that the inevitable outcome of the present contraband and blockade difficulties will be an irresistible movement in America for the neutralisation of the high seas, or, failing that, the domination of the American Navy.'

in 1915, Viscount Grey caused some surprise and aroused adverse criticism by stating that the freedom of the seas might be 'a very reasonable subject for discussion, definition and agreement between nations after this War.'[2]

What, then, is this 'Freedom of the Seas'? Where did the phrase originate, and what is its meaning? Obviously, the limitation suggested would prove to be no other than a restriction and limitation of belligerent means, and, as such, not likely to be welcomed by the superior belligerent, possessing power to exercise pressure upon his enemy. According to some interpretations of 'freedom of the seas' it would banish war from the high seas; forbid warships and transports to navigate them; enable trade to proceed in time of war just as in time of peace, and set a ban upon the passage of war material. This view of the meaning of the formula is a digest of German views, as will presently appear. More modest, if hardly less objectionable, is the attitude of those who advocate the abolition of the old right of capture, with its almost inevitable corollary of the extinction of blockade.

At the Hague Conference of 1907, Mr. Choate, in the name of the United States, made proposals for the immunity of private property, and amongst those who supported him were the German delegate, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, and the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish delegates, all representatives of the present enemy Powers, while Great Britain, France, Russia and Japan, Allies in the War, were all for the retention of the ancient right. It was doubtless to the Hague Conference and to other diplomatic discussions that President Wilson alluded when he said that representatives of the United States had repeatedly advocated the freedom of the seas. But an immutable resolve to maintain at all costs our naval ascendency, and our right thereby to control all the sea communications and supplies of the enemy is, as Prince Bülow has said, 'the Alpha and the Omega of our policy.'[3] We therefore maintain the right to seize enemy property at sea, and are thus of necessity opposed to what is loosely called the 'Freedom of the Seas.' Mr. Choate, at the Conference of 1907, described the right as a survival of ancient piracy. 'C'est vrai,' said M. Triana, the Colombian delegate, very acutely, 'comme il est vrai que la guerre n'est que le meurtre organisé. Nous ne gardons ces droits que pour le moment où la normalité aura cessé.' Neither Mr. Choate nor M. Triana had foreseen the new form of piracy by submarine.

It matters not whether the potentate opposed to the great Sea Power be named Louis, or Napoleon, or William; the neutrals must dance to his piping. The Germans claim this 'freedom' as Napoleon did, when he, too, was confronted with a power at sea

[2] *The Times*, August 26, 1915. [3] *Deutsche Politik* (1916), p. 22.

which he could not break. On this subject the former Imperial Chancellor, speaking at the opening of the Reichstag, on the 19th of August 1915, declared himself as follows: 'For our own and other people's protection, we must gain the freedom of the seas, not as England did to rule over them, but that they should serve equally all peoples.' It is pertinent to remark, with reference to this statement, that under this much-contemned shield of British 'rule' over the seas, the immense trade built up by the Hamburg-Amerika and Norddeutscher Lloyd lines, and the enormous internal industries which the trade represented, flourished exceedingly, being altogether unfettered by any British action or exclusive policy at sea. It is, or should be, an elementary proposition that command of the sea, which is the means whereby enemy communications are controlled, has no existence or meaning except in time of war.

Before the date of this speech in the Reichstag, it had fallen to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to interpret his Imperial Master's views on the same subject. On the 7th of August 1915, the United Press of America had ventured to send a message to the Emperor, who was then at Warsaw, asking His Majesty to telegraph, 'at this moment of Germany's greatest triumph, an expression of the historic significance of the German victory in Poland, or a statement of the basis which Germany considers necessary to secure European peace;' and the Imperial Chancellor had replied, in the Emperor's name, that 'far across the frontiers of Germany this peace for which we are striving will guarantee to all nationalities the freedom of the oceans.'

Viscount Grey truly stated that the expression required a definition of its meaning which is sadly lacking in the statements of its most responsible advocates. It is an error of nations, and often of democracies, to attach a whole world of vague significance to an empty deluding expression. The real construction to be applied to the phrase seemed to be indicated in a statement of Germany's aims alleged to have been made by Count Bernstorff, who referred, *inter alia*, to 'an international agreement on freedom of the seas, guaranteeing that private property at sea should be immune from attack by naval forces.'[4] Here we are obviously near to the heart of the question. This is, at least, the only meaning that can be attributed to the phrase with anything like reason. There was a double significance in his appeal, because, while on the one hand the United States Government was at the time distressed by the methods of our blockade, which interfered with the private property of its subjects, on the other Germany was suffering severely from that same interference. It is quite clear that in the late Ambassador's view our blockade was

[4] *Chicago Tribune*, September 2, 1915.

iniquitous, because it directly contravened his demand for 'freedom of the seas.'

Herr Dernburg, when he resided in America, then the classic land of peace and detachment, sought diligently to establish a deep-seated identity between American and German interests, hoping thereby to win the sympathy of the American people. He acted instinctively in the spirit of Napoleon, endeavouring to separate England from the United States, and appealing for the very things touching freedom of the seas, *tempore belli* (and for many more) which were embodied in the Franco-American Convention of Mortfontaine, September 30, 1800. There was truth in President Wilson's saying in the earlier period of the War, that 'everybody engaged in the struggle had turned to America for moral judgments concerning it.' So came Herr Dernburg, most outspoken and at the same time most fantastic and ridiculous of all exponents of freedom of the seas. His views were expressed in a speech made in New York in January 1915, in the course of which he blandly told his audience that British 'navalism' was the one great obstacle to the peace of the world. That is the very character which we have applied to German 'militarism'! 'Freedom of the seas,' said Herr Dernburg, was the first requirement for the world's peace.

> The whole fight, and all the fight [he argued] is on the one side for the absolute dominion of the seven seas; on the other for a free sea—the traditional *mare liberum*. A free sea will mean the cessation of the danger of war and the stopping of world wars. The sea should be free to all. It belongs to no one nation in particular—neither to the British, nor to the Germans, nor to the Americans. The rights of nations cease with the territorial line of three miles from low tide. Any dominion exercised beyond that line is a breach and an infringement of the rights of others. . . . To prevent wars in the future we must establish that the free seas shall be plied exclusively by the merchant marine of all nations. Within their territory people have the right to take such measures as they deem necessary for their defence, but the sending of troops and war machines into the territory of others or into neutralised parts of the world must be declared a *casus belli*. . . . If that be done the world, as it is divided now, would come to permanent peace.

The freedom of the seas thus described would be a freedom after Count Reventlow's own heart. The frankness with which Herr Dernburg expressed himself—it was after dinner!—was amazing, for, by prohibiting the oversea transport of troops and military supplies, he would have rendered the United States powerless to hold the Philippines or the Panama Canal—or to strike a mighty blow at Germany on the Continent of Europe. In the simplicity of his heart he failed to allude to such matters! What he had in mind at the time was the iniquitous despatch of British armies to those parts of the Continent which the German armies were ravaging. The sea was to be free, but not the land.

Could there be a greater height of absurdity? And with what object did Germany build her High Sea Fleet?

But it is significant, as illustrative of a definite conception of German policy, that the former German Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in an interview made public in February, seemed to look at the matter from the same standpoint as Herr Dernburg, though with much colder calculation. He complained that Germany had been compelled to renounce her traffic overseas, and he wished England would renounce hers also, so that her merchant shipping would not be endangered by those singular agencies of peace, the German submarines! England and her Allies were to be compelled to make war 'on the same conditions as Germany and her Allies—that is without any imports from abroad.' We were to be intimidated or cajoled, according to this idea, into the renunciation of our oversea supplies, while Germany drew everything she could from the countries she invaded, and from every neutral who, by land, could furnish anything she required. The Under-Secretary brought us into touch with realities, while Herr Dernburg had left us in the clouds. Germany, as a belligerent, will not spare us anything she can achieve to our disadvantage, and now to the disadvantage of the United States. That 'freedom' of the seas of which she is the protagonist is her protest against our sea power; the submarine is the practical agency with which it is hoped to nullify that power and render nugatory our blockade.

It went to the very heart of Bethmann-Hollweg that he had to thwart and oppress the United States of America. Germany had never desired to attack the States, he said in the Reichstag on the 29th of March. England alone was to blame. We had transgressed 'the laws of humanity' by our blockade. Had not President Wilson himself denounced it as 'illegal and indefensible'? In the hope that we might return to a state of grace, Germany had restrained her submarine commanders, but instead we had intensified our misdeed! 'Then,' said the Chancellor, 'we took the unrestricted submarine war into our own hands; then we had to do it.' Herr Michaelis used almost identical language in the Reichstag on the 19th of July.

From the heated arguments of these times it is important and instructive to turn to the origin of the claim for 'freedom of the seas,' and to some of the conditions in which it has been pressed upon this country. Herr Dernburg referred to the traditional *mare liberum*. He knew well enough that such a freedom of the seas as the Germans sought would have been abhorrent to the mind of Grotius—an intolerable heresy. To cite the juridical interpretation of the *mare liberum*, based upon conditions which have long since passed away, and to urge its application to the undermining of our sea power, was to travesty the meaning of history.

Herr Dernburg and his friends could assuredly experience nothing of the divine enthusiasm which filled the Portuguese, Spaniards, Genoese, Englishmen, Dutchmen, Frenchmen and Danes, who explored and charted the oceans and made them free to all men. The free sea of Grotius had to do only with the prosecution of trade and navigation in the normal times of peace. He never argued against the law of contraband or the capture of private property; he maintained both. Notwithstanding the shadowy claim of England to a certain sovereignty of the neighbouring seas, implying a salute to our flag, we were for centuries the persistent exponents of the doctrine of the free seas in all seasons of peace. Those were ages in which there existed the idea of possession of the sea, as the land was possessed. Venice laid exclusive claim to the Adriatic, Genoa and France to parts of the Western Mediterranean, Denmark and Sweden to the Baltic, Spain to the Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico, and Portugal to the seas south of Morocco and to the Indian Ocean. Such ideas inevitably tended, as time went on, to attempts to restrict by legal means the free use of the seas. Henry the Seventh, strongly opposing such restriction, concluded with Philip, Archduke of Austria and Duke of Burgundy, in 1496, the famous treaty of the Intercursus Magnus, which gave to fishermen of all nations leave to fish where they would without need of licence or safe-conduct. Francis the First, too, in his letters of marque of November 1533 against the Portuguese, boldly affirmed the right to free navigation of the seas. Elizabeth asserted for England with the utmost insistence and vigour the right to navigate the open seas against the exclusive policy of Denmark and Spain. She could not have been other than an exponent and advocate of the freedom of the seas in times when English seamen were breaking the monopolies of Spain and carrying their shipping into every sea.

Grotius set out mainly to demolish one by one the pretensions of the Portuguese to exclusive trading and navigation in the waters of the Indies, which the redoubtable Jacob van Heemskerk had struck at by warlike measures in seizing Portuguese shipping. His arguments and others like them were concerned exclusively with peaceful trading and navigation. They did not prevent the attack and defence of commerce from being the essential feature in the three Dutch wars. The right of warlike capture was in full operation, and unquestioned, except when it was exercised without declaration of war, as by Charles the Second early in 1672. The great object of Tromp, De Ruyter and the other Dutch admirals in the wars with England was to secure the safe issue of their outward-bound convoys from the narrow seas, and to safeguard the home-coming of their merchant fleets from foreign ports, while doing their utmost to seize our shipping in

the Mediterranean and to interfere with our coastwise traffic in the North Sea. No legislators of those times ever thought of applying theories on sea dominion and fishing and trading rights to the conditions of war.

The naval wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were all rooted in the destruction of trade or the safeguarding of it, or were of the nature of colonial wars, waged with the object of securing the advantage of colonial trade. The War of the Spanish Succession was the golden time of the French privateers, who practised the *guerre de course* against our shipping. It did not enter into the mind of anyone to exempt trade from attack by any legal instrument or agreement. Spain withered under the restriction and destruction of her shipping and trade. A sober-sided Dutchman in the seventeenth century described the West Indies as the 'stomach for Spain.' Dutch ships could carry Spanish supplies in peace but were subject to capture in war. The Spanish Government depended upon the slender stream of her silver mules, bringing the precious metal from the mines, and upon the silver galleons which carried her treasure to her ports. More than once the loss of galleons paralysed her activities. Her ships were chased and captured at sea, and her ports became objects of attack; and finally the destruction and restriction of her floating trade, and the loss of her possessions through the failure of her shipping, were the cause of her impotence and general decay.

It was during the Seven Years' War that we first began to be described as the 'tyrants of the sea.' The Spanish colonial empire crumpled up like a leaf. The victories of Hawke and Boscawen, the downfall of French rule in Canada, the breaking of French power in India, the immense increase of commerce we reaped, and the policy by which we rigorously employed our belligerent rights against offending neutrals, made us the first of world powers, but caused us to be more feared than loved. There was freedom of the sea neither for ourselves nor our enemies in war, and in that very war our trade suffered heavily, probably even more heavily than that of our adversaries. Martinique was the centre of French privateering enterprise in the West Indies, and it is said that before Rodney, in concert with land forces, reduced the island, 1400 of our merchantmen had been captured in that region. Yet we never sought to avoid payment of the 'price of Admiralty,' and so vast was the value of our oversea commerce that comparatively little impression was made upon our world position, and, at least until the end of Pitt's administration, our credit was fully maintained. Moreover—and the point is important at the present time—in those wars we built shipping to replace that which was lost. This was a cardinal prin-

ciple of our policy. We did not seize shipwrights to fill the Army and leave the shipyards without sufficient labour as was done in the early part of this War.

During the Seven Years' War, those nations which had sought to use the advantage of trade with our enemies began to take counsel amongst themselves against our universal control of the sea. That freedom of the seas which President Wilson described as the necessary basis of peace was in the minds of all neutrals in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Pitt foresaw that the Northern Powers might unite in armed alliance to protect their trade. The Dutch and the Danes were already shaping ideas towards the creation of a maritime union for the assertion of neutral rights, and Pitt set to work to avert the danger by exerting counsels of moderation upon the Prize Courts and limiting the action of privateers. Yet so strong was the feeling in neutral countries, and such the grouping of Powers, that in the year 1780 the First Armed Neutrality came into being. Russia issued a declaration of neutral rights, and Sweden and Denmark adhered, Spain, France, Holland, the United States and other Powers subsequently coming into the same grouping. The object of this movement on the part of neutrals, joined by belligerents, and of the Armed Neutrality of December 16, 1800 (Russia, Sweden and Denmark), was to set a limit to the full exercise of our maritime power, and the contentions put forward were substantially those embodied in the modern German claim, stripped of its wild absurdities, and in the declaration of President Wilson. Sir Francis Piggott has very ably analysed, in this Review, the genesis and character of the Armed Neutralities,[5] and therefore little shall be said about them in this article, but it is admissible to point out that the adherence of France, Spain, Holland, and the United States to the First Armed Neutrality was in the nature of an act of hostility, for they were not neutrals, but at war with us, and that therefore their action cannot be taken as an indication of settled policy on the situation of neutrals in naval warfare.

It is very important to consider the attitude of the First Consul in the period before the Second Armed Neutrality was concluded, because of its close analogy to the attitude of Germany at the present time, especially with relation to rebellion against our sea supremacy. Some account of it shall therefore be given here. Peace was ever on Bonaparte's lips, on grounds of reason and humanity, but, as M. Driault says, there was in his expressions 'plus de sensiblerie que de sincérité,'[6] and Pitt, like Cicero, replied 'Pacem nolo, quia infida.' From the very battlefield of Marengo,

[5] 'Sea-Power and the Armed Neutralities,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, April, July, and September 1917.

[6] *La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul, 1800-1803* (1912), p. 37.

on the 16th of June 1800, Bonaparte wrote to the Emperor and King calling upon His Majesty to put an end to the disorders of the Continent and to hear the cry of humanity. The equilibrium of Europe was not menaced, he said, by France, but 'by the power of England, which had so seized upon the commerce of the world and the *empire des mers* that alone she could resist the united navies of the Russians, Danes, Swedes, French, Spanish and Dutch.'[1] This appeal was directed primarily to the isolation of England and the destruction of her sea power. A little later, when an armistice was projected, Talleyrand put forward the singular proposal that during its continuance the seas should be free to French shipping, in the sense that Malta and Alexandria should be revictualled, and the blockade of Flushing, Brest, Cadiz and Toulon be raised. This extraordinary proposition naturally caused the preliminaries to break down.

The First Consul continually exerted himself to describe us as the tyrants of the sea. The several ambitions of France and Russia in the Mediterranean were contradictory, but the Tsar Paul was on his side in protest against 'la barbarie britannique.' Bonaparte always posed as the champion of the freedom of the seas, and the official papers of the French navy at the time were adorned with a representation of the Republic grasping the helm of a vessel on which, in bold characters, were inscribed the words 'Liberté des Mers.' It was mainly by this advocacy, which foreshadowed the efforts of the Germans in these days, that he brought the United States into alliance against us by the Convention of September 30, 1800. We were fighting then for sea supremacy, as the condition of our political existence, and the First Consul's efforts were directed to its destruction. His outburst at the breach of the Peace of Amiens was the measure of his intentions. Something more than two years later, in December 1805, when he declared his resolution to drive the Bourbons out of Naples and take possession of their Kingdom, he denounced us in a proclamation to his soldiers: 'Marchez!' he said; 'Précipitez dans les flots les tyrans des mers!'

English people were well acquainted with the persistency of Napoleon, both as First Consul and as Emperor, in representing us to the neutrals as maritime tyrants. In James Stephen's *War in Disguise*, 1805, there is a reference to this matter:

> The usurper's favourite topic of late has been the liberty of navigation; he would be thought the champion of the common rights of all maritime States. . . . Yes! he will clamour for the freedom of the seas, as he did for the freedom of France, till his neutralising friends shall have placed him in a position to destroy it. . . . Those who have sublimated their imaginations so far as really to think that war ought in justice and mercy

[1] *Correspondance*, vi. 365.

to be banished from the boisterous ocean, that it may prey the more and the longer on social cities or quiet plains, are not likely to descend with me into the regions of sober investigation.'

So persistent and successful was Napoleon in representing us as the enemies of the nations, that our 'naval tyranny' is denounced in much serious French literature. The following is M. Driault's picture of us, wherein it will be remarked how close is the analogy, except in regard to the pressing of men, between his accusation and those which have been made against us during the present War:

Il est certain que l'Angleterre affirmait alors sur les mers une tyrannie insupportable; comme au temps de l'insurrection des Etats-Unis, elle s'attribuait un droit de visite sur les vaisseaux neutres, sous prétexte de vérifier s'ils ne transportaient pas de contrebande de guerre; elle considérait comme contrebande à peu près tout ce qui pouvait être utile, même très indirectement, à des belligérants, non seulement de la poudre ou des armes, mais aussi des vêtements et des grains, et elle confisquait les marchandises suspectes en telle quantité qu'on put l'accuser d'y chercher des ressources pour subvenir à ses frais de guerre. Elle déclarait bloqués des ports ennemis qui ne l'étaient pas effectivement, afin d'y pouvoir interdire tout arrivage de marchandises étrangères, et elle se donnait le droit de saisir tout navire neutre à la sortie ou à l'entrée d'un port en réalité libre; elle pouvait de la sorte fermer tout un grand pays, ou au moins toute une longue ligne de côtes au commerce des neutres, qui ne pouvait pas manquer d'en souffrir des pertes importantes. Mais le pire 'barbarie' des guerres maritimes de ce temps était sans doute le système de la presse, que l'Angleterre pratiqua avec une véritable cruauté: un navire de guerre anglais entre de vive force dans un port ennemi ou dans un port neutre; son équipage tombe comme une bande de pirates sur la population des matelots, des pêcheurs, en cerne un grand nombre, les presse, les pousse, les embarque de force, pour assurer l'armement de nouveaux navires. C'est ainsi que jadis dans les ports français, par exemple, se recrutaient

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* *War in Disguise, or the Frauds of the Neutral Flags*, by James Stephen, 1805. Reprinted from the third edition (1806). Edited by Sir Francis Piggott, 1917. I am indebted to the appendix to Sir Francis Piggott's valuable reprint of this significant treatise for the following extracts from the *Moniteur* of 1805, showing the manner in which Napoleon posed as the champion of unrestricted navigation in time of war. August 15: 'Vous êtes l'ennemi de tous les peuples et tous les peuples réjouiraient de votre humiliation.' August 16: 'Elle (l'Angleterre) ne met aujourd'hui plus de bornes à ses violences. Personne désormais ne pourra naviguer que pour son compte, et pour colporter les seules denrées de son commerce. Et cet ordre de choses, si humiliant pour tous les Etats, ne fixerait pas l'attention des Puissances du monde!' September 11: (A speech of M. Bacher, French Chargé d'Affaires at Ratisbon, pointing out to Austria the dangerous course she was pursuing.) The Emperor, he said, 'livré tout entier aux opérations d'une guerre qu'il n'a point provoquée, qu'il soutient autant pour les intérêts de l'Europe que pour les siens, et dans laquelle son principal but est le rétablissement de l'équilibre dans le commerce et l'égale souveraineté de tous les pavillons sur les mers, a réuni toutes ses forces,' &c. The identity of these contentions with those placed before the United States before the latter came into the War will not escape anyone.

les équipages des vaisseaux français; l'Angleterre est peut-être seule à avoir appliqué cet odieux régime dans des ports étrangers.'

It is well known that the effort to destroy our naval supremacy was the main purpose of the Treaty of Alliance of Tilsit, July 7, 1807. The Russians had been defeated at Friedland and the Emperors met on the famous raft in the Niemen. Vandal reports the statement that Alexander's first words when he met Napoleon were 'Sire, je haïs les Anglais autant que vous!' to which Napoleon replied 'En ce cas, la paix est faite!'[10] In reality, Alexander seems to have thought that our despotism at sea was no more dangerous than Napoleon's despotism on land, though willing to take his stand, like Napoleon, as an advocate of 'freedom of the seas.' The French Emperor required his aid to 'assure the peace of the world by a maritime peace and to menace the English, or at need to fight them, and raise the Continent against them.' The important provision was made in the fourth and fifth articles of the Treaty of Alliance, in which it was laid down that, unless we consented to peace before the 1st of the coming November, recognising that the flags of all nations should enjoy equal and perfect independence at sea, and restored the conquests we had made since the year 1805, Russia would make common cause with France, and the Courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm and Lisbon would be called upon to recall their Ambassadors to our Courts and declare war upon us, and if Sweden refused, Denmark would be compelled to declare war upon her. As is well known, Canning heard of what was in progress, and a combined naval and military expedition was despatched to Copenhagen, whereby the Danes were compelled to capitulate, and to surrender their fleet, which was retained by us until the conclusion of the European War. To this Review Major Sir John Hall recently contributed a highly interesting article on the means by which Canning gained the information that enabled such prompt and effective action to be taken.[11]

We are indebted to the Poet Laureate, in a letter to *The Times*,[12] for a masterly translation of Fitche's famous account of Napoleon, with Freedom of the Seas on his lips and Overlordship of the Seas in his heart. Napoleon, says Fitche, was endowed with the two elements of heroism—calm perspicuity of intellect and firmness of will, but these were irradiated with no

[9] *La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul* (1912), p. 151.
[10] *Napoléon et Alexandre I.*, i. 58.
[11] 'A New Clue to the Mystery of Tilsit,' by Major Sir John Hall, Bart., *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1916.
[12] February 7, 1917.

inkling of the moral vocation of humanity, which seemed to him a blind lump, either stagnant or moving in disorder. He thought that rare spirits were born at long intervals, 'the like of Charlemagne, and of none other but himself after Charlemagne,' and thus, deeming himself a master spirit, 'the very godlike and holy, the first principle of motion in the world's history,' he set great forces in motion.

> And the most immediate indispensable tool of his ordinance was at this moment 'The Freedom of the Seas,' as he said, but thereby intended the 'Overlordship of the Seas' in his own hands; and for this most important aim, determined by his world-law, all the happiness of Europe must be sacrificed, all its blood flow—since for that purpose only was it there; and this mighty world-plan, which indeed overstretched the scope of one lifetime, should be carried on after him by his dynasty, so long as until, maybe in another thousand years, another inspired hero might spring up, a new incarnation of the type of himself and Charlemagne.

This study of the history of the claim for 'freedom of the seas' might have been carried much further, but enough has been said to lead to two definite conclusions. The first is that when the Germans appeal to ancient pleas for *mare liberum*, as put forward in the writings of Grotius and others, they misrepresent the demands of those times, and apply to their present purpose, which is the restriction of our maritime power in war, contentions which were made in protest against deprival and embargo in time of peace, in an age when there still survived some belief in a right to appropriate areas of seas or oceans, in the sense of inhibiting nations from the enjoyment of the trade of the colonies or territories which lay beyond them. The exclusive policy of Spain in the West, of Portugal in the East, and of Denmark in the North, was contested by the French, the Dutch and ourselves. When Selden produced his *Mare Clausum*, devoting his keen intellect, immense erudition and powers of marshalling evidences to a legal argument which flattered the vanity of the King, by appealing to the half-legendary glories of Plantagenet and other times, he was fighting for theories which became more and more unreal with every year that passed. Going back to the Scriptures and the *jus divinum*, he traversed every century in which national ambition has laid claim to the possession of the seas, and in which English Kings had been described as Lords of the Sea. He enunciated a claim for the sovereignty of the English seas, and, contrary to the spirit of the Intercursus Magnus, maintained our right to forbid the fishing and even the navigation of foreigners in our waters. All that remains of this elaborate and learned argumentative legal structure, related as it undoubtedly was to

shadowy notions of strategy and sea command, not to be obtained by any legal means, is the national right of the country to its own territorial waters and estuaries, and, in regard to fishery and other jurisdictions, to exclusive rights to shore waters within the three miles limit.

The other conclusion at which we arrive is that indicated by Fitche in the extract given above. During and subsequently to the Seven Years' War, and more especially when we were confronted by the vast combinations of Napoleon, we were the great Sea Power, compassing our purposes in every part of the world, except in the time when we lost our American colonies. We exerted our belligerent rights to the full, but rarely with excess, and our fleets ranged every sea, exerting our influence of compression and control against which military force often strove in vain. It was the consciousness of powerlessness felt by our enemies and rivals that caused us to be denounced as the tyrants of the sea, and led to that demand for freedom of the seas, which, as Fitche indicated, would mean the passing of the control of the seas from our hands into those of others. That freedom of the seas, that liberty of the oceans, for which the Germans have declared they were fighting, means in reality the destruction of our maritime influence in war. The object was, if it were possible, to range the neutrals in opposition to us, as in the times of the Armed Neutralities, and thus to curb that power at sea which Germany herself is unable to curtail.

President Wilson, before he was driven by outrage to his great resolve, proceeding from his then detached standpoint, put forward similar ideas, looking forward, if one rightly interpreted his meaning, to a time when the private property of belligerents and neutrals alike would be exempt from capture. Will the entry of the United States into the War change the view of the President and of the law officers of the United States? It seems highly improbable that a ruling feature of the President's policy will be abandoned by him at the close of the War. We may certainly expect the question of 'Freedom of the Seas' to be raised at the conference which will terminate it.

To interrupt or utterly destroy our enemy's commerce at sea has at all times been regarded as a highly important function of the Fleet. Such operation may, and in former times has, on occasions, decided the issue of war without land operations being involved at all. Admiral Mahan, in telling phrases, described the silent effect of sea power as the most formidable mark of its working. Blockade and capture are operations on which we have relied throughout the present War. Upon their ruthless submarine warfare, which they denominate as 'blockade,' the

Germans depend as a means whereby they hope we may be compelled to relinquish our objects in the War. If there had been 'freedom of the seas' the Germans would have received ample supplies in their own and neutral ships through neutral ports and perhaps even through their own ports. Blockade itself would have been abolished, and there would have been free entry for everything that the enemy required. There is futility in proposals of this nature, blockade and capture being of the very essence of naval warfare.

Lord Loreburn, who argued that 'commercial blockade, which aims at impoverishing the civil population and arresting its industry, should be abolished'—confessed that he could not understand why a soldier should be forbidden to seize, say, 1000 bushels of wheat, unless he absolutely needed the supply and paid for it, while a naval officer might seize any merchant ship, and whatever might be in her, bullion, jewels, wheat or anything else, without the least suggestion that he had any real need of these things. 'What is the difference,' he asked, 'between 1000 bushels of wheat in a ship and 1000 bushels in a barn?'[13] The answer to this, and to other like questions, is that sea warfare differs entirely from land warfare. How, in this War, have not the forecasts of those been falsified who, like Lord Loreburn, said 'Put it how you will, the truth is that private property is respected by the laws of land warfare, and is not respected by the laws of war at sea'! An army may occupy a country, use its resources, make exactions from its people, and employ against its populations the extremities of military cruelty, under any kind of pretext, and in conformity with a 'Kriegsbrauch' or other instrument. It may besiege cities, cut off their water supplies, lay waste the surrounding tracts, reduce their inhabitants to famine, and bring them to misery and destruction. This invading army may pursue the national army, and destroy it in battle, or cause its surrender, or drive it over the land frontier of its country. A fleet cannot do any of these things. It can occupy nothing, and has no power of land action outside the range of its guns. It has no means of bringing the enemy to action, if that enemy, as in the present War, chooses to remain in fortified ports. All it can do is to hold communications of the enemy and maintain its own. It operates in an element that gives it a long reach, and enables it at times to exercise influence where it is never seen. There is nothing comparable in its action to the operations of an army.

That is why the British Empire can admit no so-called 'freedom of the seas.' The right of blockade and capture will be abandoned only with the abolition of war itself. 'For two hundred years,' wrote Admiral Mahan in his classic work, *The*

[13] *Capture at Sea*, p. 165.

Influence of Sea Power on History, 'England has been the great commercial nation of the world. More than any other her wealth has been entrusted to the sea in war and in peace; yet of all nations she has ever been most reluctant to concede the immunities of commerce and the rights of neutrals. Regarded not as a matter of right, but of policy, history has justified the refusal, and if she maintains her Navy in full strength, the future will doubtless repeat the lesson of the past.' Elsewhere, speaking of the Great War of former times, he said that it was the glory of Pitt that, as he discovered the object 'security,' so likewise he foresaw the means 'exhaustion' by which alone the French propaganda of aggression could be brought to a pause. We uphold the doctrines of blockade, capture and exhaustion because their efficacy has been exemplified many times by the logic of facts, and is exemplified a hundredfold in the present War. We naturally argue that a serviceable weapon should not be abandoned until circumstances emerge over which we have no control that may render it obsolete.

In the last analysis the movement for the surrender of the right of capture and the freedom of the seas is based on a conception of war grotesquely at variance with the object for which war is undertaken. We associate warfare with a wastage of human life. But the murderous aspects of the battlefield should not mislead us. If there existed some humane method of paralysing hostile armies until our aims were accomplished, the nation would not permit of killing for killing's sake. Life is taken, just as property at sea is seized, with the sole view of weakening the enemy and compelling him to yield to his adversary's demands or relinquish his own. That is why ports are blockaded and towns besieged. The capture of private property at sea is really a humane method of exercising the pressure of war. It is infinitely more merciful than are the methods of military operations on land. Moreover, if we were so foolish as to give up the rights of blockade and capture, the sequel would be that, in addition to a Navy required to keep the seas against all comers—for international laws in time of war have about as much binding force as ropes of sand—we should have to maintain an Army permanently on the Continental model, in order that we might exercise on land the degree of pressure we had foolishly forfeited on the sea.

We know well that behind all legal enactments restricting naval operations there must be power, and that no power exists except naval belligerent power. Since the Germans proclaimed a new 'blockade,' the blockade by submarine, carrying the ruthlessness of land warfare into naval operations, we have heard less of their claim for 'freedom of the seas.' But whenthe submarine campaign has been suppressed, as we believe it will be, and especially when the Conference meets at the close of the War, we shall hear

of it again. This country can have no parley with its advocates. By the Navy we stand or fall. We cannot permit any element of its power to be diminished or undone. Many centuries of our history justify and demand the fulness of its exercise. Not seldom in times of peace it has lain between the weak nations and aggression. Behind it the Monroe doctrine itself was evolved and maintained. To describe it as the oppressor of freedom is to fly in the face of facts. When is the sea not free? Only in time of war, and in that dread time nothing must be allowed to diminish the full efficacy of naval power.

JOHN LEYLAND.

The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY *cannot undertake to return unaccepted MSS.*